Iоwa City must be a special place. The plaintiffs in this personal-injury action filed suit in Johnson County, notwithstanding the fact that it hardly had any connection to the case. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for a change of venue. The plaintiffs lost their trial and now appeal the venue change. Because we agree venue was not proper in Johnson County, we affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
This appeal stems from a chain-reaction collision on a highway in Grundy County in *678 early 2001. The accident involved a semi-truck owned by the Anderson Erickson Dairy Company (“AE”). Lorraine and Ward Richards suffered injuries in the accident and sued AE for negligence. They also sued Gary Link, the AE employee driving the semi-truck, and Kellie and Mary Barney, the operator and the owner of another car involved in the accident.
The Richards filed their lawsuit in Johnson County, even though none of the parties resided there. The Richards are residents of Grundy County; Link is a resident of Story County; the Barneys are residents of Polk County; and AE is an Iowa corporation whose principal placе of business is in Polk County. Although the motivation for filing in Johnson County remains unknown, 1 the Richards claimed venue was proper there because AE regularly drove its trucks through Johnson County.
Before filing an answer, AE and Link moved for a change of venue. 2 See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.808(1). They sought to have the trial moved to Grundy County, where the accident occurred. The district court granted the motion.
At trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. The Richards filed a motion for a new trial. They argued the district’ court should not have transferred the case to Grundy County. The district court denied the motion, and the Richards appealed. 3
II. Principles of Review
“The scope of our review of a district court’s ruling on a motion for new trial depends on the grounds raised in the motion.”
Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
[t]o the extent the motion is based on a discretionary ground, we review it for an abuse of discretion. But if the motion is based on a legal question, our review is on error.
Roling v. Daily,
For example, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.801(3)
permits
the district court to change the venue of a trial if the inhabitants of the county are prejudiced against the moving party. In a number of appeals concerning this and similar rules, we have reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Peters ex rel. Peters v. Vander Kooi,
III. The Merits
The primary issue is whether venue was proper in Johnson County. If venue was proper there, we assume the district court lacked authority to transfer the case elsewhere; when venue is proper in multiple counties, the plaintiff may choose where to file and the district court lacks the discretion to transfer the case pursuant to rule 1.808. See id. 4 . If venue was not proper in Johnson County, we must decide whether it was proper in Grundy County. Id.
To answer the foregoing questions, we must apply the various provisions of Iowa Code chapter 616. Id. We first analyze Iowa Code section 616.17, our general venue statute. We then consider two specific venue provisions, which the parties variously claim have applicability in this case.
A. Iowa Code § 616.17
In Iowa, there is a long-standing preference for trying cases in the county of a defendant’s residence.
Tull v. Honda Research & Dev., Ltd.,
Personal actions, except as otherwise provided, must be brought in a county in which some of the defendants actually reside, but if neither of them have a residence in the state, they may be sued in any county in which either of them may be found.
Iowa Code § 616.17 (2001). Although renumbered several times ovеr the years, the substance of the statute has remained unchanged for over a century.
Compare
Iowa Code § 2586 (1873),
with
Iowa Code § 616.17 (2001). Clearly, the present personal-injury lawsuit is a “personal action” for purposes of the statute.
See, e.g., Tull,
Having applied the general venue statute to the facts of this case, we now turn to examine two specific venue provisions the parties have brought to our attention, Iowa Code sections 616.18 and 616.8. We must determine whether they fit within the “except as otherwise provided” proviso in the general venue statute and also make venue
*680
proper in other counties.
Id.) see, e.g., Tull,
B. Iowa Code § 616.18
In 1941, the legislature enacted a law permitting plaintiffs in motor vehicle accidents to sue in the county in which the injury was sustained. 1941 Iowa Acts ch. 298, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 616.18 (1946)). In 1972, the legislature broadened this special venue provision to plaintiffs in all personal-injury lawsuits. 1972 Iowa Acts ch. 1127, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 616.18 (1973)). We subsequently held Iowa Code section 616.18 falls within the “except as otherwise provided” proviso of Iowa Code section 616.17.
Tull,
C. Iowa Code § 616.8
To show venue was proper in Johnson County, the plaintiffs cite another special venue statute, Iowa Code section 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides:
An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or сars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated.
Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute.
Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston,
The Richards contend section 616.8, like section 616.18,■ falls within the “except as otherwise рrovided” language of section 616.17 and thereby authorized venue in Johnson County. Prior precedent holds otherwise. We were presented with simi-larfaets and identical statutes in 1926 and held our common carrier statute did not fall within the exception to the general venue statute. For this reason, today we hold venue was not proper in Johnson County and affirm the district court.
Nickell I
In
Nickell v. District Court (“Nickell I”),
the plaintiff was killed when his automobile 'collided with a train in Wayne County.
The engineer filed a motion to change venue to Appanoose County.
Id.
The plaintiff resisted the motion.
Id.
The plaintiff claimed Iowa’s eomhion carrier statute fit within the “except otherwise provided” language of the general venue statute and therefore permitted him to sue both the railroad and the engineer any
*681
where the railroad had tracks in the state.
Id.
at 410,
The district court denied the engineer’s motion, but on appeal we reversed. We held “the exception provided for in [the general venue statute] does not cover the conditions provided for in [the common carrier statute].”
Nickell I,
Our holding in
Nickell I
was premised upon a distinction between suability and residence.
Id.
at 410-11,
Nickell II
We further explained and reaffirmed our holding in
Nickell I
the next year in
Hinchcliff v. Dist. Ct.,
In
Nickell II,
we reaffirmed our holding in
Nickell I
and again ordered the entire case transferred to Appanoose County.
Id.
at 472-73,
When reading
Nickell I
and
II
together, it becomes manifest that it was the
engi
*682
neer’s
interest to be sued in his county of residence that controlled the analysis in
Nickell I.
Put simply,
Nickell I
held that Iowa Code section 616.8 does not fall within the “except as otherwise provided” proviso of section 616.18 when the plaintiff also sues other Iowa residents.
See also Halse v. La Crescent Grain Co.,
In light of
Nickell I
and
II,
it is clear in the case at bar that venue was not proper in Johnson County. AE was suable in Johnson County but not a residеnt thereof. Link was entitled to have the case moved to a proper venue. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.808. As indicated, venue was proper in either Polk or Story counties, the counties wherein at least one defendant was resident, as well as Grundy County because the injury was allegedly sustained there. Iowa Code §§ 616.17, .18;
see also Tull,
Reaffirming Statutes of Convenience
To overrule
Nickell I and II
after nearly eight decades would frustrate legislative intent in two respects. First, the legislature’s silence over the years is evidence of its tacit approval of our construction of the statutory framework.
State v. Anderson,
As enacted, the common carrier statute both expanded and restricted venue for suits brought against common carriers. In each instance, however, the statute promoted convenience.
The common carrier statute expanded the venue options for plaintiffs suing a resident common carrier by itself. At the time, of cоurse, there was not a special venue statute such as Iowa Code section 616.18 permitting plaintiffs to bring suit in the county where the injury occurred. Instead of forcing the plaintiff to sue the resident common carrier at its principal place of business, the plaintiff could sue it wherever its lines ran.
See Bruce Transfer,
The common carrier statute restricted venue for plaintiffs suing a nonresident common carrier by itself. In its absence, the general venue statute permitted plaintiffs to sue the common carrier anywhere it could “be found.” Iowa Code § 11041 (1924) (now codified at Iowa Code § 616.18). Again, the common carrier statute promoted convenience because the common carrier
can more easily procure its witnesses, and carry on the process of the trial [when sued where its lines run] than if it were forced to defend in some remote corner of the state where one of its officers may be served, but where it does not carry on its business of transportation.
The Distinction Between Suability and Residence in Venue Statutes,
13 Iowa L. Rev. 212, 214 (1928);
see, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Mershon,
The Richards would have us overrule our precedents and reinterpret chapter 616 to permit a plaintiff to sue any Iowa resident who happens to have a common carrier as a codefendant in the remotest parts of the state, even though the chosen venue had no connection with the case. This interpretation would clearly promote forum shopping and inconvenience, and thereby frustrate legislative intent. It would also foster injustice because it would encourage plaintiffs to sue defendants in inconvenient venues as lеverage in the settlement process. We will not sanction an interpretation of chapter 616 that would permit a plaintiff to transform statutes of convenience into statutes of inconvenience.
We are obligated to consider the common carrier statute
in pan materia
with other pertinent statutes.
Niles v. Iowa Dist. Ct.,
IV. Conclusion
Venue was proper in Polk, Story, and Grundy counties. The plaintiffs filed suit in Johnson County, which was not a proper venue. The district court rightly transferred the entire case to Grundy County.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. In their reply brief, however, the Richards state "Of course this court is fully aware of the strategy reasons that are back [sic] of this litigation.”
. The same law firm represents AE and Link. Although in the motion for a change of venue the firm only referenced AE, on appeal the parties appear to agree that both AE and Link sought the change of venue to Grundy County. We assume the same. The Barneys did not join in this motion until after filing their answer. But see Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.808(1) (requiring defendants to object to venue before filing answer).
.After the case was transferred to Grundy County, AE and Link cross-petitioned against a number of third-party defendants. These defendants resisted the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and are also parties to this appeal.
But see Cooley v. Ensign-Bickford Co.,
. As in
Slattery,
the defendants in this case did not ask the court to move the trial for non-statutory reasons.
. The parties here do not discuss Nickell II.
. As in
Nickell II,
we expressly do not decide whether venue would have been proper in Johnson County had the plaintiffs only sued AE or had settled with Link.
See Nickell II,