Case Information
Sessions BIA Sagerman, IJ A042 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At stated term United States Court Appeals for Second Circuit, held at Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in City York, th day March, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges,
PAUL A. CROTTY,
District Judge.
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RICARDO ANDRE RICHARDS,
Petitioner ,
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL, Judge Paul A. Crotty, United States District Court Southern District York, sitting by designation.
Respondent .
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FOR PETITIONER: L EON B. H AZANY , Los Angeles, CA. RESPONDENT: J ANETTE L. A LLEN , Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation (Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, the brief ), United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION petition for review Board Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED petition for review DENIED.
Petitioner Ricardo Andre Richards, native citizen Jamaica, seeks June decision BIA, affirming February decision Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering Richards removed Jamaica. In re Ricardo Andre Richards, No. A042 June 2015), aff’g No. A042 (Immig. Ct. Napanoch, Feb. assume parties’ familiarity with facts record prior proceedings, which refer only as necessary explain our decision deny petition.
On appeal, challenges holding he was convicted two offenses constitute crimes involving moral turpitude *3 (“CIMTs”). See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). We defer to BIA’s reasonable interpretations meaning “moral turpitude” de novo BIA’s interpretation elements York’s criminal laws. Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2005).
Richards first argues that third degree assault, N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00(1), is categorically not a CIMT because a conviction can result from a “minor” injury caused by a “slight” amount force. But § 120.00(1) requires a specific intent to cause “physical injury” that is more than a mere technical battery. See N.Y. Penal Law § 10.00(9); People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677, 680 (1999); Matter Philip A., N.Y.2d (1980). therefore defer BIA’s reasonable view that conviction under § 120.00(1), requiring proof intentional assault meant cause more than de minimis physical harm, constitutes CIMT. See Solon, 2007).
Richards next argues second degree menacing, Penal Law § 120.14(1), categorically not CIMT. Here again, defer BIA’s contrary conclusion. argument second degree menacing *4 general intent crime misreads the statute, which requires “intentionally plac[ing] or attempt[ing] to place another person in reasonable fear physical injury . . . .” Penal Law § 120.14(1). York courts construe language require a specific intent cause fear injury. See People v. Bartkow, N.Y.2d (2001); People v. Bryant, N.Y.S.2d 541–42 (4th Dep’t further argues that § 120.14(1) cannot categorically be a CIMT because the use an object that only appears be a firearm not a sufficient aggravating factor. The BIA disagreed, noting that § 120.14(1) requires a specific intent make victim fear physical harm from use a deadly weapon, whether or not displayed weapon real. Because courts require defendant display object could reasonably be perceived as real firearm, see People Lopez, N.Y.2d (1989); People Colon, N.Y.S.2d 440–41, (3d Dep’t 2014), conclusion—that use fake firearm constitutes sufficient aggravating factor—is permissible and therefore deserves deference, Gill, F.3d at 89. Finally, reject argument BIA erred in relying on Silva Trevino, (A.G. 2008) (“Silva Trevino I”). The agency relied only Silva Trevino I’s definition CIMT as “involv[ing] both reprehensible conduct some degree scienter,” decision vacating *5 1 Silva Trevino I expressly preserved definition. Matter Silva Trevino, 26 I. n.3 (A.G. 2015); also Silva Trevino, & N. Dec. n.2 have considered remaining arguments conclude they are without merit. For foregoing reasons, petition DENIED. THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
[1] has abandoned any challenge conclusion Penal Law §§ 120.14(2) (3) are CIMTs. Yueqing Zhang Gonzales, F.3d n.7 (2d Cir. 2005); also Gross Rell, F.3d (2d Cir.