Richards v. Schreiber, Conchar & Westphal Co.Richards v. Schreiber, Conchar & Westphal Co.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Robinson
Por some time prior to the eighteenth day of August, 1898, the defendant, H. C. Ehrlich, had been engaged at Manson, in the business of selling hardware, agricultural implements, and other kinds of property. On the day named, he executed to the plaintiff, E. A. Richards, and E. A. Richards as trustee for the Manson Loan and Trust Company, and L. H. Plumb, a mortgage on his entire stock in trade, and on all his book accounts, and also a mortgage on real estate. These mortgages were *425given, in part, at least, to secure the payment of about nine thousand dollars, with interest, represented by promissory notes, which the mortgagor and Ehrlich & Eadie (a firm of which he was a member), had sold and guarantied to the plaintiffs, and the persons whom they represent. The mortgage was recorded on the nineteenth day of August, and on the twenty-first this action was commenced. The plaintiff, E. A. Richards, was appointed and qualified as receiver, and took possession of the mortgaged property. The defendants are creditors of Ehrlich, and claim interests in the mortgaged property, or rights against the plaintiff on account of it. They allege that the chattel mortgages were fraudulent and void, as against the creditors. Questions in regard to the priority of the claims of some of the defendants, and their right to have them treated as preferred, are also involved in the case.
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Section 2952 of the Code, provides that “where the petition states, in addition to the other facts required, that the plaintiff will lose his claim unless the attachment issues and is served on Sunday, it may be issued and served on that day.” Section 2965 provides that, “where there are several attachments against the same defendant, they shall be executed in the order in which they were received by the sheriff.” Section 3021 is also a part of the chapter relating to attachments and garnishments, and contains the following: “This chapter shall be liberally construed, and the plaintiff, at any time when objection is made thereto, shall be permitted to amend any defect in the petition, affidavit, bond, writ or other proceeding; and no attachment shall be quashed, dismissed, or the property attached released, if the defect in any of the proceedings has been or can be amended, so as to show that a legal cause for the attachment existed at the time it was issued, and the court shall give the plaintiff a reasonable time to perfect such defective proceedings.” The policy of the law is, to. permit service of the writ on Sunday, when the essential facts are shown by the petition. *432The reasons for permitting the service on Sunday of a writ issued on that day, apply as strongly to the service of a writ issued on another day, but which, for a sufficient reason, has not been served, if the petition shows, that the plaintiff will lose his claim if the service is not made on Sunday. It would not be a liberal, but a most narrow and technical construction, to hold that the writ cannot be served on Sunday, if issued on some other day of the week. Nor do we think the effect of filing the amendment to the petition, showing the facts necessary to a service on Sunday, should be limited to the time commencing with the filing. The writ was at all times valid, and was in the hands of the sheriff for service. The right to serve it was suspended Sunday morning, but was revived when the amendment was filed; and, as it was the first one placed in the hands of the officer for service, it was properly served first. We do not think the evidence shows delay or misconduct on his part sufficient to give the service of the second writ priority over that of the first. Our attention has been called to numerous authorities which are claimed to be in conflict with our conclusions on this branch of the case, but the statutes of this state must govern, and we do not think any of the authorities cited are applicable under those statutes. We have construed them liberally, as we are required to do, to the end that substantial justice shall prevail, and not be defeated on purely technical grounds. In our opinion, the district court was right in giving to the garnishment in favor of the stove company, priority over that under the writ in favor of the Schreiber, Conchar & Westphal Company.
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VI. The plaintiff, Richards, appealed from so much of the decree as required the plaintiffs ¿o exhaust the real estate security before appropriating any of the property secured by the chattel mortgage to the payment of their claims. In view of the conclusions we have reached, that part of the decree is of but little importance. The objection to it is that it is not supported by the evidence. The point is suggested, rather than argued, and we need only say that there is evidence to justify the part of the decree to which we have referred.
VII. The decree provided for the payment by the receiver of the claims of the Standard Oil Company, from collections made on collateral notes which were not required to pay the notes to secure the payment of which they were held. No objection to that portion of the decree is made, and it is affirmed.
The district court found and adjudged that the mortgagees were in possession of the mortgaged personal property when they were garnished by the Michigan Stove Company and the Schreiber, Conchar & Westphal Company, and the decree in that respect is fully sustained by the evidence.
We conclude that the order of payment of the several defendants is substantially correct as fixed by the district court; that is, that the funds and other *438property in the hands of the receiver are to be used in first paying the Standard Oil Company, next the Michigan Stove Company, and then the Schreiber, Conchar & Westphal Company. The property, if any, remaining after those payments are made, is to be used in paying the claims of the general creditors, in proportion to their respective amounts. The decree of the district court, in all particulars not in conflict with the views we have expressed, is affirmed, and, in all other respects, it is reversed. The cause is remanded to the district court for a decree in harmony with this opinion. — Reversed.