Order unanimously affirmed
Woodstream contends that it was formed solely for the purpose of holding title to the real property, which was leased from it by Crossroads, and thus that it also should be deemed plaintiff’s employer. We disagree.
The Jenkins operated Woodstream as a separate corporate entity, with records and functions separate from Crossroads. When an employer and the owner of the premises where a plaintiff is injured are distinct legal entities, there is no basis to dismiss an action against the landowner based on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law (see, e.g., Rosenburg v Angiuli Buick, 220 AD2d 654, 655; Casas v 559 Warren St. Realty Corp., 211 AD2d 742, 743). Here, as in Buchner v Pines Hotel (87 AD2d 691, 692, affd 58 NY2d 1019), “[t]he individual principals in this business enterprise, for their own business and legal advantage, elected to operate that enterprise through separate corporate entities. The structure they created should not lightly be ignored at their behest, in order to shield one of the entities they created from * * * common-law tort liability.”
Woodstream’s reliance on Heritage v Van Patten (59 NY2d 1017) is misplaced; here, the owner of the real estate is a corporation and not a coemployee of plaintiff (see, Workers’ Compensation Law §29 [6]; see also, Thomas v Maigo Corp., 37 AD2d 754). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Shaheen, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present — Denman, P. J., Green, Wisner, Balio and Fallon, JJ.
