Opinion by
Dеfendant company insured the life of George Brady in two industrial policies, one dated February 6, 1933, for $300 and the other, June 4, 1934, for $200. The insured made his homе with plaintiff, his cousin, and she was the beneficiary of both policies. He died on January 22, 1935 from pulmonary tuberculosis. Defendant contested payment on the ground of false and fraudulent representations in the applications for the insurance, attached to the policy in each instance. The jury found for plaintiff for the full amount of both policies and judgment was entered on the verdict. The error assigned is the refusal to limit rеcovery to a return of the premiums paid.
The undisputed records of Allegheny General Hospital, admitted in evidence, indicate that insured was hospitalized for two months in 1931 for streptococcic lobar pneumonia. And that he again appeared at the hospital on March 8, 1932, complaining of pain in the upper left chest and of difficulty in breathing. He had lost weight. He had a severe cough and had “coughed up а lot of blood 2 weeks ago.” Tuberculosis of the right lung was suspected and he was requested to return at intervals for observation. He received additional clinical examinations on six other days during March 1932 and treatment on three occasions in April, 1932. He reported about oncе each month thereafter until the end of the year. On January 20, 1933, the very day of the application for the first policy, the hospital recоrd indicates that he appeared at the clinic complaining of weakness with dyspnoea on exertion and a severe cough. Cоronary disease was suspected and digitalis was prescribed. He applied for the second policy on April 27, 1934. Beginning in August 1934 there was positive evidence of involvement of the lungs and on 'September 7, 1934, x-ray showed active tuberculosis. Two weeks later he was committed to the mu *313 nicipal hospital at Leech Farm where he remained until his death.
Both policies provide that “all statements made by the insured shall, in the absenсe of fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties.” Specifically, in each instance, application was made fоr the insurance on the basis of the information supplied. We must assume that the contracts were made upon his representations.
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brandwene,
The applications signed by decedent, were made on the same printed form supplied by the company. The statements are numbered and among them the following appear in the printed language of the applications: “12(a) I am free from all injury, DO NOT now have, nor have I ever had......hеart trouble, consumption ......spitting of blood, habitual cough......nor any other ailment or infirmity, except......12(e) I have never had tuberculosis nor am I, or hаve I been, in close contact with anyone having tuberculosis, except ...... 13. I have NOT been disabled nor had any medical or surgical treatment or consulted or been treated by a physician during the past FIVE YEARS, except......” On the first application there is a ^ mark following the word ‘except’ in each instance without any qualification, and on the second application, the space is entirely blank. We do not agreе that these statements are any the less representations of the applicant because of the lack of comment after thе word ‘except’ or because of the check marks appearing on the one or their absence on the other. The abovе printed statements were all in declarative form and in the first person, (with the exception of part of 2., relating to marital status, which was in the fоrm of questions admittedly properly answered). There was ample space in each instance following the word “except”, inviting comment if the statement did not reflect the *314 facts. Since the decedent signed the application without qualifying the above quoted material statеments, he adopted them as his representations, in the form in which they appear in the applications.
The policies were not solicited by the same insurance agent. The writing on the first application, other than the signature of the insured, was that of defendant’s agent, W. Haller, аnd on the second, the writing of its agent, H. Wilstein. There is no evidence that the insured was not questioned as to the subject matter of every statement сontained in the first application or that anything was written into it after signing. Plaintiff however testified that she was in her kitchen, an adjoining room, when the seсond policy was solicited and that no questions were asked the insured and that application was signed by him in blank. If her testimony is true, the handwriting on the аpplication was inserted by the agent after it was signed. It was the view of the lower court that this testimony carried the case to the jury on
both
pоlicies and that the verdict may not be disturbed on the authority of
Stein v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
The hospital record in this case was competent documentary evidence of fraudulent misrepresentations which induced the policies. The record meets the requirements of admissibility as evidenсe: the various entries were made contemporaneously with the successive appearances of the insured at the hospitаl; there was no reason or motive for falsification and they appear to have been made at the direction of the examining physician. The case therefore is controlled by the rule of
Evans v. Penn Mutual L. Ins. Co.,
This result is not affected by the fact that the insured was illiterate and could not read. The applicable rule is thus stated in
Prevete v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co.,
Reversed, and it is ordered that the judgment be reduced to the amount of premiums paid.