129 Ky. 449 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1908
Lead Opinion
Opinion of the Court by
Reversing.
On January 19, 1893, C. Richardson shipped from Irvine, in’Estill county, Ky., to Cincinnati, Ohio, a carload of hogs. The car was carried hy the Richmond, Mcholasville, Irvine & Beattyville Railroad Company to Richmond, Ky., and then turned over to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, to be carried hy it to Cincinnati. When the car reached Cincinnati and was delivered, the hogs were in had condition and some of them were dead. Richardson thereupon brought an action against the Richmond, Nicholasville, Irvine & Beattyville Railroad Company to recover damages, charging that the loss was due to the negligence of the carrier. That company showed
The hogs were shipped under a written contract, which is as follows:'“Irvine, Ky., Station, Jan. 19, 1893. This memorandum of a special contract of carriage between the Richomnd, Nicholasville, Irvine & Beattyville Railroad and C. Richardson, of Irvine, Ky., witnesseth: Whereas, the said Richardson has this day shipped a carload of hogs to be carried by the Richmond, Nicholasville, Irvine & Beattyville Railroad from Irvine, Ky., to Richmond, both points on its own line of road, and by it as agent of shipper to be forwarded to Green & Embry at Cincinnati, Ohio, on the same terms as this contract: In consideration of the special rate of $36 for ear guaranteed by said railroad company between said point of shipment' and Cincinnati, Ohio, the shipper hereby agrees to load, unload, feed, water, and take all proper care of said stock, and insure the said railroad company and all connecting lines over which said stock may pass between point of shipment and destination from all loss
By section 2534 of the Kentucky Statutes of 1903, an action upon a written contract may be commenced within 15 years after the cause of action accrued. By section 2515, Ky. Stats., 1903, an action upon a contract not in writing, signed by the parties, express or
It is insisted that the written contract only obligates the initial carrier to carry the freight from Irvine to
As the contract was in writing, this action was upon a written contract made by the defendant, within the meaning of section 2514 of the Kentucky Statutes of 1903, and the demurrer to the plea of limitation should have been sustained.
Judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Rehearing
On Petition eor Rehearing.
In the petition for rehearing it is suggested that the court in the opinion made no reference to the question raised by appellee in the lower court, and urged by it in the brief filed in its behalf in this court, that the Madison circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. The action was brought under section 73 of the Civil Code of Practice, providing that: “Excepting the actions mentioned in section 75, an action against a common carrier, whether a corporation or not, upon a contract to carry property, must be brought in the county in which the defendant, or either of several defendants, resides; or in which the contract, is made; or in which the carrier agrees to
Before entering its appearance in the Madison eir,cuit court, the appellee filed the following special demurrer: “The defendant demurs specially to the plaintiff’s petition herein on the ground that this court has not jurisdiction of this cause of action set forth in the plaintiff’s petition and amended petition.” It did not file any other pleading of record stating the reasons why the Madison circuit court did not have jurisdiction, or setting out that it resided in Jefferson county, or that the contract was made in Estill county, or that the property was to be delivered in Kenton county.- The petition did not disclose the fact that the Madison circuit court was not the county in which the contract was made or the county in which the defendant resided. In the absence of a pleading showing a want of jurisdiction, the lower court properly overruled the special demurrer. Section 92 of the Civil Code of Practice provides that: “A special, demurrer is an objection to a pleading which shows: (1) That the court has no jurisdiction of the defendant or of the subject of the action; or (2), that the
Circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and it will be presumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that they have jurisdiction of the defendant. The Madison circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and as the pleading to which the special demurrer was filed did not disclose the want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, and the objection was not made by answer or other pleading, it was waived.
The petition for rehearing is overruled.