132 Iowa 612 | Iowa | 1906
In October of the year 1898, one D. T. Blodgett obtained from certain members of defendant district the following order:
State of Iowa, October 24, 1898. We, the undersigned members of the school board of district township of Jackson, in the county of Calhoun, do hereby contract for nine sets of Kennedy’s Mathematical Blocks, provided a majority of said board sign this agreement, for which we agree to pay D. T. Blodgett, or agent, the sum of twenty-five ($25.00) dollars a set.
We hereby authorize the officers of said board to issue a warrant for the, same, payable twelve months after date without interest. [Signed] S. M. Clements, G. Packard.
For my name it must be made payable two years after date. W. S. Chambers', Joe Oxenford, John Wingerson.
This action is bottomed upon the original contract of October 24, 1898, and the resolution of acceptance of January 7, 1899. As the board had-not, in regular session, authorized the purchase of blocks, and had not given the five signers of the contract authority to do so, and as the five signers acted independently of each other and not as a board, the contract or order was not binding upon the defendant, and it can be held liable only because of ratification of the contract through the receipt and retention of the blocks, or by reason of the resolution of January 7, 1899. That there was a ratification in both ways seems too clear for argument. The defendant accepted and used the blocks with full knowledge of all the facts for more than six years before it offered to return them, and it made no offer to return until this suit was brought on for trial. Moreover, at the January,. 1899, meeting, all members being present, the board voted to accept the blocks and pay for the same. This resolution was not a new contract, for no price was fixed therein. The vote was to accept the blocks and to pay for the same. Manifestly this had reference to an acceptance under the .contract and to payment of the price at which the blocks were sold. In other words it was a ratification of the contract theretofore attempted to be made on behalf of the school district. No proposition was then pending for
As the case seems to be ruled by Johnson v. School District, it follows that the motion directing a verdict in plaintiff’s favor was correctly sustained, and the judgment must be, and it is, affirmed.