41 Ga. App. 520 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1930
Lead Opinion
This is a workmen’s compensation case. B. T. Richardson, whose wage was $25 per week, sustained injury to a leg, and after he had been paid compensation for a certain period a controversy arose between him and his employer, Etowah Monument Company, as to further payments. Commissioner Land found a permanent partial loss of use of the leg, amounting to 10 per cent., and awarded compensation at the rate of $1.25 per week for 167 weeks. This award was affirmed by the full commission except that the weekly payments were raised to $4. On appeal by the employer and the insurance carrier, the superior court reversed the award of the full commission as to the amount of the payments and made a judgment in accordance with the award of the sole commissioner. The employee on the one side and the employer and the insurance carrier on the other brought respective bills of exceptions to this court. The questions for decision are as to the amount of the compensation to be awarded, and as to the manner of its payment.
Section 32 of the compensation act as amended (Ga. L. 1920, pp. 167, 184; Ga. L. 1923, pp. 92, 95) provides as follows: “In the cases included by the following schedule the permanent par
The employer and the insurance carrier insist that, since the weekly wage here was more than $4, section 30 can not have application so as to increase the aggregate amount to which the employee would otherwise be entitled, notwithstanding under the particular facts the amount of the weekly payments, so long as they are to be made, should be determined thereunder, because of the provisions in the latter clause of section 33 with reference to “maximum and minimum” payments. We agree with the position taken by the employer and the insurance carrier on both propositions. The material portion of section 30 is as follows: “That when the incapacity from work resulting from an injury is total, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, as hereinafter provided for, the employee during such total incapacity, a weekly compensation equal to one half of his average wages, but not more than fifteen dollars per week nor less than four dollars per week, except when the weekly wage is below four dollars, then the regular wages on the date of the accident shall be the weekly amount paid.” It is clearly apparent that this section was intended to apply only to cases of total incapacity, and this was not such a case. The employee is therefore not entitled to claim the amount of $4 a week for the
The provision in section 38, that the payments therein referred to shall be subject to the same limitations as to maximum and minimum as set out in section 30, was not intended to increase the entire amount of the compensation to be paid for a partial handicap falling under the terms of section 38; that is to say, this clause was not intended to prescribe the minimum total amount of compensation to be paid, but had the purpose of providing the manner, and terms of payment, so as to prevent the spreading of the total amount over long periods by small installments, except when necessary to do so because the wage itself was small — below $4 per week. Any other interpretation would render sections 30 and 38 inconsistent, and would practically nullify the rule of proportion for partial incapacity as contained in section 38; whereas these sections and every part of each must be construed together and be given such a meaning that the language of both'will, if possible, be reconciled. Let us suppose that two men are each receiving-wages at the rate of eight dollars per week, one of whom loses a leg, while the other sustains a ten per cent, loss of use of a leg. Was it the intention of the law that each of these men should receive the same compensation, that is, $4 per week for 175 weeks, or was their compensation to be proportioned according to the comparative handicap of each? Common sense will suggest the proportional compensation. Again, if each of such employees was working for a wage of $4 per week, then each, according to the contention of the claimant in the instant case, would be entitled to the full equivalent of his wages for 175 weeks, which as to the one who had suffered the total loss of a leg would probably be entirely just, but which as to the other who had suffered only a ten per cent, loss of use of a leg, would contain a patent inequality as regards both the employer and other employees, since in the latter
An award of $4 per week in the instant case, as by an application of section 30, would amount to a proportional compensation for more than thirty per cent, impairment; whereas, under the facts as found by the commission, there exists only a ten per cent, impairment, and we can' not agree that the legislature intended the inequalities which would result from the construction contended for by the claimant.
An examination of the compensation statutes of a number of other states will disclose provisions more or less similar to those here under consideration, and it seems to be the general scheme of the acts to reduce the number, and not the amount, of the payments for the partial loss, or loss of use, of a member. For instance, the Kentucky statute provides that for partial disability the compensation “shall be 65 per cent, of the average weekly earnings of the employee, but not less than $5 nor more than $12, multiplied by the percentage of disability caused by the injury, for such period as the board may determine, not exceeding 335 weeks nor a maximum sum of $4,000;” but that “whenever the weekly payments under this paragraph would be less than $3 per week, the period may be shortened and the payments correspondingly increased to that amount.” Kentucky Laws of 1916, chapter 33, p. 354.
The various provisions of section 32 of our own statute clearly manifest a like intention. For each of the injuries referred to in paragraphs (a) to (q) respectively the employee is to be awarded 50 per cent, of his weekly wages, regardless of the comparative incapacity from the several injuries; but the period of the weekly payments is made to vary widely according to the extent oE the resulting handicap. We think the certain accomplishment of such a result in case of partial loss, or loss of use, of a member was the chief purpose of the provision of section 32 as to maximum and minimum payments, since it is only by this construction that the
There is a dearth of authority upon the question here under consideration, and the few cases to be found are not persuasive. Some of them are based upon statutes differing in some degree from the language of the Georgia act, and several were decided by divided courts. Emry v. Cripes, 110 Kan. 693 (205 Pac. 598); Kupis v. Wilmington Provision Co. (Del.), 138 Atl. 358; Lewis v. Allied Contractors Inc. (Neb.), 225 N. W. 770. The case of James A. Banister Co. v. Kriger, 84 N. J. L. 30 (85 Atl. 1027), decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, is in direct accord with the contention of the employee in the present case; but in the later case of Barbour Flax Spinning Co. v. Hagerty, 85 N. J. L. 407 (89 Atl. 919), the same court, speaking of its decision in'the Kriger case, said: “It was only the amount that was subject to variation and variation was prevented by the clause fixing a- minimum of $5 per week. The legislature seems to have thought our construction too liberal to the employee, for it amended the act in 1913 immediately after our decision. Pamph. L. pp. 302, 304.”
It is noted that the maximum and minimum clause provides only that the payments shall be subject to the limitations stated in section 30, not that the amount of the whole compensation shall be so determined. Furthermore, that clause was apparently not intended to qualify the prior language of subparagraph (r) as to proportions; because this paragraph prescribes no payments within, itself, but merely speaks of a proportion of the “payments above provided,” and the succeeding clause, as to maximum and minimum, would therefore be applicable only to the payments referred to in the several antecedent paragraphs as to specific injuries. This we think is the correct interpretation of section 32 as a whole.
In view of what has been said, we hold that the employee was entitled to ten per cent, of the total amount of compensation which he would have received for a total loss of his leg or the use thereof, that is, ten per cent, of fifty per cent, of what his weekly wages would have amounted to for the remaining period of 167 weeks, and to this only; but that in order to avoid the small payment of $1.25 weekly, the industrial commission should have proportioned the period of the weekly payments rather than the amount of such
The number and not- the amount of the weekly payments ivas held by this court to be the variable element, in the decision in American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Brock, 35 Ga. App. 772 (2) (135 S. E. 103). See also Galloway Coal Co. v. Stanford, 215 Ala. 79 (109 So. 377); Lewis v. Allied Contractors Inc., supra; Phonville v. New York & Cuba S. Co., 226 N. Y. 622 (123 N. E. 258); Knoxville Power & Light Co. v. Barnes, 156 Tenn. 184 (299 S. W. 772); and compare section 45 of the Georgia compensation act. The Brock case was reviewed and reversed by the Supreme Court, but not on this point. 165 Ga. 771 (142 S. E. 101). Nothing contrary to this ruling was intended to be held in South v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 39 Ga. App. 47 (146 S. E. 45), notwithstanding certain language in the decision in that case. ■ The questions here raised were not involved in the South case.
Even before we decided the Brock case the industrial commission had adopted the practice of reducing the number of the weekly payments rather than the amounts. The courts will take judicial cognizance of the practice of the departments of government, and may give weight thereto in the construction of statutes. Griner v. Baggs, 4 Ga. App. 232 (3), 234 (61 S. E. 147); Temple Baptist Church v. Georgia Terminal Co., 128 Ga. 669, 680 (58 S. E. 157); Carroll v. Wright, 131 Ga. 728 (4), 736 (63 S. E. 260).
Judgment in No. 19988 affirmed; in No. 19981 reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. As has already been shown by the majority opinion, Commissioner Land found that the claimant had a ten per cent, disability of his leg, and allowed him compensation at the rate of ten per cent, of one half of his weekly wages, that is to say, $1.25 per week for the remainder of the period of 175 weeks, amounting to 167 weeks, as provided by section 32 of the workmen’s compensation act. On appeal to the full commission, the finding of fact by Commissioner Land as to the ten per cent, impairment was affirmed, but the full commission awarded the claimant $4 per week for the remainder of the period, applying the minimum:payment provision of section 30. On appeal by the insurance carrier the superior court of Pulton county set aside the judgment of the full commission, and substituted
As I construe the two sections, both the maximum and the minimum compensation are made to apply with exactly the same and equal force to compensation allowable under section 32, relating to permanent industrial handicaps, as they do to the compensation provided for by section 30 relating to total incapacity to work. Accordingly, I must construe section 32 as related to section 30 of the statute as follows: In addition to not more than ten weeks compensation for total incapacity, the full compensation in a case of permanent partial industrial handicap, consisting of the loss of a leg, shall be fifty per centum of the average weekly wages during 175 weeks, and if such permanent partial industrial handicap consists of only the partial loss of or partial loss of the use of such member, the compensation shall be such' proportion of the payments above provided for total loss as such partial loss bears to such total loss, but with the limitation that not more than $15 per week, nor less than $4 per week, shall be allowed, except when the weekly wage is below $4, in which case the regular wages on the date of the accident shall be the weekly amount paid; and in no case shall the period covered by such' compensation be greater than 350 weeks, nor shall the total amount of compensation exceed $5,000.
It is apparent that the injury involved in the instant case comes squarely under section 32 as related to section 30 of the compensation act, inasmuch as the industrial handicap relates to the permanent partial loss of the use of a leg. If the loss of the leg had been total, since the claimant was receiving a wage of $25 per week, it is clear that in addition to whatever h'e might have been entitled to by reason of a total disability, he should have received one half of his wages, or $12.50 per week, for a period of 175 weeks, less whatever payments thereon had already been advanced at the time of the award. But since, under the findings of the commission, there was only a ten per cent, loss of the use of the member, it is apparent that the claimant would have been entitled to an amount represented by but ten per cent, of his weekly wages for a period of 175 weeks, but for the additional provision contained in section 32 of the act that “the weekly compensation payments referred to in this section shall be subject to the same limitations
This situation is recognized by the writer of the text in the Corpus Juris supplement to 40 Cyc. 96, § 88, as follows: “In this connection it should be noted that the provision of the statute for a minimum weekly award may in a particular case render the award for a minor injury the same as would have been the award for a greater injury according to the schedule, where the number of weeks is fixed by the statute, and only the amount is subject to variation;” citing Banister v. Kriger, 84 N. J. L. 30 (supra). The New Jersey case cited was, as is pointed out by the majority opinion, referred to in the case of Barbour Flax Co. v. Hagerty, 85 N. J. L. 407 (supra), the latter case being distinguished from the Kriger case, in that in the Kriger case the number of weeks during which compensation should be paid was fixed by the statute, and the amount only was subject to variance, while in the Hagerty case there was no statutory period fixed during which payments should continue. It was stated in the Hagerty case that the New Jersey Legislature must have felt that the rule of the Supreme Court of
The policy of this State in prescribing both a minimum and a maximum limitation is not, however, a onesided rule, since it
My brethren indicate that the maximum-and-minimum limitation clause was evidently intended to provide the manner in which the compensation should be paid, as to the maximum and minimum weekly payments, so as to prevent the spreading of the total amount over long periods of small payments, but it does not seem that the provision for a maximum weekly payment could possibly be thus explained, and since the majority opinion ignores the provision as to the $4 weekly payments, in directing how the compensation in the instant case shall be paid, by directing the payment of $12.50 per week for ten per cent, of the disability period, neither does it appear that the provision for minimum payments could for any such reason be construed and explained. The only force and effect which it would seem can be given to the prescribed minimum limitation is to apply it just as it reads, just as the language provides, —that is, to allow the stipulated benefits in cases of partial impairment, for the prescribed period, with the proviso that in no case shall such benefits be less than $4 or more than $15 per week.
With reference to the point made in the cross-bill of exceptions, pertaining to how the payments should be made in case of a partial rather than a total loss of the use of a member, counsel cite American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Brock, 35 Ga. App. 772, and South v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 47 (supra). In the Brock case it was held that in a permanent industrial handicap, involving a
Hpon a reconsideration of the Brock case and of the South case, and of such foreign authority as could be found and consulted, I have personally reached the conclusion that the rule implied in the South case relative to the method of payment is correct, rather than the previous rule laid dowii in the Brock case, in which the writer had concurred. This construction flight not be reasonable, and its application might not bo feasible, but for the provision prescribing a maximum-and-minimum limitation. It appears
As I understand and construe the statute, its express language provides that the “payments” rather than the weeks should be apportioned, and this method seems to work in harmony with all the other provisions of the act; which would not be the case in applying- the rule laid down in the Brock case. It perhaps might be suggested that the rule which the writer here indicates could work a hardship or injustice by reason of the fact that the smaller payments might not be sufficient to tide over an employee during the period immediately following the accident, whereas the larger payments might better meet the immediate emergencies. Even this idea, however, seems to have been in the minds of the law makers. Not only does the statute take care of such an emergency by providing special and additional compensation as for total disability for a period not longer than ten weeks, but by section 41 of the statute it is further provided that any payments made by the employer to the injured employee during the period of his disability, or to his dependents, which by the terms of the act were not due and payable when made, may, subject to the approval of the industrial commission, be deducted from the amount to be paid as compensation. In this way the employer may, with safety to himself, meet the requirements of any emergency, and can shorten the period of the payments by adding to the amount of the weekly payments any sum necessary to meet any immediate and extraordinary demand.
The foreign authorities would seem to indicate that except in states where the statutes, contrary to ours, specifically provide for an apportionment of the period instead of an apportionment of the amount, the rule adopted is that indicated in the South case and by this dissent. The only case which seems to at all sustain the ruling in the Brock case is that of Lewis v. Allied Contractors (Neb.), 225 N. W. 770, in which there is a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Good. The decisions in Knoxville Power & Light Co. v. Barnes (Tenn.), 229 S. W. 772, Phonville v. New York &c. S. Co., (N. Y.), 123 N. E. 258, and Galloway Coal Co. v. Standford, 215 Ala. 79 (supra), cited in the majority opinion, are all based upon statutory provisions in force in those States, expressly stipu
While the workmen’s compensation act is in derogation of the common law, it has been uniformly held by the Supreme Court and by this court that in view of its remedial nature, it should be so liberally and broadly construed as to effect its general purpose in every instance in which its language is such as to render judicial interpretation necessary. Van Treeck v. Trav. Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 204 (121 S. E. 215); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682 (118 S. E. 786); Austin Bridge Co. v. Whitmire, 31 Ga. App. 560 (121 S. E. 345). The manifest purpose of the statute was to afford relief to employees who, at common law, by reason of the fellow-servant rule and the doctrine of assumption of risk, were deprived of any means of obtaining compensation for injuries incurred during the course of their employment, and that such relief should be in the form of weekly payments, sufficient, within the limitations as to maximum and minimum prescribed by the act, to supply the deficiency in the earning capacity of the employee during his period of disability. Necessarily the periods prescribed within which compensation should be paid on account of specific injuries are more or less arbitrary, as is the provision that in no event, regardless of the extent of the injury or the earning capacity of the employee, shall a claimant be compensated for a greater period than 350 weeks or in a greater amount than $5,000, but the periods named would seem to be in keeping with the