57 So. 977 | Miss. | 1911
delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant was in the employ of the appellee in appellee’s saw and planing mill, and while so employed was
We have been so particular in describing the cause of ■action as set out in the declaration, because the allegations of the declaration.are material for the proper consideration of the question presented. There was some evidence to the effect that one Skean was the superintendent of the mill, and that in his absence one Lucius
Without passing upon the correctness or incorrectness of this instruction, a sufficient, answer to the contention of appellant is that the princple invoked in the instruction is not-the ground upon which the plaintiff sought to recover in his declaration. The declaration, as hereinbefore stated, simply charges that the defendant failed to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work, and failed to furnish him with safe and
It is urgently insisted that the court erred in giving an instruction to the defendant to the effect that contributory negligence was a defense; and appellant contends that contributory negligence is not a defense, under chapter 135 of the Laws of 1910. The facts in this case are that the injury occurred on the 30th day of March, 1910, and the suit was instituted on January 12, 1911, and chapter 135 of the Laws of 1910 was approved and took effect on April 16, 1910. In other words, the contention is that this act of the legislature had a retroactive effect.
The rule is fundamental, in the construction of statutes, that they will be construed to have k prospective operation, unless the contrary intention is manifested by the clearest and most positive expression, and, further, that such a construction should be placed upon the statute in order to- preserve, if possible, its constitutionality; that the legislature has no power to take away vested rights, in order to create a cause of action out of an existing transaction, for which there was at the time of its occurrence no remedy; nor can it destroy a
The act reads: “In all actions hereafter brought.” It may be that this language is sufficiently broad to cover causes of action arising prior to the passage of the act; but our duty is to so construe the act to preserve, if possible, its constitutionality, and, since it is not manifest that the purpose of the legislature was to embrace prior causes of action and thereby destroy vested rights, we must construe the act so as to limit its operation to causes of action arising subequent to its passage. The law is: “Statutes not expressly made retrospective in terms are otherwise construed, if possible.” 8 Cyc. 1022, and authorities cited.
We see no error in the record, and it is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Suggestion of error filed and overruled.