Richards, Alvin v. Buss, EdwinRichards, Alvin v. Buss, Edwin
Before Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, and Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Indiana prisoner Alvin Richards petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus under
In 2004 an officer at Indiana State Prison began investigating Richards after thousands of dollars were deposited to his рrison commissary account via money order, bringing the balance of his account to over $10,000. Richards claimed that a relative sent him the money to pay for his attоrney. The officer’s investigation revealed, however, that individuals from Greenwood, Wisconsin, paid the money to Richards for contraband that he trafficked in the prison, and that they forged the signatures of Richards’s relative on the money orders to avoid detection. The officer also secured corroborating statements from fellow prisoners, some of whom stated that they had received tobacco from Richards in the past. At the close of his investigation the officer compiled a cоnfidential report of his findings (the CAB would later refer to this document as the “Case Report”) and placed it in Richards’s case file for review.
Based on this information, the CAB chаrged Richards with the infraction of “giving or receiving anything of value without authorization.” Richards was pro-
After Richards exhausted his appeals in the prison administrative system he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the CAB violated due process by denying him the opportunity (1) to review the “Report of Investigation” and money order receipts; (2) to present the “Report of Invеstigation” and money order receipts to the CAB; and (3) to call as witnesses the individuals from Wisconsin who forged the signature of Richards’s relative on the money orders and the prisoner who stated Richards sold him tobacco. He also argued that the CAB’s finding of guilt was not supported by “some evidence,” and that it failed to state adequately the rеasons underlying its finding. The district court denied Richards’s petition in its entirety.
Richards now appeals, renewing the arguments he made to the district court. Richards has a protected liberty interest in his earned good time credits and credit-earning class and may not be deprived of either without due process. See Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Due process in this сontext requires advance written notice of the charges, a right to be heard before an impartial decision maker, and a written statement presenting the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974)). Prisoners also have a conditional right to access and present documentary evidenсe and testimony. McBride, 277 F.3d at 924-25. This right extends only to documentary evidence that is exculpatory in nature, id.; Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992), and the right to access and present such documentary evidence or testimony may be limited if “institutional safety or correctional goals” are compromised by the evidence or testimony, see Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). A finding of guilt need only be suppоrted by “some evidence in the record.” See Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)).
Richards first asserts that the CAB violated due process by denying him the opportunity to review and present the “Report of Invеstigation” and money order receipts to the CAB. As a preliminary matter, the record shows that the CAB provided Richards with this report when it gave him the “Notice of Disciplinary Hеaring,” so his argument fails on that score. We can assume, however, that Richards is also referring to the confidential Case Report, see Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[P]ro se pleadings are hеld to less exacting standards than those prepared by counsel and are to be liberally construed ....”); the similarity in the names of the two documents supports such an assumрtion. But even if Richards intended to refer to this docu-
Richards’s argument that he was deprived of the opportunity to review and present the money order receipts likewise fails. He asserts that, had he bеen given the opportunity to review the receipts, the signatures on the receipts would have shown that he received money only from his relative. But the CAB reviewed the receipts (as well as separate evidence that the signatures on them were forgeries) before reaching its decision; it thus would have taken into account any exculpatory value that they possessed. See White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 768 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that there is no denial of opportunity to review and present evidence where CAB reviewed the evidence in question as part of case file).
Richards next argues that the CAB impermissibly denied him the opportunity to present testimony of the individuals from Wisconsin who forged the signаtures of his relative on the money order receipts and the prisoner who told the investigator that Richards sold tobacco. The CAB has no authority to compel out-of-state individuals to testify. See id. (stating that CAB “lacked the compulsory process to require civilians to appear before it”). It also acted within its authority to deny Riсhards’s request to compel the testimony of the prisoner who told the investigator that Richards sold tobacco. The CAB denied Richards’s request to compel the prisoner’s testimony on the basis that Richards did not specify who that offender was. Richards, of course, was trying to claim that he had not sold contraband to anyone; it thereforе would have been hard for him to identify which person had allegedly fabricated a claim against him. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why the CAB’s denial of his request can stand. First and most importantly, Richards lacks the right of confrontation in this context, see Rasheed-Bey, 969 F.2d at 361, and compelling the prisoner to testify would compromise his safety by revealing his identity, sеe Whitford, 63 F.3d at 535. Additionally, we have held before that even a violation of the right to call witnesses is harmless unless there is evidence that the testimony could have aided the prisoner’s defense. See Piggie, 344 F.3d at 678. There is no such evidence here.
Richards’s final argument is that the CAB’s guilty finding is not supported by “some evidence” and adequately explained. The “some evidence” standard requires no mоre than a mere “modicum of evidence,” and we will uphold the CAB’s decision if there is any evidence to support its finding of guilt. See Webb, 224 F.3d at 652 (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455). Here, the Case Report showed that Richards was paid to traffic tobacco, and the CAB succinctly explained that this evidence, coupled with the fact that he received “a large amount of mоney” without proper authorization, pointed to Richards’s guilt. The district court thus did not err in concluding that
AFFIRMED.
Alvin Richards, Michigan City, IN, pro se.