95 P. 103 | Ariz. | 1908
— This suit was originally brought in the district court of Pima county by one Prank Ely in 1887, and was entitled “Frank Ely v. New Mexico & Arizona Railroad Com
Counsel for appellant has raised two questions by his assignments of error: First, that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; second, that under the provisions of the act of Congress creating the court of private land claims appellant’s lands, having been theretofore patented by the United States, were eliminated from the grant, notwithstanding the confirmation of the title by the court of private land claims and the patent from the government.
1. The question of jurisdiction, whatever might otherwise have been open to adjudication by us in this respect, has been definitely settled adversely to the contention of appellant by the supreme court of the United States upon the second appeal in this cause. The question of jurisdiction was directly decided in that case, and this ruling has become the law of the ease. United States v. Camou, 184 U. S. 572, 22 Sup. Ct. 505, 46 L. Ed. 694; Thompson v. Maxwell Land Grant & R. Co. 168 U. S. 451, 18 Sup. Ct. 121, 42 L. Ed. 539; Snyder v. Pima County, 6 Ariz. 41, 53 Pac. 6.
2. The act creating the court of private land claims conferred upon it jurisdiction in three classes of cases. The first class included suits brought by claimants of Mexican land grants which, at the time of the passage of the act, were unconfirmed or not otherwise finally decided upon, and which
Section 14 of the act reads as follows: “That if in any case it shall appear that the lands or any part thereof decreed to any claimant under the provisions of this act shall have been sold or granted by the United States to any other person, such title from the United States to such other person shall remain valid, notwithstanding such decree, and upon proof being made to the satisfaction of said court of such sale or grant, and the value of the lands so sold or granted, such court shall render judgment in favor of such claimant against the United States for the reasonable value of said lands so sold or granted,” etc.
The question presented is whether said section 14 applies to those cases which, under the provisions of the act, might be brought against grant claimants who might not voluntarily sue for the confirmation of their titles, and whose titles, in suits brought by the United States, should be found by the court of private land claims to have been complete and perfect, and who should receive patents to the lands included within the boundaries of the grants confirmed to them. It has been held by the supreme court of the United States in United States v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 441, 22 Sup. Ct. 422, 46 L. Ed. 632, that said section 14 of the act does apply to the second class of eases we have enumerated, and that one holding a Mexican land grant by perfect and complete title, who brought suit in the court of private land claims for the confirmation of his title, did so upon the condition that, if any
The Secretary of the Interior, in the case of Ely’s Admr. v. Magee, 34 L. D. 506, has construed the act as limiting the application of said section 14 to cases of confirmations of grants where the grant claimants have brought suit in the court of private land claims, and as not applying to cases of confirmation of grants in suits brought by the government against claimants who have not voluntarily appeared in said court to obtain the benefits of the act, The secretary in his decision points out the distinction between the two classes of claimants, and applies to the latter the doctrine expressed in Ainsa v. New Mexico & Arizona Railroad Company, supra, that the private holder of any complete and perfect grant may, at his election, have its validity determined as against the United States in the court of private land claims, but that in case he should not so elect his title will nevertheless be valid and enforceable iñ the ordinary courts of justice, and under the treaty with Mexico he is entitled to have his title recognized in the latter courts as the absolute owner in fee of such grant. He distinguishes between the ease of one voluntarily seeking relief under the act in the court of private land claims, and the ease of one who was brought into such court at the suit of the United States. The reasoning is that the claimant who chose to avail himself of the act, and who brought suit, was bound by the terms imposed, and must be held to have accepted the condition that he should not have decreed to him, in any such suit, land the title to which had passed to other parties from the United States. In the latter case the appearance of the grant claimant not being voluntary, and he not being bound by the act to invoke the aid of the court in the settlement and confirmation of his title, and having all the title that was necessary to enforce his rights as the owner of the grant in the ordinary courts of justice, the act should not be construed as intending that the suit brought by the United States should operate arbitrarily to confiscate his claim or any portion thereof against his consent;
The record in this case discloses that the court of private land claims did not except the lands, or that of any other of the defendants from its decree of confirmation, although by the pleadings it appears that its attention was called to the fact that titles had been issued to portions of the grant by the United States to said defendants. We infer from this, therefore, that the court of private land claims construed the act as did the Secretary of the Interior in the Magee case. The reasoning of the secretary in the latter case is convincing, and, no other authority appearing to the contrary, we adopt his construction of the act. It follows, therefore, that appellant’s lands were not excepted from the confirmation of the grant and from the patent of the government.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
KENT, C. J., and DOAN and NAYE, JJ., concur.