Richards v. MacKall
124 U.S. 183
SCOTUS
1888
Check Treatment
Me. Justice HaelaN,

аfter stating the facts as above reported, ‍‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‍delivered the opinion of the court.

Is appеllee entitled to relief in a court of equity ‍‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‍in respect to the sale of June 13, 1870? In Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87, 95, it was said that a party who makes an appeal to the conscience of the chancellor should “set forth in his bill specifically what were the impediments to an earlier prosecution of his claim; how he came to be so long ignorant of his rights, and the means used by the respondent to fraudulently keep ‍‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‍him in ignorance; and how and when he first came to a knowledge of the matters alleged in his bill; otherwise, the chancellor may justly refuse to consider his case, on his own showing, without inquiring whether there is a demurrer or formal pleа of the statute of limitations in his answer.” So *188 in Sullivan v. Portland, &c., Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 806, 811: “ To let in the defence that the claim is stale, and that the bill cаnnot, therefore, be supported, it is not necessary that a foundation be laid by any averment in the answer of defendants. If the case, as it appears at the hearing, is liable to the objection by rеason ‍‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‍of the laches of the complainants, the court will, upon that ground, be passive and refusе relief.” In the' latter case, it was said that equity would sometimes refuse relief where a shorter time than that prescribed by the statute had elapsed without suit. See also Hume v. Beal, 17 Wall. 336; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178, 184, 185; Hayward v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 611, 617; Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377, 387.

These principles, applied to the present case, lead to a reversal, upon the ground that the appellee, upоn his own showing, has been guilty of gross laches in applying for relief. When the sale to Richards was made the appellee had in his possession a tax deed to himself conveying the legal title to the whole оf lot 7. While he says he was advised by counsel that that deed was of no value, and for that reason he did nоt put it upon record, he fails to suggest in his pleadings any reason why it was not sufficient to invest him with the legal title tо the premises. The evidence fairly justifies the conclusion that he was induced, by reason of his embarrassed financial condition, to keep it from record in order thereby to confuse the title to the рroperty, and ‍‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‍increase the difficulties in the way of creditors reaching it for his debts. Be that as it may, and аssuming that thé tax deed was invalid, the ap-pellee having gone into possession of lot 7, and improved it, with the consent of his father, and under the latter’s promise to convey it to him, he was entitled, at any time aftеr the sale to Richards, to raise the identical questions now presented, as to the invalidity of the salе and conveyance. He made, as we have seen, an effort, before the sale, to have it stopped; but he did not prosecute the suit brought for that purpose; and after the sale, so far as the record shows, he took no legal steps whatever to prevent a conveyance bеing made to the purchaser or to h^tve the sale set aside. It is true he alleges *189 that he complained to Richards of the injustice done by the sale, and endeavored to procure a compromise with him; that the latter repeatedly promised to do what was right, and to release his claim on the property when he was reimbursed by rents and profits for the money he had expended; that Richards promised to render an account of his claim, but no account was ever rendered, except one so extravagant that it could not be considered; and that he has never been able to effect any arrangement with him. The evidence does not sustain these allegations. Appellee testifiеs that in August, 1873, his father tendered to Richards the amount of his judgment, together with all the expenses and costs of all kinds. But he admits that the appellant declined to accept the money. "While appellant wаs, perhaps, willing to surrender his purchase, shortly after it was made, if he had been reimbursed his expenditures in сonnection with the property, there is no satisfactory proof that he ever recognized the legal or equitable right of the appellee or of any one else to deprive him of the full bеnefit of that 'purchase. We find nothing whatever in the record to excuse the failure of the appellee to institute, legal proceedings, in due time, to have the sale set aside. He knew that the аppellant relied upon the sale, and upon the faith of it expended large sums. He knew that the premises here in dispute were in fact levied on for his debts, and were intended to be sold in satisfaction оf those debts.' But after the property has largely increased in value, and after sleeping upon his rights fоr nearly twelve years, with information, during the whole of that period, of every fact now relied upon by him, appellee asks the aid of a court of equity to set aside the sale and conveyance, and adjudge, him to be the owner of the property; and chiefly, because of a mistake of the оfficer in not so describing the premises in the advertisement of sale and in the conveyance, as to properly identify them. In our judgment, he is not in a position to claim the interference of a court of equity. For that reason alone, the judgment "must be

Reversed cmd the cause remanded, with direction to dismiss the hill.