46 F. 843 | U.S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illnois | 1891
This is a suit on a policy issued by defendant, whereby it assured the life of Frederick Richardson, the husband of plaintiff, against death by accident, in the sum of $6,000, payable to plaintiff. The proof shows that Mr. Richardson died at the Hotel Grace, in the
“(4) This insurance does not cover disappearances; nor suicides, sane or insane; nor injuries of which there is no visible mark upon the body; npr accident, nor death, nor loss of limb or of sight, nor disability, resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from any of the following causes, or while so engaged or affected: * * * Taking poison; contact with poisonous substances; inhaling gas.”
It seems very clear to me that, on the admitted facts in this case, defendant cannot be held liable. It is admitted that the death of the assured was caused by the inhalation of illuminating gas. There was ne visible sign of violence or external injury on his body. The proof shows that, when found dead, he was lying upon his side in his bed, as if asleep, with no distortion of limb or features, or other evidence of violence, pain, or suffering. Plaintiff relies for recovery éntirely on Paul v. Insurance Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 20 N. E. Rep. 347, where, under a policy precisely like this in its terms, the court held that the defendant, “in expressing its intention not to be liable for death from inhaling of gas, can only be understood to mean a voluntary and intelligent act by the insured, and not an involuntary and unconscious act. Read in that sense, and in the light of the context, these words may be interpreted as having reference to medical or surgical treatment in which, ex vi termini, would be included the dentist’s work, or to a suicidal purpose.” The reasoning by which that court reached its conclusion is not satisfactory to my mind. The language ot the policy is so clear as to require no construction. The words are unequivocal that the defendant does not insure against death caused by inhaling gas. There is nothing in the terms of the policy intimating or suggesting that the inhalation of gas must be voluntary or involuntarj' in order to exempt defendant from liability. That the defendant had the right to so limit its liability there can be no doubt. All the plaintiff’s rights in this action arise under the policy. It constitutes the only relation between the parties. If the policy does not, by the fair-and natural import of its words, give a right of action under the facts, then the plaintiff has no right of action. It seems to me, and that, too, without regard to the testimony which de-