Lytle v. LindLytle v. Lind
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Mead, Connors, Lawrence, Douglas, Lipez, Hjelm A.R.J.
[¶1] Richard Lytle, Sandra Lytle, and Gregg Wilson (collectively, the neighbors) appeal from an order of the Superior Court (York County, Mulhern, J.) granting a partial summary judgment in favor of Douglas E. Lind and Louise B. Lind on the parties’ respective cross-motions for summary judgment relating to certain claims of unreasonable interference with an easement. The parties later stipulated to the dismissal of allegations of other forms of interference with the easement, resulting in a final judgment. The neighbors argue that the court erred in concluding that a split-rail fence erected by the Linds within an easement held by the neighbors did not unreasonably interfere with the right-of-way as a matter of law. We agree and remand for further proceedings.
[¶2] The following facts are presented in the light most favorable to the neighbors as the nonprevailing party and are supported in the summary judgment record. Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 2, 45 A.3d 722.
[¶3] The Linds live on and hold title to property in Wells. The Lind property is identified as Lot 327 on a 1938 subdivision plan titled “Plan of the Wells Beach Improvement Company.” Parties in interest, Eric D. Blomgren and Kristen D. Blomgren, own an abutting parcel, Lot 328, in the subdivision.
[¶4] The subdivision plan depicts a ten-foot-wide right-of-way that is located over the Lind and Blomgren parcels, running along the parcels’ common boundary, with five feet of the easement’s width located on each of the two parcels.1 The right-of-way leads to a cement bulkhead and stairway that allows access to the Webhannet River.
[¶5] In 1987, Richard Lytle and Sandra Lytle purchased Lot 303 in the subdivision. The Lytles’ deed does not contain an express easement granting them rights to the right-of-way depicted in the plan. Wilson is a joint owner of Lot 302 in the subdivision. Wilson’s deed states that the “premises are
[¶6] Even though the Lytles’ deed does not contain an express easement granting them rights to the right-of-way depicted in the plan, the court determined that the Lytles’ parcel benefits from an implied easement identical to the one described in Wilson’s deed. See Edwards v. Blackman, 2015 ME 165, ¶ 34, 129 A.3d 971. The court also determined that the Lytles possess an easement under the “paper streets” statutes. See
[¶7] The Linds have observed the Lytles use the right-of-way from time to time to access the Webhannet shoreline since the Lytles purchased their lot in 1987. The neighbors use the right-of-way to carry a variety of water-related items, including paddleboards and kayaks, to the river.
[¶8] On May 22, 2023, the Linds installed a split-rail fence within the right-of-way just inside the property line they share with the Blomgrens. The fence runs parallel to the common boundary, along the center of the right-of-way, and ends near the river. The section of the fence closest to the
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶9] On October 4, 2023, the neighbors filed a complaint against the Linds seeking, in part, a declaratory judgment that the fence and vehicles parked in the Linds’ driveway unreasonably interfered with their easement rights. The neighbors also sought injunctive relief and requested a preliminary injunction that would have required the Linds to remove the fence. Following a hearing, the court denied the neighbors’ request for a preliminary injunction. On October 31, 2023, the Linds filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to join the Blomgrens as a necessary party. The court issued an order requiring the neighbors to file an amended complaint naming the Blomgrens as a party in interest, and the neighbors then filed an amended complaint joining the Blomgrens.
[¶11] The Linds and the neighbors each filed a motion to alter or amend the order, see
III. DISCUSSION
[¶12] On appeal, the neighbors argue that the court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the Linds’ motion for
[¶13] “We review de novo the grant or denial of cross-motions for summary judgment, and consider both the evidence and any reasonable inferences that the evidence produces in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment has been granted in order to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Osprey Landing, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2017 ME 46, ¶ 7, 157 A.3d 247 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
[¶14] “Property, although subject to an easement, remains within the ownership and control of the owner of the servient estate. That ownership and control is subject only to the restriction that the owner of the servient estate
[¶15] To support the conclusion that the fence does not unreasonably interfere with the right-of-way, the trial court relied on the absence of any dispute among the parties that users of the easement are able to gain access to the river even with the installation of the fence. This analysis, however, is in error because, since 1898, we have routinely held that owners of easements have the full right to use the entire width of a right-of-way and “are not limited in such right to what is necessary or convenient.” Rotch v. Livingston, 91 Me. 461, 472-73, 40 A. 426, 431 (1898); see Stanton v. Strong, 2012 ME 48, ¶ 10, 40 A.3d 1013.
[¶16] In 2024, we reaffirmed our commitment to easement holders’ rights in Kinderhaus N. LLC v. Nicolas, 2024 ME 34, ¶¶ 31-34, 314 A.3d 300. There, the dispute centered on the presence of trees located within a twenty-foot-wide right-of-way. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. We noted that the trees were an obstacle that would force the dominant estate holders to “zig-zag or otherwise use only a portion of the twenty-foot right of way to avoid the trees.” Id. ¶ 34. As a result, we concluded that the dominant estate holder was within her rights
[¶17] Similar to the interference created by the trees in Kinderhaus, the Linds’ fence forces the dominant estate holders to use only a portion of the right-of-way or otherwise vary their path because they cannot walk through the center of the easement or traverse from one side of the easement to the other. The fence also restricts the width of objects that the easement otherwise would accommodate. “It may be argued that this is a trifling inconvenience, but as owners of the dominant estate, they have the unrestricted right to ‘use the full extent of the described land for purposes consistent with the deeded easement.’” Id. ¶ 34 (quoting Mill Pond, 2006 ME 135, ¶ 7, 910 A.2d 392).
[¶18] “The right to unfettered use of the full area of the easement is not, however, a blanket prohibition on any objects being placed within the space of the easement.” Id. ¶ 34 n.8. In Mill Pond, for example, we sanctioned the
[¶19] Mill Pond is distinguishable from this case because the sign in that case was placed on the southeast corner of the easement in a remote and unusable location—an area that could not “be reasonably used for purposes of ingress and egress.” Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Here, in contrast, the fence was placed squarely down the middle of the right-of-way, an area that undoubtably can and should be used for purposes of ingress and egress. Unlike the sign in Mill Pond, the Linds’ fence interferes with the use of the right-of-way because it splits the easement in half, transforming the ten-foot-wide right-of-way into two five-foot-wide rights-of-way, making the easement more difficult to traverse. See id. ¶ 7. The fence itself also consumes space that is part of the easement.
[¶20] Our sanctioning of the placement of the sign in Mill Pond does not undermine our existing jurisprudence that servient estate holders may not erect permanent structures within specified travel portions of an easement. See
The entry is:
Summary judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings, including adjudication of the neighbors’ claim for injunctive relief, consistent with this opinion.
Gene R. Libby, Esq., and Tyler J. Smith, Esq. (orally), Libby O’Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellants Richard Lytle, Sandra Lytle, and Gregg Wilson
Gordon R. Smith, Esq. (orally), Verrill Dana, LLP, Portland, for appellees Douglas Lind and Louise Lind
York County Superior Court docket number CV-2023-185
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY