292 S.E.2d 787 | S.C. | 1982
Appellant, a former director of the Williamsburg County Recreation Department, initiated this action to recover $25,333.00 pursuant to his employment contract which had been terminated by the Williamsburg County Recreation Commission. Appellant alleged that the two acts increasing the number of recreation commissioners from five to seven and then from seven to nine were unconstitutional, and therefore, his termination by the nine member commission was invalid. Respondents, members of various governing bodies of Williamsburg County, were granted a summary judgment. We conclude that the two acts are unconstitutional; we reverse and remand for trial.
In 1971 the General Assembly created the five member Williamsburg County Recreation Commission as a special
Both Act No. 246 and Act. No. 381 were enacted subsequent to the ratification of Article VIII by which the General Assembly was prohibited from enacting laws for a specific county or municipality. S. C. Const. Art. VIII, §§ 7, 10. This Court held in Kleckley v. Pulliam, 265 S. C. 177, 217 S. E. (2d) 217 (1975) that the prohibition means that no law may be passed concerning a specific county which relates to those powers, duties, functions and responsibilities, which under the mandated systems of government, are set aside for counties. The prohibition is applicable to special legislation dealing with districts created prior to the ratification of Article VIII or the amendment of prior special legislation. Cooper River, etc. v. City of N. Charleston, 273 S. C. 639, 259 S. E. (2d) 107 (1979); Torgerson v. Craver, 267 S. C. 558, 230 S. E. (2d) 228 (1976). Because Acts 246 and 381 amended the prior special legislation which created the Williamsburg County Recreation Commission, the prohibition of Article VIII § 7 applies.
Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that the two acts increasing the commission’s membership were constitutional as “transitional legislation” under Duncan v. York County, 267 S. C. 327, 228 S. E. (2d) 92 (1976). We disagree. Duncan held that § 1 of Article VIII allows the General Assembly to legislate to bring about an orderly transition to local home rule government, but that such authority is temporary and extends only so far as necessary to place Article VIII fully into operation. Van Fore v. Cooke, 273 S. C. 136, 255 S. E. (2d) 339 (1979), however, limited transitional legislation to a “one shot” proposition so that the General
Accordingly, we hold that Act 246 of 1975 and Act 381 of 1977 are unconstitutional. We remand for trial on the merits.