Case Information
*1 Before S MITH , W IENER , and O WEN , Raymond Richardson sued the United
Circuit Judges. States Postal Service (“USPS”), alleging em- ployment discrimination and constitutional vio-
P ER C URIAM : [*] lations. The district court granted the USPS’s
motion for summary judgment, and we affirm. [*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has de- The Postal Service has employed Richard- I. son, who is black, as a mail handler since termined that this opinion should not be published 1985. In January 1997 Richardson suffered a and is not precedent except under the limited cir- stroke. A few months later, his two doctors cumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. *2 completed a “request for a light duty assign- Richardson’s second statement in which he ment” on his behalf and stated he was ready to alleged race discrimination under title VII, 42 return to work, but the reports contained dis- U.S.C. § 2000e-16, et seq. , disability discrimi- crepancies. The doctors wrote new reports, nation under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. both of which stated Richardson had difficulty § 794, et seq. , and due process violations un- with speech and comprehension. Richardson der the Fifth Amendment. He asserts that he then underwent a fitness-for-duty exam at the suffered these ills from March 1997, when his direction of the USPS. The examining doctor doctors released him to return to work after recommended that he not lift over fifty his stroke, until January 1998, when he re- pounds or operate or be around heavy equip- sumed work. More specifically, he claims in- ment. jury from the USPS’s failure to grant his re-
quest for light duty and its insistence on his Based on the doctors’ requests and the ex- second fitness-for-duty examination, which am report, the USPS in July 1997 denied Rich- delayed his return. In his briefs on appeal, ardson’s request for light duty, because “[a]ll Richardson asserts claims beyond those in- examinations still indicate that you have diffi- volved in the summary judgment ruling, but cultywith comprehension/understanding. This we limit our discussion to the issues resolved may present a safety problem in our work.” by the district court. After a second fitness-for-duty exam in De-
cember 1997, also scheduled by the USPS, II.
Richardson was notified to report back for We apply the familiar standard of review of duty in January 1998, and he resumed his summary judgments.
work.
We review a grant of summary judgment de After pursuing relief through administrative novo , applying the same standard as the channels, Richardson, proceeding pro se district court. A motion for summary judg- sued, alleging discrimination based on disabil- ment is properly granted only if there is no ity, hostile work environment, interference genuine issue as to any material fact. An with Family and Medical Leave Act leave, vio- issue is material if its resolution could affect lations of procedural due process, and breach the outcome of the action. In deciding of contract. Unable to decipher Richardson’s whether a fact issue has been created, we claims, the district court ordered him twice to must view the facts and the inferences to be file statements outlining the specific claims he drawn therefrom in the light most favorable was asserting. to the nonmoving party.
The court based its summary judgment on Roberts v. Cardinal Servs. , Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
First, Richardson’s contention that the granted summary judgment. “An individual USPS discriminated against him because of his with a disability is any person who (1) has a race fails because he offered no evidence that physical or mental impairment which ‘substan- the USPS’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea- tially limits one or more of such person’s ma- son for its adverse employment decision was jor life activities’; (2) has a ‘record’ of such an false or pretext for illicit discrimination. Under impairment; or (3) is ‘regarded’ as having such McDonnell Douglas ’s burden-shifting frame- an impairment.” [5] work, [3] Richardson must establish a prima fa-
cie
case of discrimination.
Frank v. Xerox
Richardson offered no evidence that his im-
Corp.
,
must also be permanent or long term.” Toyota Assuming without deciding that Richardson Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams , 534 U.S. established a prima facie case, he did not dem- 184, 198 (2002).
onstrate that the USPS’s reason for refusing to
assign him light-duty work or for requiring him Richardson does not even allege that his to undergo a second fitness-for-duty examine impairments prevent or severely restrict major was pretext for discrimination. The USPS life activities, and the evidence suggests that claimed that Richardson’s comprehension limi- his do not. His doctors and the examinations tations posed a safety problem, and Richard- all concluded his ability to lift was not sub- son offered no evidence that this nondiscrimi- stantiallyimpaired, and none suggested that his natory reason was false or a pretext. He failed comprehension limitations prevented or se- to meet his burden under McDonnell Douglas verely restricted activities that are of central so summary judgment on this issue was not importance to most people’s daily lives. Thus, error.
*4 the district court did not err in its conclusion
Richardson is not disabled under the first
prong.
Similarly, Richardson presented no evi-
dence that there was a record of an impairment
that substantially limited a major life activity,
so he was not disabled under the second
prong. His best evidence that the USPS re-
garded him as having an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity is the fact
that the USPS did not permit him to work.
Nonetheless, “[a]n employer’s belief that an
employee is unable to perform one task with
an adequate safety margin does not establish
per se that the employer regards the employee
as having a substantial limitation on his ability
to work in general.” Chandler v. City of Dal-
las
,
Without more evidence, Richardson failed
to present evidence that the USPS regarded
him as disabled. Because he was not disabled
under the Rehabilitation Act, his claim of dis-
crimination because of disability was correctly
dismissed at summary judgment.
Finally, Richardson complains of a violation
of his constitutional procedural due process
rights. Without reaching whether he can assert
such claims given the statutory remedies avail-
able to him, we agree with the district court
that Richardson has not offered evidence that
any of his procedural rights was violated. He
had access to and was heard by both adminis-
trative and judicial bodies, which addressed
his claims.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
[1] The district court’s ruling outlines Richard- son’s successes and failures before the Equal Em-
[2] The district court explicitly stated that these ployment Opportunity Services and the Merit Sys- tems Protection Board. Our disposition in this three claims were the only claims at issue before it. opinion does not require recounting those proceed- It summarily dismissed other claims Richardson ings. had previously raised.
[4] (...continued) Second, Richardson urges that the USPS (5th Cir. 1997) (“To qualify for relief under the discriminated against him because he is dis-
[2] Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove that abled. Richardson, however, has not made the
[3] (1) he is an ‘individual with a disability’; (2) who requisite showing that he is disabled as defined
[4] is ‘otherwise qualified’; (3) who worked for a ‘pro- by the Rehabilitation Act,
[4] so the court rightly
[5] gram or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
[6] tance’; and (4) that he was discriminated against
[7] ‘solely by reason of her or his disability.’ 29
[8]
[3] McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S.C. § 794(a); Chandler v. City of Dallas
[9] U.S. 792 (1973).
[10]
[4]
Hileman v. City of Dallas
,
[5]
Hileman
,
[1] (continued...) § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1997)).