Richardson v. Fowler

154 Ark. 92 | Ark. | 1922

Hart, J.

(after stating the facts).

The law in the case has been settled in favor of the defendant by several decisions of this court, and we cite the following: Gibson v. Inman Packet Co., 111 Ark. 521; Georgia Marble Finishing Works v. Minor, 128 Ark. 124; McGehee v. Yunker & Ronk, 137 Ark. 397.

In the last mentioned case the court said that the delivery of goods by the seller to the carrier duly consigned to the purchaser constitutes a delivery to the purchaser and consummates the sale. The court also said that the converse of the rule is, that where the seller consigns the shipment to his own order, thus manifesting his intention to reserve his dominion and right of disposition over the property, nothing else appearing to manifest an intention to pass the title, such consignment does not constitute a delivery to the purchaser. In that case the testimony tended to show that the parties agreed on a method of delivery of the potatoes by delivery to the carrier and that the bill of lading was made out in the name of the seller to be changed as soon as the consignment reached Ft. Smith. The court said that the eiroumstances warranted the inference that the parties intended that the sale would be complete, and that the title to the potatoes should pass by delivery to the carrier. In such cases oral proof may be admitted to show the real intention of the parties to the transaction with respect to the question of delivery.

In the present case there is nothing in the record tending to show that the parties agreed that the corn should be consigned to shipper’s order when the contract for its purchase was executed. The defendants purchased from the plaintiff a car of corn of a certain grade for a stipulated price. The plaintiff on his own motion consigned the corn to himself at the place where the defendant lived, with directions on the bill of lading to notify the defendant. Thus it will be seen that the plaintiff reserved his dominion ever the corn until the purchase price was paid by the defendant. There was no agreement between the parties or anything else in the record tending to show that the plaintiff intended to pass the title to the corn to the defendant when it was delivered to the carrier.

There being nothing in the record from which it could be legally inferred that the sale was complete when the plaintiff delivered the corn to the carrier, the court erred in finding for the plaintiff. A delivery, either actual or constructive, is essential to complete a sale of chattels, and the title does not pass untilthere has been such a delivery.

As we have said, the plaintiff having consigned the corn to shipper’s order without any agreement in this respect with the defendant, and there being nothing else in the record from which it could be legally inferred that plaintiff intended to pass the title when he delivered the corn to the carrier, the circuit court should, as a matter of law, have found for the defendant and rendered judgment accordingly. ‘

Therefore the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.