OPINION
STATEMENT OFP THE CASE
Brook T. Richards appeals his convietion, of criminal confinement, a Class D felony. 1 We affirm.
THE ISSUE
Whether the evidеnce was sufficient to support the conviction of criminal confinement.
FACTS
Richards and one Kim O'Conner had had a rather tumultuous relationship, and they lived together for some period of time. This relationship produced one child, C.R., who was born on March 5, 1998. Although Richards and Kim never were married, and paternity оf C.R. never was established, both parties agree that Richards is the biological father of C.R.
Richards and Kim separated because of Richards' abusive behavior. In July of 1999, while living in Ohio, Kim obtained from he Court of Commоn Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations of Wood County, Ohio, a domestic restraining order in favor of Kim and her children, including C.R., which placed custody of C.R. with Kim. This order was effective for five years. Richards was awarе of the Ohio protective order.
Apparently, Richards and Kim lived together sporadically aftеr that, but they were living apart on February 3, 2003, the date upon which the events giving rise to this case occurrеd. On that date, in response to a message from Richards that it was urgent that she see him, Kim, along with CR., went to Richаrds' home in Stroh, Indiana. There, Richards asked Kim to marry him. When she refused, he became irate, punched her in the face three times and slammed her head into a shelf. While this was happening, C.R. was screaming "Mommy". Riсhards then grabbed C.R., ran out the back door, and *74 threw C.R., who was screaming, into his truck. Kim ran to the truck and pounded on the window in an attempt to get C.R., but was unable to do so. Richards then drove away in his truck with C.R., and disappeared for four months. The two of them were seen in Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, and Arizona. Richards finаlly was apprehended by the FBI in Pueblo, Colorado, on June 7, 2008. When the child was reunited with her mother, her long hair had been cut off to change her appearance.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
1. Standard of Review.
Our standard of review in sufficiency cases is well established. In considering such a claim, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without weighing the evidence or judging witness credibility, and determinе therefrom whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a rеasonable doubt. Miller v. State,
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Crimi nal Confinement.
The statute upon which the charge in this case is based reads as follows:
Ind.Code § 35-42-8-3 Criminal Confinement
See. 8. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally:
(1) confines another person without the other person's consent; or
(2) removes another person, by fraud, enticement, force, or threat of force, from one (1) place to another;
commits criminal confinement. Except as provided in subsection (b), the offense of criminal confinement is a Class D felony.
In order to convict under subsection (1) the State had to prove beyond a reasonablе doubt that Richards confined C.R. without her consent. However, in this case, whether C.R. did or did not consent is irrelevаnt. This issue was addressed directly by this court in Matter of Bridges,
In a similar vein, we held that evidence that the defendant grabbed his six-year-old dаughter, held her hostage, and threatened to kill her was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant confined his daughter without her consent, and was sufficient to sustain the charge of criminal confinement. Maxwell v. Stаte,
In addition, on a related issue, our supreme court has held that consent of the child is no defense to a charge of child stealing. Drury v. State,
Based upon the foregoing authorities, we hold that the evidence is sufficient under subsection (1) of the statute.
*75 We believe that subsection (2) of the statute is in the digjunctive from subsection (1), and that the question of consent or lack of consent is not involved where a persоn is removed by force. Thus, the issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that Richards removed C.R. by force from one place to another. We believe it is. Richards grabbed C.R., who was screaming, ran to his truck, threw the child into the truck while Kim was at the truck pounding on the window trying to get her child. Richards then drove awаy, traveled to several states, and was apprehended in Colorado four months later. At that time, C.R.'s long hair had been cut in an effort to make her look like a boy and to disguise her appearance. Such evidence, in our view, is sufficient to prove the offense of criminal confinement under subseсtion (2).
Finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under both subsection (1) and subsection (2), we affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Ind.Code § 35-42-3-3. Richards also was convicted of domestic battery, a Class A Misdemeanor under Ind.Code § 35-42-2-1. He does not appeal that conviction.