RICHARDSON v. THE STATE
S02G1698
Supreme Court of Georgia
APRIL 29, 2003
RECONSIDERATION DENIED JUNE 2, 2003
276 Ga. 639 | 581 SE2d 528
CARLEY, Justice.
4. The caveator did not come forward with any evidence tending to prove the unreasonableness of the testator‘s will. “A testator by will, may make any disposition of property that is not inconsistent with the laws or contrary to the public policy of the state and may give all the property to strangers, to the exclusion of the testator‘s spouse and descendants.”
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED APRIL 29, 2003 --
RECONSIDERATION DENIED JUNE 2, 2003.
Thomas M. Strickland, for appellant.
John F. Lyndon, Benton, Preston & Malcom, Eugene M. Benton, Robert M. Malcom, for appellee.
CARLEY, Justice.
Terry Richardson was tried for rape and kidnapping with bodily injury. At trial, he admitted engaging in sexuаl intercourse with the victim, but claimed that it was consensual. On direct examination, the victim testified that she was walking to an ex-boyfriend‘s home to return his jacket when she accepted a ride from Richardson. According to her, he drove to a secluded area and assaulted her. During cross-examination, the defense sought to inquire furthеr about the former boyfriend. The contention was that the victim wanted to rekindle a relationship with him, but his jacket became stained with blood and semen during the voluntary intercourse with Richardson. According to the defense, she then fabricated the rape charge to explain those stains and to prevent the act of consеnsual sex from hindering a possible reconciliation with her previous boyfriend. The trial court disallowed this cross-examination, finding that it was irrelevant and barred by the rape-shield law.
During the trial, Richardson also asked if he could stand behind
The jury found Richardson guilty of both offenses. On appeal, he enumerated as error the trial court‘s rulings on cross-examination of the victim and the right to confront the witnesses. The Court of Appeals found no merit in either assertion, and affirmed the conviсtions. Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. App. 322, 323-326 (1), (2) (568 SE2d 548) (2002). We granted certiorari to address the two issues.
1. A defendant in this state enjoys the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination.
Courts of last rеsort must frequently construe the language of a statute, but such courts may not substitute by judicial interpretation language of their own for the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, so as to change the meaning.
Frazier v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 593 (2) (37 SE2d 774) (1946). Evidence merely that the victim has or had a romantic relationship with another man does not reflect on her character for sexual behavior. Therefore, so long as Richardson confined his questioning to the non-sexual nature of the victim‘s former relationships, the statute would not be a basis for curtailing his cross-examination of her. See Banks v. State, 185 Ga. App. 851, 853 (2) (366 SE2d 228) (1988) (State‘s introduction of testimony that victim was “going steady” did not open door to introduction by defense of evidence of her past sexual experience). Compare Harris v. State, 257 Ga. 666 (1) (362 SE2d 211) (1987) (evidence that victim was prostitute related to her sexual behavior and was inadmissible); Alford v. State, 243 Ga. App. 212, 215 (5) (534 SE2d 81) (2000) (victim‘s mode of dress at time of rape was inadmissible); Burley v. State, 190 Ga. App. 75, 77 (2) (378 SE2d 328) (1989) (victim‘s marital history implicates her sexual behavior and was inadmissible).
There is no indication that the defense intended to exceed that limitation and to pursue the inadmissible topic of the victim‘s sexual
The evidentiary ruling would be correct only if non-sexual questioning of the viсtim about her previous relationship was irrelevant to the motive that Richardson attributed to her. He did not contend that she was lying to protect an existing relationship. Compare Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U. S. 227 (109 SC 480, 102 LE2d 513) (1988). His position was that, because she desired to rekindle a relationship with her former boyfriend, she needed an explanation for the stained jaсket when she returned it to him and, thus, she fabricated the rape charge. As the trial court and the Court of Appeals observed, she was not compelled to return the stained jacket and had other options, such as cleaning it or claiming that it was lost, which would not threaten a possible reconciliation. The existence оf other measures which, if pursued, would prevent the victim‘s former boyfriend from learning about the sexual encounter with Richardson is certainly a factor bearing on the viability of the defense‘s contention that she lied about engaging in consensual sex with him. However, such credibility determinations are properly left to the jury. On cross-examination, ” ‘it is always permissible to sift the motives of the witness and to show, if possible, any reason other than a purpose to tell the truth which may consciously or unconsciously actuate him in his testimony. (Cit.)’ [Cits.]” Arnold v. State, 163 Ga. App. 10, 13 (4) (293 SE2d 501) (1982). Although a trial court has discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, the long-standing rule in this state favors the admission of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value. Hudson v. State, 273 Ga. 124, 126 (2) (538 SE2d 751) (2000). The trial court erroneously prevented Richardson from presenting for the jury‘s consideration all testimony relevant to his consent defense, and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that ruling.
2. “The Confrontation Clause does not . . . compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously loоk elsewhere . . . .” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012, 1019 (II) (108 SC 2798, 101 LE2d 857) (1988). See also Ortiz v. State, 188 Ga. App. 532, 533 (2) (374 SE2d 92) (1988). However, that constitutional provision does “guar-
It is unclear from the record whether Richardson‘s constitutional right of confrontation was violated in this case. The record shows that the trial court offered to move the defense table, but that Richardson declined that alternative. According to the trial court, “[i]f he moved over there on the end kind of like [the prosecution‘s] table is, [then the witnesses would] be able to see him.” If that is true, then Richardson waived his right by rejecting the trial court‘s offer. However, we need not decide whether there was a violation or a waiver. Richardson must be retried for the reason discussed in Division 1 and, at the retrial, the trial court will undoubtedly provide the face-to-face confrontation with witnesses that the Constitution guarantees.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Benham and Hunstein, JJ., who dissent.
BENHAM, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority‘s determination that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the triаl court‘s grant of the State‘s motion in limine to exclude evidence about the victim‘s relationship with her former boyfriend. I agree with the Court of Appeals’ assessment that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the evidence the defendant wished to present was not relevant. I take issue with the majority‘s narrow construction of the coverage of the rape shield statute (
1. The majority construes the rape shield statute as barring only “evidence regarding the sexual aspects of a prior relationship,” and concludes that cross-examination of the victim concerning the non-sexual nature of the victim‘s former relationships does not fall within the statute‘s coverage. I disagree with such a narrow reading of the coverage of the rape shield statute and take issue with the majority‘s creation of an undefined vague guideline that I assume prohibits only evidence with a “sex” component. The rape shield statute ” ‘is a strong legislative attempt to protect the victim-prosecutrix in rape cases by the exclusion of evidence which might reflect on the character of the witness without contributing materially to the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused.’ [Cit.]” Harris v. State, 257 Ga. 666, 667 (1) (a) (362 SE2d 211) (1987).
2. While the scope of evidence excluded by the rape shield statute is, in my view, broader than the scope espoused by the majority, I recognize that the evidentiary safeguards provided by the statute must yield, in the proper circumstances, to a defendant‘s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him by means of cross-examination. This case, however, does not present the proper circumstances.
The
retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogatiоn that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.
See also Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257 (2) (290 SE2d 911) (1982). In Olden v. Kentucky, supra, the case relied upon by appellant, the U. S. Supreme Court held that the constitutional right of confrontation was violated when a rape defendant was not permitted to impeach the complaining witness by eliciting on cross-examination facts showing that she had a motive tо lie about the rape because she was living with and having an extra-marital affair with the male witness who saw her exit the defendant‘s car and to whom she immediately stated she had been raped.2 The Court described the excluded cross-examination as having “such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of [the complaining witness‘s] tеstimony[,]” and stated, “It is plain to us that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility had defense counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id., 488 U. S. at 232. Thus, it was not merely the presentation of a theory that the complaining witness had a mоtive to lie that made the proffered testimony relevant, but the presentation of facts from which the jury could immediately discern a motive to lie which made the proffered evidence probative and triggered the right of confrontation. See Lewis v. State, 591 S2d 922 (Fla. 1991), where the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that a rape defendant‘s constitutional right of confrontation was violated when he was not permitted to elicit testimony that the complaining witness, his stepdaughter, had engaged in sexual activity with her boyfriend, had lied about the sexual activity to her mother, and was scheduled to undergo a gynecological exam a
In the case at bar, the jury was made aware through the complaining witness‘s testimony on direct examination that she had broken up with a boyfriend the day before her encounter with the defendant and that she encountered the defendant while on her way to the former boyfriend‘s home to retrieve personal items and return items belonging to the former boyfriend. On cross-examination, appellant did not wish to present facts from which the jury could discern that the complaining witness was lying about being raped. Instead, appellant wished to theorize that the complaining witness was going to her former boyfriend‘s home at a time when she knew he was not there in order to return a jacket that could only be returned that day, and had to lie to a woman at the house about being raped in order to have an exрlanation for the former boyfriend about some stains on the jacket. I agree with the Court of Appeals that the proffer made by appellant was too attenuated to be relevant and probative, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow the theory to be presented to the jury. Accordingly, I believe the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming appellant‘s conviction should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins this dissent.
DECIDED JUNE 2, 2003.
Gary P. Bunch, for appellant.
Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Anne C. Allen, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.