75 F.2d 853 | 6th Cir. | 1935
The Willys Corporation was organized under the laws of Delaware. In 1921 it was placed in the hands of federal court receiv
The deposit was admittedly a general deposit prior to April 23, 1929, the bank being debtor to the receivers in an amount equal thereto. The appellant contends that by the court order of that date it was converted into a special deposit. Such a deposit, as has been frequently held, “consists in the placing of specific kinds of money or property in the possession of the bank, with an obligation of the bank to return the identical thing deposited; the depositor retaining title.” Keyes v. Paducah & I. R. Co., 61 F.(2d) 611, 612, 86 A. L. R. 203 (6 C. C. A.). It contemplates a preservation of identity by segregation from other like kinds of monéy or property, and the bank becomes a bailee and not a debtor, as where the deposit is general and the bank takes title and becomes obligated not to return the specific money deposited, but to pay the depositor an equal sum on demand. The order -of April 23d stated that the fund should remain on deposit with the bank, and authorized the bank to hold it from and after that date as a “special trust deposit of Willys Corporation, subject to the order of this court, instead of an account in the name of Francis G. Caffey, as Receiver.” There is no showing that at that time any identifiable money was held by the bank for the Willys Corporation. The money had long been commingled with the other funds of the bank and perhaps loaned to the bank’s patrons or spent. The title to it was not in the receivers but had been parted with, and all that the receivers owned or had was a claim against the bank for an amount equal to it. That it was the intention of the receivers and the bank that it should be a general deposit, with the bank having the right to use it and pay back an equal sum, is evidenced by the crediting of interest to the account by the bank computed on the average daily balances. These credits were reported by receiver Caffey to and approved by the court on April 8, 1929. After April 23d the bank continued to credit interest to the account, indicating that it was the intention of the bank that the deposit should retain its status of an interest-bearing general deposit. Nothing’ appears in the record' to show a different intention on the part of the appellant receiver; indeed, as late as November 6, 1931, he insisted that the bank be required to pay over to him the principal sum of the deposit, with the interest credited thereon. The crediting of interest on the deposit indicates a general deposit, and “in the absence of a definite understanding to the contrary” is controlling. Restatement, Trusts (Tent. Draft No. 1) pp. 41, 42; Columbia Law Review, June, 1921, vol. 21, p. 507.'
It is also clear, we think, that, no trust was created by the order of April 23d. The case is not as it would be had the money
The order of the court is affirmed.