38 Vt. 602 | Vt. | 1866
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The contract between the teacher and the school district contained a stipulation “ that she should leave if the school was not satisfactory.” It was not by its terms determinable at the pleasure of the employer, and does not come within the principle of the decisions which have been made upon contracts of service in which there is an express agreement that either party may, at any time,
It does not seem necessary to decide in this case just what the effect or force of this stipulation in a contract of service is, because under nó interpretation would it warrant the prudential committee in dismissing the teacher for any other reason than dissatisfaction with her school; and we are satisfied that the fair and reasonable interpretation of the whole report taken together is, that the teacher was not dismissed on account of dissatisfaction with her school or her teaching, but on account of dissatisfaction with her. The force of the finding of the referee, that “ no dissatisfaction would have existed if she had been acceptable to the district apart from her qualifications as a teacher,” is not materially qualified by his also finding that if she had been a person entirely without fault the slanders would not have been effectual.
There is no question upon the report of the existence of dissatisfaction, which arose from her change of her boarding place, nor of the existence of prejudice and unfavorable public opinion, which, the referee finds, were manufactured by the influential family, who were affronted, and this was extended to a belief in her incompetency; but it not appearing that during the three weeks she was allowed to teach, she manifested incompetency, or that her school was examined, or her method of teaching investigated, and in the absence of any affirmative finding that the dissatisfaction was with the school, we are
A contract with a teacher is like a contract with any other person. One who sets a tailor at work making him a suit of clothes and agrees to take them if satisfactory, could not refuse to accept them upon the ground of dislike of the person ; or stop the work after it is begun on the ground of information or belief that he is incompetent. The dissatisfaction must be with the article, not the man.
II. After the teacher was dismissed the prudential committee came to her and requested a proposition of settlement to be used at a school meeting to be held soon after. The teacher offered to accept twenty dollars and the offer was communicated to the district in writing. The district then voted to settle with her “ if it could be done for twenty dollars.” They did not, however, make any effort to do so and never communicated to her any acceptation of her proposal. The vote was a mere expression of a purpose to accept it. A district like an individual may have an intention of accepting a proposal and may declare that intention to third persons or to themselves, and, as in this case, may never carry it out or communicate it to the other party and may abandon it. We do not think this offer now binds the teacher. When the prudential committee wrote the teacher to close her school the next evening, he promised to give her, at that time, an order for her pay.
The next evening she took an order for $7.50 upon the simple statement to her that it was left for her by Mr. Peck, and in the course of the same evening she returned it. It does not appear that she aceepted it as payment even to the extent of $7.50, or that the committee himself so regarded it. He called it not pay but an order for her pay. Until she had availed herself of it in some way, the district had paid her nothing and parted with no value. It does not appear upon its face or otherwise to have been in full for her services nor to have been expressly offered or received as such.
The judgment of the county court, which is for the largest sum reported, is affirmed.