This аppeal is one more step in a running battle between these parties. The problems are all traceable to various business arrangements apparently commenced in 1956 whereby appellee’s petroleum products were to be distributed through appellants’ filling stations. In 1960 the appellants commenced a lawsuit in the Federal Courts alleging certain antitrust violations by the аppellee and others. That lawsuit was settled by the then attorney for the appellants and agreements were drawn up. The appellants, however, refused to sign the agreements on the ground that their attorney had exceeded his authority. The appel-lee then cross-complained for enforcement of the agreement. The Court found that the attorney had the necessаry settlement authority and ordered the appellants to sign the various documents which were part of the memorandum agreement. Included among these documents was a broadly worded general release. The appellants signed the documents. No appeal was taken from the judgment in that earlier case.
In 1965 appellants brought the present suit against the appellee fоr breach of contract. There seems to be no disagreement that this cause of action arose from the same dealings as were covered in the antitrust suit. The ease was instituted in a statе court and was removed to the District Court upon petition by the defendant.
The answer in this case set up the prior release as a defense. Both sides attempted discovery and ultimately the appellee moved for summary judgment. The motion was granted by the District Court and this appeal resulted.
Basically the appeal in this case turns on whether the appellants have any means of successfully attacking the release which they signed pursuant to the prior settlement agreement. The main thrust of their argument seems to be that the attorney in the prior suit could only have settled that suit аnd cause of action. Arguments are also raised concerning intent and consideration. Additionally, the appellants say that certain erroneous limitations upon their diseov- *347 ery made it impоssible for them to properly oppose the motion for summary judgment.
The basis for the summary judgment is the release signed by the appellants pursuant to the settlement of their prior suit against the appellee. As noted above, that settlement and release were only signed after the appellee had successfully pursued a cross-complaint for enforcement. The issue on that сross-complaint was whether or not the attorney for appellants had authority to settle the case in the manner and on the terms set out. The Court found that the attorney had the necessary аuthority.
The appellants cite general case law for the proposition that where a summary judgment is involved, they are entitled to have almost everything interpreted in their favor. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
The Court in its findings of fact in the earlier lawsuit found that:
“3. Plaintiffs and each of them, instructed and authorized Dwyer to compromise the claims set forth in the complaint herein on the terms contained in the Memorandum of Settlement Agreement.”
Part of the terms of the settlement agreement was the signing of the general release executed by the appellants pursuant to court order.
The apрellants now urge that there are three factual issues concerning the release which should preclude summary judgment. They argue that the attorney did not have authority to settle the breach of сontract claim; that there was inadequate consideration for a release including that claim. Additionally, in their reply brief they add a legal argument that even if the release is valid, it does not сover the breach of contract claim by its terms. Appellee urges that these points are without merit and that in any event they should not be considered here since they were not raised belоw. Ring Engineering Co. v. Otis Elevator Co.,
The argument as to authority is the major one made by the appellants. It is based on the words, “to cоmpromise the claims set forth in the complaint herein * * * ”, which are included in finding of fact No. 3 quoted above. From this language they reach the conclusion that the first suit only determined that the attorney had authority to settle the antitrust claims which they were making against Richfield. Having reached this conclusion, they are then able to cite the authority that only issues actually decided can be used for collateral estoppel.
The argument is valid as far as it goes. The attorney was employed for that lawsuit and authorized to settle it. The trouble, however, with the appellants’ position is that finding of fact No. 3 goes on to say “on the terms contained in the Memorandum of Settlement Agreement”. In settling the prior suit the attorney for the appellants agreed to the terms of a general relеase which barred all other claims. The District Court specifically found that the appellants instructed and authorized their attorney to enter into the agreement and ratified it
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thereafter. What the appellants seem to be saying is that they may authorize the settlement in general without authorizing its specific terms. They cite no authority for this proposition and we have found none. The closеst they can come is a case where an injured railroad employee was allowed to recover for personal injuries even though he had signed a general release which his attorney advised him covered only his claim for wages and tips. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
The other two factual issues asserted by the appellants will be considered together. The appellants first assert that they never intended to compromise the breach of сontract claim. They further assert that the small consideration in the transaction will show what their intent actually was. For several reasons there does not seem to be much to support these аrguments. First, they offer no legal support for a theory that their unilateral intention should have any effect. Secondly, they still do not deal with the findings in the prior case which refer to the “terms of the agrément”. Third, they suggest no facts to show that their intention was any different. The affidavits filed in the District Court by the De Harts are merely conclusions about how they have been put upon by the appellee and by various аttorneys whom they have employed. Finally, they show no reason why testimony should be allowed on this issue. The general release is very clear and the parol evidence rule would seem to cоme into effect. Combined Bronx Amusements, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
The final point raised by the appellants is that the release by its terms does not cover anything more than the antitrust claim. This is raised for the first time in their reply brief. The argument is specious. By selecting certain phrases from the release, appellants seek to avoid the obvious meaning. The argument is that the release only bars certain claims which are “hereinabove specified” and that the prior sentence of the release only refers to the antitrust claim. That is true, but in several sentences prior to the language selected by аppellants, all manner of possible claims are enumerated. It seems clear from reading the document that “hereinabove specified” referred to everything listed above and not simply the prior sentence.
The appellants attempted to discover a variety of information by means of interrogatories and a motion to produce. The appellee objected to most of this discovery. The objections were sustained largely on the grounds that the interrogatories were either irrelevant or requested conclusions of law and that no good cause was shown for the motion to produce.
On this appeal the appellants say that the judge was incorrect in his rulings and that because of this they were unable to present adequate opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Their chief objection was to the decisions of the judge refusing to allow them to go back over the question of settlement authority. The District Judge obviously felt the question was settled and hence the successful summary judgment. We agree.
Affirmed.