SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Opinion by
Appellee Allstate’s motion for rehearing is before this court. 2 In its first issue on rehearing, putting aside the issue of whether the appraisal award was in substantial compliance with the terms of the policy, Allstate asks whеther the district court correctly considered Allstate’s affirmative defenses and properly granted summаry judgment on Richardson’s extra-contractual claims.
Allstate raised the affirmative defenses of accord and satisfaction and estoppel. For reasons that follow, we conclude those affirmative defenses were without merit. We also conclude that because appellee’s extra-contractual claims are inherently dependent on a proper appraisal award, ap-рellee was not entitled to summary judgment. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting appellee summary judgment.
*865 Accord and Satisfaction
Thе issue is whether appellee conclusively established the affirmative defense of accord аnd satisfaction as a matter of law to entitle it to summary judgment. After invoking the appraisal clause of a homeowner’s insurance police, appellee issued a check to the insured. The check bore no notation it was a full or final payment of the claim. Appellant was not satisfied with the award, claiming the appraisal process was not in compliance with the policy’s terms. Appellant сhallenged the award immediately in writing; however, appellant eventually cashed the check aftеr a trial date was set by the trial court. Because those facts do not conclusively establish the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction as a matter of law, the trial court erred in granting summary judgmеnt on appellee’s affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction.
As both the party asserting the affirmative defense and the movant for summary judgment, appellee bore the burden to “conclusively establish” the defense as a matter of law.
Jenkins v. Henry C. Beck Co.,
The consequence of a finding of accord and satisfaction is a bar to any action on the original obligation.
Harris v. Rowe,
The rеquirements to conclusively establish the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, as set out by the Supreme Court of Texas in
Jenkins,
Estoppel
Appellee аlso raised the affirmative defense of estoppel. Under Texas law, the affirmative defense of estoppel applies in a breach-of-contract claim when a party accepts a benefit voluntarily
and
with knowledge of all material facts. This defense does not apply, however, in cases in which a party is forced to accept an otherwise unsatisfactory benefit due to financial duress. This is so because it does not constitute voluntary acceptance. As claimant of such defensе, appellee had the burden to prove appellant was “estopped by the accеptance-of-benefits doctrine.”
Cooper v. Bushong,
*866 Did appellant meеt the financial duress exception and thereby defeat appellee’s affirmative defense of estoppel? Under the facts here, the family’s health insurance did not cover a two-year-old grandsоn’s surgery. This caused an economic hardship that was enhanced by the need to remove contamination in the home in order to improve the home’s safety and prevent future medical problems. Because fact issues existed about whether appellant accepted the benefit provided by appellee voluntarily as well as whether appellee provided appellant with all the matеrial facts, appellee was not entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defense of estoppel. The trial court could not have properly granted summary judgment on the defense of estoppеl.
We deny appellee’s motion for rehearing.