123 Minn. 360 | Minn. | 1913
These two actions, involving the same controversy, were tried together in the court below, resulting in an order for judgment in favor of the plaintiff in each. Defendant appealed from separate-orders denying a new trial.
The facts are as follows: Julia Byan, at the time of the transaction in question, was and still is the owner of the fee title to certain real property, subject to the life estate of Margaret Buckley, who by reason of mental infirmities is incompetent to manage her affairs and was represented by a guardian. In June, 1911, Mrs. Byan, acting in her own behalf, and Joseph C. Bichardson, as-guardian of Mrs. Buckley, entered into an executory contract with defendant in which they agreed to sell and convey said property to him for the consideration therein named, the sale and conveyance to include both the fee title of Mrs. Byan and life estate of Mrs. Buckley. Defendant, under and pursuant to the contract, entered into the possession of the property and now holds the same. The contract has never been performed by either party, for the reason that the probate court, to which the contract was presented for approval so far as the rights of Mrs. Buckley were concerned, made an order disapproving the sale, and the guardian was thereby prevented from completing the contract.
The first action above entitled was brought by the guardian for and on behalf of his ward, Mrs. Buckley, to recover the possession of the property, and was founded upon the refusal of the probate court to confirm the sale, in consequence of which it is claimed the contract became invalid and unenforeible.
The second action was by Mrs. Byan to set the contract aside, on the theory that it was the joint obligation of both vendors, and since by the action of the probate court it could not be performed as to one of the parties, Mrs. Buckley, it should fail as to both.
The trial court sustained the contention of both plaintiffs,, and ordered judgment in favor of Mrs. Buckley for the possession of the property, and judgment for Mrs. Byan canceling the contract.
The case is unlike those where the husband alone contracts to ■convey land owned by him, to which the wife subsequently refuses her assent, in which it has been held that the contract may at the ■option of the vendee be enforced as to the interests of the husband, •deducting from the purchase price the value of the wife’s interest in the land. Nor is it like those cases where a cotenant undertakes without authority to make a sale not only of his own interest in land but that of his co-owner -as well, and the co-owner repudiates the •contract. In a case of that kind no question can arise respecting the question whether the parties intended the contract to be the joint .act of all owners of the property, for one of the joint owners without night or authority assumes the right to sell the whole estate, and his act is repudiated by his co-owners. In a situation of that kind the
Order affirmed in each case.