Case Information
*0 FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk *1 ACCEPTED 15-24-00052-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/24/2025 11:38 AM No. 15-24-00052-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK
I N THE F IFTEENTH D ISTRICT OURT OF A PPEALS (A USTIN ) Richard M. YOUNG, Jr. a/k/a Richard Young, Appellant vs .
TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT, et al., Appellees.
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PANEL REHEARING
This Court issued its Opinion on April 24, 2025, affirming the trial court ’ s dismissal of Appellant ’ s inverse condemnation claims and
refusing to afford Appellant the opportunity to amend his live petition to
include additional jurisdictional facts. Because this Court ’ s Opinion
contains numerous errors, this Court should grant Appellant ’ s request
for a rehearing.
INTRODUCTION A review of this Court s Opinion readily proves three errors made by this Court: (1) assuming jurisdiction over this eminent domain case,
which the Texas Legislature has excluded from this Court s jurisdiction;
(2) relying on (even going so far to quote) the wrong petition (quoting the
original as opposed to the amended, which is substantially different); and
(3) failing to remand to allow Appellant Richard Young, a licensed
breeder of whitetail deer, to amend his live petition to assert additional
jurisdictional facts. This Court should withdraw its current Opinion and
fix these devastating errors that will lead to continued litigation on this
already controversial and embattled issue.
The underlying lawsuit brought by Young contends that the conduct of Appellees (collectively referred to as “ TPWD ” ) constitutes the
exercise of eminent domain over his ranch land, small business, and
breeder deer, causing him tremendous lost profits and damages. Before
and after taking Young ’ s personal and real property, TPWD afforded
Young no due process or adequate compensation. Thus, Young s lawsuit
is not barred by sovereign immunity. Clear black letter law reveals these
claims are not barred by sovereign immunity, but this Court affirmed the
trial court s plea to the jurisdiction.
TPWD says its conduct (constituting a taking) is authorized to achieve the “public good ” of controlling Chronic Wasting Disease
(“CWD”), which TPWD contends poses an existential threat to Texas’s
free-range whitetail deer population. Yet, the test utilized by TPWD –
called “ the gold standard ” – detects only the presence of a misfolded prion
within the body of the deer, which is not the equivalent of the presence of
CWD. Moreover, TPWD’s narrative, i.e., that untested breeder deer
living in doubly high-fenced pens will spread CWD to free-range deer, are
assumptions by TPWD that have yet to be tested in court or subjected to
a merits-based analysis.
TPWD ’s sweeping CWD assumptions are unfounded and unsupported by scientific data. In fact, TPWD has not performed any
substantial testing of Texas’s free-range population. The majority of
available Texas-based CWD data arises from privately-funded testing of
deer born and raised in breeder pens on the ranch lands of Texas
landowners, one of which is Young. The testing detects only the presence
of a misfolded, which may indicate CWD but could be indicative of other
things, in a deer isolated from others (and free-range deer) by high-
fencing. In fact, Texas s free-range population has exploded in size since
the first misfolded prion was detected in Texas over a decade ago.
Nevertheless, because a non-evidentiary-based jurisdictional plea was
granted, Young s eminent domain and due process claims were dismissed
-- based purely upon the ipse dixit of a TPWD veterinarian ’ s opinion that
remains untested. This Court ’ s insistence on locking Young out of the
courthouse only furthers the continued destruction of the deer breeding
industry in Texas.
REHEARING ARGUMENT I.
T HIS C OURT L ACKS J URISDICTION O VER T HIS E MINENT D OMAIN A PPEAL
The August 26, 2024 Omnibus Transfer Order explained that Young’s appeal, and about 60 others, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Fifteenth Court. The statutory language explaining this Court s
exclusive jurisdiction is expansive, affording this Court jurisdiction over
most “government” appeals. T EX . G OV T ODE §22.220(d)(1). But not all
government appeals come to this Court, with the Texas Legislature
excluding appeals arising from:
(F) a condemnation proceeding for the acquisition of land or a proceeding related to eminent domain
Id. § 22.220(d)(1)(F) (emphasis added).
A. Eminent domain-related claims fall outside this Court ’ s
appellate jurisdiction – takings cases are mandatorily filed in the county where the land is located.
Excluding proceedings related to eminent domain makes sense because venue for eminent domain related cases is mandatory in the
county where the land is located. T EX . P ROP . C ODE § 21.013. Young’s case
alleges TPWD exerted eminent domain over his land, business, and
breeder deer, and so his lawsuit was filed in the county in which his land
is located – Gillespie County. That means any appeal arising therefrom
should go to the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio, not this Court.
Significantly, when crafting this exception, the Texas Legislature included two types of cases: (1) condemnation cases; and (2 ) “a proceeding
related to eminent domain. ” T EX . G OV T ODE §22.220(d)(1)(F). Clearly,
the exception to this Court s jurisdiction is much broader than just
condemnation lawsuits initiated by governmental entities to acquire
land. To argue otherwise would be to render the second clause , “a
proceeding related to eminent domain,” meaningless, which is precluded..
Tex. Windstorm Ins. Assoc. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.3d 632, 640 (Tex. App. –
Beaumont 2023, pet. denied); Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Tex. Gas
Transmission Corp., 105 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.]
2003, pet. denied).
When “a proceeding related to eminent domain,” it is important to remember that “[t]here is no statutory definition for ‘eminent domain.’”
JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC v. State, 693 S.W.3d 679, 684-85 (Tex. App. –
Houston [14 th Dist.] 2023, n.p.h.). When addressing what “eminent
domain” means, the JRJ Pusok court stated , “that phrase has a
longstanding meaning at common law, which we can consider in our
interpretation of Chapter 21, ” noting the Black’s Dictionary definition
providing : “the inherent power of a governm ental entity to take privately
owned property, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to
reasonable compensation for the taking.” Id. (citing City of San Antonio
v. Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430, 41 S.W. 477 (1897) (holding no particular
writing or judicial decree is necessary for the issue to fall within litigation
for “eminent domain”).
The Supreme Court of Texas often refers to “eminent domain” when discussing Young s type of condemnation claim -- inverse condemnation:
When the government takes private property without first paying for it, the owner may recover damages for inverse condemnation.” The elements of an inverse condemnation or “takings” claim are that (1) an entity with eminent domain power intentionally performed certain acts (2) that *7 resulted in taking, damaging, or destroying the property for, or applying it to, (3) public use.
Tex. Dep’t. of Transp. v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12, 25-26 (Tex. 2024) (citations
omitted & emphasis added). “The action is ‘inverse’ because an entity
with the power of eminent domain has not filed a statutory
condemnation action to determine adequate compensation before taking
the property, so the owner initiates an action for compensation under the
Constitution.” Id. n.9 (emphasis added); id. at 30 (“ The point of a
constitutional action for inverse condemnation is to allow private
property owners to obtain compensation for other intentional
government conduct that takes, damages, destroys, or appropriates their
property for public use without any valid legal basis other than eminent
domain ”) (emphasis added) .
Looking across the Government Code, there are other situations where a court’s jurisdiction turns on whether the case involves “eminent
domain”. For example, several provisions detail whether proceedings
shall be heard in a county court at law or a district court. See, e.g., T EX .
G OV T ODE A NN . § 25.1032(c) (“county civil court at law has exclusive
jurisdiction in Harris County of eminent domain proceedings, both
statutory and inverse, if the amount in controversy . . . “) ; Villareal v.
Harris Cty., 226 S.W.3d 537, 543-44 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] 2006,
no pet.) (holding “that improper use of taxing power to accomplish a
taking of real property is a use of eminent domain power, and thus,
jurisdiction over any claim that alleges such rests exclusively in the
Harris County Civil Courts at Law” ).
In this case, Young’s live petition states:
The actions of the Defendants amount to a taking or inverse condemnation, in violation of the Federal and State Constitutions. The actions of Defendants amount to an unlawful taking of Mr.
Young’s real and personal property in violation of Mr. Young’s cons titutional rights under Texas Constitution Article I, Section 19 and also protected under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Texas district and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction over eminent domain cases (direct condemnation and inverse condemnation). . . . This type of claim must be filed in a district court in the county in which the private real property owner’s affected property is located.
(CR162); (CR174) (“The requirements imposed by the governmental
action has precluded Mr. Young’s ability to use [his] personal and real
property in a manner allowed under Texas and federal law and has been
restricted by the laws, orders, mandates of the state and federal law. In
addition, the actions of Defendants place a stigma on the value of the
personal and real property, which will amount to at a minimum, a taking
of Mr. Young’s land (personal and real) without compensation as required
by the Federal and State constitution.”).
B . The majority of this Court ’s Opinion addresses matters
(eminent domain) outside this Court ’s jurisdiction.
This Court ’ s Opinion makes it even more clear that this case is “ related eminent domain. ” The Opinion spends over half of its content on
Young ’ s inverse condemnation claims as to his breeder deer, breeding
business, breeding permit, and ranch land. Young v. Tex. Parks &
Wildlife Dept., et. al, No. 15-24-00052-CV, 2025 WL 1200947 (Tex. App.
– Austin April 24, 2025, n.p.h.). Section II of the Opinion is entitled
“ Takings or Inverse Condemnation. ” Id. at *3. Section II(A) of the
Opinion addresses Young ’ s eminent domain claim about his breeder deer
(remember, this Court mistakenly quoted language from Young s original
petition in an effort to state his position, but that pleading was no longer
live after the amended petition, which claimed full ownership of the
breeder deer, was filed). [1] Then, Section II(B) of the Opinion addresses
Young s eminent domain claim as to his ranch land. Id. at *5. Also, the
*10 Opinion ’ s Section II(C) addresses Young ’ s eminent domain claim as to his
deer breeding permit and business. Id. at *6. Clearly, the majority of the
Opinion cites and analysis eminent domain law! This Court lacks
jurisdiction over this appeal. Simply put, the Opinion reveals this appeal
was a proceeding related to eminent domain, which falls outside the
jurisdiction of this Court.
C. This Court ’ s exercise of appellate jurisdiction on matters
expressly excluded by the Texas Legislature unconstitutionally imposes a retroactive law.
The general rule is that “ [a] statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective”). T EX . G OVT . C ODE
A NN . § 311.022. Here, the provision vesting the Fifteenth Court with
jurisdiction over certain types of appeals contains no language indicating
retroactive application. T EX . G OV ’ T ODE §22.220(d)(1). In fact, the Rule
of Appellate Procedure adopted to operate parallel to the statute
explicitly states it applies to appeals perfected after September 1, 2024.
Supra n.1 (discussing Rule 27A). Young’s appeal was perfected on July 3,
2024. (CR270).
The transfer of Young s appeal from the Fourth Court, which holds jurisdiction over the county where Young s land is located, to the
Fifteenth Court violates the constitutional right against the imposition
of retroactive laws. Article I, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution
provides that no “bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or
any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall b e made.” T EX .
C ONST . art. I, § 16. “Constitutional retroactivity bars exist to ‘protect the
people’s reasonable, settled expectations.” Hogan v. Southern Methodist
University, 688 S.W.3d 852, 860 (Tex. 2024). Young had a reasonable and
settled expectation that when he prepared and filed his appeal, paying
the filing fee to the Fourth Court, which presides over the county where
his land, business, and breeder deer are located, that his appeal would be
heard by the Fourth Court.
Young understands that the Texas Legislature vested the Supreme Court of Texas with authority to “order cases transferred from one court
of appeals to another at any time that, in the opinion of the supreme
court, there is good cause for the transfer.” T EX . G OV T ODE A NN . §
73.001(a). The Order transferring Young’s appeal cites the legislation
creating the Fifteenth Court, demonstrating the transfer is based on the
exclusive jurisdiction provision, not docket equalization or any other
purpose. That motivation for the transfer, i.e., a belief that the appeal
falls within this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, is acknowledged by the
transfer order language providing the transferred appeals (including
Young s) are ones “that those Courts have determined are within the
exclusive intermediate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifteenth Court of Appeals District.” [2]
However, a comparison of Young’s live petition and this Opinion, against the statutory exceptions to this C ourt’s jurisdiction , reveal that
Young’s appeal falls outside th is Court s jurisdiction. Despite the
Supreme Court of Texas’s Omnibus Transfer Order claiming “good
cause,” it simply does not exist. “Appellate jurisdiction cannot be created
by consent, stipulation of the parties, or waiver, either by the court or by
litigants.” Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Am. Nat'l Fire
Ins. Co ., 928 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 1996, no writ).
*13 “Jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be ignored by this court or
waived by the parties.” Id. “When jurisdiction does not lie in an appellate
court, it normally has only the power to recognize that fact and dismiss
the appeal for want of jurisdiction, regardless of any agreement or waiver
by the parties.” Id.
While a statute authorizes the Supreme Court of Texas to transfer cases among intermediate appellate courts for “good cause,” the cause
cited for this transfer is invalid. Although Young knows the Supreme
Court of Texas has transferred other appeals for docket equalization to
low volume appellate courts, that did not occur here. The Supreme Court
of Texas outlined the reason for the transfer – exclusive jurisdiction -- but
a close review of the live pleading (and now this Court s Opinion) reveals
Young’s claims fall outside the purported exclusive jurisdiction.
Furthermore, Young contends this Court s issuance of an Opinion constitutes the unconstitutional application of a retroactive law. Young
had a settled expectation that his appeal, when filed in one appellate
court, would be disposed of in that appellate court, other than for docket
equalization (which also involves intermediate appellate courts who are
vested with likewise civil and criminal jurisdiction and where the justices
presiding are duly elected as opposed to appointed). Young’s settled
expectation is especially true when the case was filed to the appellate
court with jurisdiction over the county where his land, business, and deer
are located. This Court ’ s Opinion should be withdrawn and the case
remanded to the Fourth Court of Appeals for disposition.
II. T HIS OURT ’ S O PINION Q UOTES THE O RIGINAL , N OT A MENDED , P ETITION W HEN D ECIDING N O W AIVER OF S OVEREIGN I MMUNITY E XISTS
This Court quoted Young when describing Young ’ s claims. Young, 2025 WL , *1 ( “ Young acknowledged that he had only a ‘ possessory ’ right
in his breeder deer, ‘ as opposed to the ownership of title to the deer ’” ).
The quoted language comes from Plaintiff ’ s Original Petition. (CR12).
However, when the plea to the jurisdiction was granted, the trial court
considered Plaintiff ’ s First Amended Original Petition, which contains
language directly to the contrary – Young pleaded he had ownership of
title. (CR165-68) (describing the 174 deer owned by Young and their
value to him of $705,000). This Court ’ s belief that Young did not claim
ownership of the deer (but only a possessory right) is pivotal to this
Court s analysis of Young s taking claim about the deer. Specifically,
Young contends he is owed just compensation for the taking of his deer
( “ including but not limited to Mr. Young ’ s animals, ranch equipment,
ranch land, permit, and other personal and real property ” ). This Court ’ s
Opinion should be withdrawn and an analysis conducted based on
Young s live petition.
III. T HIS OURT E RRED IN F AILING TO R EMAND FOR A P LEADING A MENDMENT
When Young filed suit, the defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction.
(CR144). The day before the jurisdictional plea hearing was held, Young
expanded upon his Original Petition, (CR6), by filing his Amended
Original Petition. (CR162). This caused Co-Defendant TAHC, not a party
to this appeal, to seek and receive a continuance of its jurisdictional plea.
(RR6-7). TPWD took a different approach, abandoning the right to file
Special Exceptions, [3] despite Young s far-reaching Amended Petition, and
demanding to be heard immediately. TPWD’s decision to pursue a non -
evidentiary jurisdictional plea (and to have the newly-pleaded and broad
claims heard immediately) required the trial court (and now this Court)
to take as true all of Young’s allegations. [4] The record shows TPWD,
*16 represented by “opposing attorneys of reasonable competence,” were put
on notice of Young’s claims of the taking of his breeder deer, ranch land,
improvements, small business, and permit rights without due process or
just compensation. [5]
The Supreme Court of Texas has made clear that appeals should be decided based on substance as opposed to form. Thus, courts generally
allow parties to replead during immunity-based jurisdictional challenges
unless their pleadings demonstrate incurable defects. Tex. Dep't of
Transp. v. Sefzik , 355 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2011) (“When this Court
upholds a plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds, we
allow the plaintiff the opportunity to replead if the defect can be cured”);
City of Waco v. Kirwan , 298 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Tex. 2009) (“The allegations
Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley , 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). Additionally,
reviewing courts must construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor and look
to the plaintiff's intent. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217,
226 (Tex. 2004).
[5] A pleading should contain “a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give
fair notice of the claim involved ....” T EX . R. IV . P . 47(a). “We will uphold the petition
as to a cause of action that may be reasonably inferred from what is specifically
stated, even if an element of the cause of action is not specifically alleged.” The Huff
Energy Fund, LP v. Longview Energy Co. , 482 S.W.3d 184, 195 (Tex. App. — San
Antonio 2015), aff'd sub nom. Longview Energy Co. v. Huff Energy Fund LP, 533
S.W.3d 866 (Tex. 2017). “In determining whether a pleading is adequate, we examine
whether an opposing attorney of reasonable competence , on review of the
pleadings, can ascertain the nature and the basic issues of the controversy.” Id.
(emphasis added).
found in the pleadings may either affirmatively demonstrate or negate
the court's jurisdiction. If the pleadings do neither, it is an issue of
pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to
amend the pleadings.” (citations omitted )); Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 226 –
27 (“If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively
demonstrate the trial court[‘]s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively
demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading
sufficiency and the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to
amend.”). This Court s jurisdiction is, at best, on shaky ground, so to then
disallow Young the privilege afforded nearly all other similarly-situated
litigants facing a dismissal causes great pause. This Court erred in
denying Young a remand for a right to amend his live pleading.
CONCLUSION & PRAYER This Court should grant the rehearing, withdraw the Opinion, issue an Order stating this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal, and
asking the Supreme Court of Texas to re-transfer this case to the Fourth
Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction over the county mandatorily
required to address Young s eminent domain claim. Alternatively, this
Court should, after withdrawing the Opinion, remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings or to allow Young the opportunity to amend
his live petition. Young also requests any relief to which he is entitled
under law and equity.
Respectfully submitted, Kimberly S. Keller K ELLER S TOLARCZYK PLLC 215 W. Bandera Road No. 114-PMB 800 Boerne, Texas 78006 Tele: 830.981.5000 /s/Kimberly S. Keller Kimberly S. Keller SBN: 24014182
Email: kim@kellsto.com APPELLANT’S COUNSEL *19 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE & SERVICE I certify this Motion for Panel Rehearing contains 3,815 words. On June 24, 2025 , I served, through this Court’s e -filing server, a copy of this
Motion on those listed below:
Counsel for Appellees:
KEN PAXTON, Attorney General of Texas; BRENT WEBSTER, First
Asst. Attorney General; JAMES LLOYD, Deputy Attorney General for
Civil Litigation; KELLIE E. BILLINGS-RAY, Chief, Environmental Protection Division, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Environmental Protection Division, P.O. Box 12548, MC066, Austin, Texas 78711-2548
IAN LANCASTER, Asst. Attorney General, Email: ian.lancaster@oag.texas.gov H. CARL MYERS, Asst. Attorney General, Email: carl.myers@oag.texas.gov
HEATHER COFFEE, Asst. Attorney General, Email: heather.coffee@oag.texas.gov Counsel for Texas Animal Health Commission: KAREN L. WATKINS, Asst. Attorney General, Administrative Law Division, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas
78711, Email: karen.watkins@oag.texas.gov /s/Kimberly S. Keller Kimberly S. Keller *20 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Kimberly Keller on behalf of Kimberly Keller
Bar No. 24014182
kim@kellsto.com
Envelope ID: 102351808
Filing Code Description: Motion for Rehearing
Filing Description: Appellant's Motion for Panel Rehearing
Status as of 6/24/2025 11:54 AM CST
Associated Case Party: State Of Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Kellie E.Billings-Ray Kellie.Billings-Ray@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Ian Lancaster ian.lancaster@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Laura Courtney laura.courtney@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
H. CarlMyers Carl.Myers@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
James ScottMcCarley scott.mccarley@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: Maurice E. "Pete" Moore, III, d/b/a Cypress Ranches
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Kevin Dubose kdubose@adjtlaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Paul W.Green pgreen@adjtlaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Latonya McPherson lmcpherson@adjtlaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
James T.Drakeley jdrakeley@spencerfane.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Karen LWatkins karen.watkins@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
C DixonMosty cdmosty@mostylaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Richard Mosty rmosty@mostylaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Jennifer SRiggs jriggs@r-alaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Kimberly SKeller kim@kellsto.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
Clayton CUtkov cutkov@andrewsmyers.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT
[1] Young addresses this error within the Opinion in Section II of this Rehearing Motion.
[2] In Simmons v. State, an appellant challenged the constitutionality of the transfer of appeals for docket equalization purposes. 2009 WL 2341921 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d). The Simmons appellant based his challenge on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at *3 (“Observing that voters in the Fourth District elect justices to the Fourth Court of Appeals and transfer of his appeal to the Seventh Court of Appeals means it will be decided instead by justices elected by voters living in the Seventh District, appellant reasons that transfer of appeals of cases arising in the Fourth District deprives voters of the right to elect the appellate judges who will decide cases arising in their district.”). However, the appellate court rejected the challenge because the a ppellant failed to prove that “he has standing to litigate the Equal Protection rights of Fourth District voters.” Id. Young challenges the retroactive application of this statute in violation of constitution.
[3] When special exceptions are not filed, courts must construe the live petition liberally in favor of the pleader. Roark v. Allen , 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982).
[4] In non-evidentiary jurisdictional pleas, this Court must accept as true all pleaded factual allegations and then determine if the allegations confer jurisdiction. Dallas