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Richard Graff v. City of Chicago, an Illinois Corporation
9 F.3d 1309
7th Cir.
1993
Check Treatment

*1 Right D. Cozzi’s to a Set-Off Reboy employment

If on issue prevails retrial, parties agree that he have all will compensation repay the worker benefits prevent

he received after his accident to occurs, recovery. If

double we ask the clarify

district court to order whom

Reboy repay and amount must must repaid.

be

III. above,

For all of the reasons we REVERSE

judgment plaintiffs in favor of and RemaND jury only. employment

for a trial on the issue grounds.

We AffiRM all other GRAFF, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Richard CHICAGO,

CITY OF an Illinois

corporation, Defendant-

Appellee.

No. 92-2352. Appeals, States

United Court

Seventh Circuit.

Argued June

Decided Nov. *2 Piers, Jonathan A. Rothstein

Matthew J. Fischer, Gessler, Flynn, (argued), Jennifer L. IL, Soeol, Fleisehmann, Hughes Chicago, & for Richard Graff. Counsel, Pahl, Corp.

Eileen T. Office of Moscovitch, IL, Asst. Chicago, Ruth M. 13H Counsel, Gregg, Bobbie McGee Asst. newsstand. Such Corp. newsstands seemed to Welsh, Atty., Kelly Corp. operated R. Asst. Coun- property by have sheer Solomon, Corp. sel, acquiescence. R. Office of the purchased Benna At the time Graff Counsel, Div., Rosenthal, newsstand, Appeals Chicago ostensibly Lawrence required *3 (argued), County Deputy Counsel Deputy operators permits. to acquire newsstand We IL, City Chicago, Chicago, say Corp. ostensibly, Counsel because Graff asserted that Chicago. for operated then and now newsstands on have public way permits the without only and Kraus, Jeffrey Ettelson, Al- T. William S. targeted Graff has been for eviction. IL, Gray, Chicago, & for theimer amicus Committee, Chicago curiae Cent. Area Burn- ordinance, shall Under what we call old the Bd., Planning Michigan ham Park Cent. Ave- permits these were issued at the discretion Assoc, nue Business and LaSalle Street sanitation, the commissioner streets and Council, Inc. mayor permit any and the could revoke a provided time. The old ordinance that such Levin, Dunn, R. Damon E. Lev- Lawrence only Chicago papers, newsstands could sell Funkhouser, IL, Chicago, for amicus & mayor provided and with no standards Sun-Times, Inc., Chicago Gannett curiae Sat- guide hearing his discretion. It also lacked Network, Chicago Inc. and ellite Information procedures to deny review the decisions to or Co. Tribune permit. Chicago revoke a §§ Mun.Code 10- POSNER, Judge, 28-130 to -190. attempted apply Before Chief and Graff for BAUER, CUDAHY, CUMMINGS, permit under the old ordinance without COFFEY, FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, success, although much Chicago continued RIPPLE, MANION, KANNE, permits issue for newsstands at other loca- ROVNER, Judges, tions. Circuit

FAIRCHILD, Judge. Senior Circuit gave In Chicago November Graff two months’ notice to remove his newsstand from MANION, Judge. Circuit way. public This order was later re- seventy nearly years For a newsstand has Graff, however, enough. scinded. had had City Chicago in front stood Cultural February complaint On filed a he Li- (formerly Center Public against Chicago Mayor Daley alleging Graff, brary). plaintiff, op- Richard has that the old ordinance violated the Com- July his newsstand there erated since merce Clause and the First and Fourteenth purchased fifty when he for stand over Amendments to the United States Constitu- dollars. This concerns thousand case relief, injunctive sought compensa- tion.1 He Chicago municipal designed ordinance tory damages attorneys fees. Rather Graff, operators, force newsstand such as ordinance, than on defend the old June acquire permit either or eviction. face Chi- 1991, Chicago amended it. Mun. cago threatened to remove Graff from his (1991). §§ Code to -192 de- 10-28-130 request permit, location. Rather than fendants thereafter moved to dismiss ultimately sought Graff relief the federal complaint arguing the new ordinance correct- court, challenge district with a facial to the ed constitutional that deficiencies Graff ordinance. The court district denied Graffs complaint. had in his identified The court enjoin request Chicago’s proposed enforce- prejudice. without dismissed case Rath- F.Supp. ment the ordinance. 800 apply er than for a under new reasons, following For the we affirm. ordinance, September on Graff complaint his new amended and attacked the Background I. complaint sought its face. The declaratory, all comprehensive prelimi- From indications Graffs predecessors relief: property rights nary permanent injunctions, compensato- had no ownership to the Graham, Mayor Daley tucky sued his ca- official (1985) (official pacity. appeal capacity Graff does not the district court’s suits are L.Ed.2d 114 dismissing Mayor Daley essentially against municipality). case. from the See Ken- attorneys ruled could establish size fees under the court that ry damages newsstands, though did even Fourteenth Amendments. limitations First and cafes. The not do the same sidewalk alleg- Broadly in count one Graff speaking, municipal court ruled that the code did consti- Chicago’s permit ordinance es allegation support that the landmark Graffs restraint of free tutes unlawful differently newsstands commission treated alleges he new speech. In count two visibly than other affected structures Equal Protection ordinance violates property. landmark Because could Graff other, non-expressive uses of Clause because likelihood of success on show a substantial cafes) (such way sidewalk merits, court denied the district Graffs favorably newsstands. than treated more *4 injunctive for relief. Count three motions old alleges he that the ordinance count three dealing old remains alive with the law under equal protection him of the denied in the district court. In 1987 Graff Amendment. Fourteenth from the east side of moved his newsstand appealed the of While Graff dismissal the side Center to west entrance the Cultural two, applied permit counts one and he con- Randolph to accommodate off of Street in front of the operate to two newsstands underground Pedway the Tunnel. struction of location, of the Cultural Center. Because recoup he to the count three seeks Under permission to from the Graff had first seek having move expenses of had to his news- Chicago Historical and Archi- Commission on expenses architectural he stand and certain application That was tectural Landmarks. filing application his for a incurred when 13,1992, the August on because news- denied permit the old ordinance. under compromise would the architectural stands Chicago Again, moved to dismiss. Before building. integrity adjoining landmark the motion, 14, May court ruled on the on the 1992, Chicago August again notified On again Chicago notified Graff that days Graff that he had fifteen to remove his in fifteen intended to remove his newsstand injunction in sought an newsstand. Graff consistently objected days. Chicago to had court, promptly this which we dismissed. requested of the and had the size newsstand to the directed him file matter We that it be out of steel rather than wood. built 8(a). Fed.R.App.P. pursuant district court “Emergency Tem- filed an Motion for Graff relief, him After the district court denied porary Restraining Order and for Prelimi- September granted mo- we Graffs Injunction.” nary The had the effect motion enjoined Chicago destroying tion and from forcing May hand. quickly the court’s On appeal. pending the newsstand one and the court dismissed counts entirely. injunctive relief two denied 8, 1993, argument February On after oral decision, Chicago but before moved to dis- complaint initially The found that the court injunction planned solve the because of reha- as-applied an could be read raise bilitation the Cultural Center. challenge to the ordinance. But facial new handicap hoped replace had the access applied for a because had not Graff ordinance, ramp, and clean and remodel exterior court concluded under new 16,1993 February panel challenge stonework. facial was before it. As On reversing one, opinion this court its the court concluded that issued to count district court the new ordinance new ordinance was content-neutral did because judicial self-censorship provide oversight, raise the failed to sufficient threat Amendment as es- City Lakewood v. Plain violation of First enunciated FW/PBS, Dallas, Dealer, poused Inc. v. (1988). 215, 228, 606, 107 The L.Ed.2d 771 court also conclud- (1990). new ordinance contained reason- L.Ed.2d See ed Graff (7th Cir.1993). time, Chicago, 986 F.2d Chi- place and manner restrictions nec- able multiple cago’s injunction essary to uses motion to dissolve accommodate the 15,1993, pro- April court public way, adequate contained denied as moot. On this two, granted Chicago’s petition rehearing en safeguards. As count cedural panel opinion. refusing preliminary After injunction and vacated the to enter banc review, dismissing we now and in counts en banc affirm. one and two. Graff Chicago’s

attempts to have newsstand ordi- II. Jurisdiction nance declared unconstitutional in hope However, stays put. that his newsstand complaint, requested his Graff ordinance, without the newsstand Graff still injunction. press He did not preliminary right operate has no his newsstand on early apparently hearing court for an district public property. Contrary to Graffs conten- yet had not the bull moved speech, tions about case involves a struc- May in for the kill. On dozers no ture. Graff has First right Amendment however, Chicago notified that he had Graff public property. build a structure on days A later to vacate. week Graff fifteen properly district court also acted in dismiss- “Emergency Temporary Motion for filed ing challenges to Graffs the new ordinance. Restraining Preliminary In Order and for ordinance does not allow junction.” court dis Within the week the opportunity grant deny per- newsstand two, denied all missed counts one and personal mits because or institutional injunctive In his notice of motions as moot. government views of a official. To the extent *5 appeal, sought Graff of the district review that types pub- the ordinance restricts the “denying plaintiffs order the motion court’s newsstand, from a lications sold the restric- order, temporary grant restraining for a tions are reasonable. ordinance contains part, in ing, defendant’s motion to dismiss time, place reasonable and manner restric- complaint.” first plaintiffs amended tions, justified speech without reference to jur Initially, City argues lack the that we content, open and leaves alternative avenues appeal to one isdiction hear this to the communicate same information. We court, in count remains alive the district also conclude that the ordinance contains suf- therefore, judgment final has not been en judicial provisions passes ficient review 1292(a)(1) However, § tered. 28 U.S.C. Equal analysis. muster under Protection jurisdiction grants us to hear inter certain locutory appeals, as when court the district A. Newsstand Structure Here, injunction. to enter an refuses that; just court did refused to district injunction an enter favor of dis Graff passed Chicago has numerous ordinances missing complaint. counts one and two of the attempting myriad deal with prob- to (7th Fisher, v.

Holmes 854 F.2d public way, lems that on its arise from carni- Cir.1988). It not also does matter that Graff vals to snow removal. Mun.Code sought temporary review of the denial of his §§ to 10-28-010 -800. that asserts (which restraining yet appeal- order is prohibits this ordinance all vendors from able). Syndicate, See Geneva Assurance building public way; on structures news- Ass’n, Emergency Inc. Medical Servs. paper can vendors erect a structure (7th curiam). Cir.1992) (per F.2d permit. general obtaining after As a start- Therefore, jurisdiction we have to review the ing point, another specifical- unless injunction court’s district refusal to enter an otherwise, ly person “no authorizes shall properly whether the district dis court any building, structure, place erect or or missed counts one and two. stationary object, in part, other whole or in way upon any public public ground or other Analysis

III. city.” within the Id. at -040. There are essentially any “It exceptions. This case involves two interde- shall be unlawful for erect, questions: place in, pendent person upon whether the district or maintain or enjoined Chicago any way public should from public place court have re- over or other moving city, any ... display Graffs newsstand and whether Chi- for the or [stand] cago’s goods, newsstand wares or ... ordinance is constitutional. sale of merchandise un- permit conclude that the statute constitution- less a for the same shall be We is obtained Also, properly superintendent compensa- al. the district court from acted

tion_” ornaments; desiring display persons for Specifically at -050. news- other Id. vendors, symbols religious were allowed to lease paper airport. The Lubavitch Chabad area of the any person unlawful It shall be however, House, pay. not want did erect, locate, any construct or maintain organization sought display a free stand- way any public on or newspaper stand ing public menorah one of the Chanukah con- property owned or other unenclosed held that the ordinance did per- areas. We obtaining a trolled without any constitutionally protected form of from involve mit the commissioner therefor speech.. provided. Id. at 347. There no transportation as hereinafter parties fo- Id. -130. In this case the have right private' to erect a constitutional arguments in the district court cused their public property. on If there structure constitutionality appeal on on of Chi- forums, were, public our traditional such as - ordinance, cago’s id. at newsstand public parks, be cluttered with our would injunction sought an ISO to -196. Graff parks all manner of structures. Public removing prevent Chicago his news- from certainly quintessential public forums supposition per- if stand under protected, where free but unconstitutional, mit ordinance were declared provides, nor has it Constitution neither stay. But even his newsstand should without mandate, any been construed to ever ordinance, challenged newsstand Graff person group or be allowed to erect struc- public right occupy has side- still no tures at will. walk; is, unless has a constitutional he Id.; v. Tax accord Members Council right to build maintain newsstand Vincent, 813-15, 104 payers goes If property. the ordinance down (1984). 2118, 2133-34, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 *6 (along availability permit) of a with the Lubavitch, years after decided Two we goes prelimi- down As a newsstand as well. Supreme then, airport Court that an was not matter, ruled nary we examine must whether public a traditional The considered forum. independent right has to he constitutional Lubavitch rule nevertheless stands that even public erect on sidewalk. his newsstand public forum is no a there constitutional city “absolutely pro- In Lakewood the had right a to erect structure. F.2d at 347. private placement any hibited struc- The de- structure a Chanukah menorah property.” public ture on protection serves no less than the structure 2142. court found 108 S.Ct. at The district building a newsstand. The a newsstand prohibition First this violated the simply constitutionally pro- not a form of applied The Amendment as to newsracks. expression. dispos- tected Thus Lubavitch is however, rather, city, appeal; did not it en- request injunction. for an itive Graffs that permitted acted ordinances newsracks Requiring permit a for the is not a structure Supreme under certain conditions. The speech. public fo- restraint While Court concluded the new ordinances certainly provide places people rums where placed city too much discretion with offi- through right express a to their have views cials, rendering thus the ordinances unconsti- handbills, word, spoken literature and the ques- tutional. reach The Court did not Texas, 413, 416, Jamison city may constitutionally tion of “a whether (1943), they 87 L.Ed. 869 do not prohibit placement pub- of newsracks on newsstand, right to have the erect a property.” lic Id. at n. public case on a sidewalk. Without an ordi- Today, regard n. news- with requires, nance and the newsstands stands, that question. reach we protection no from and other structures have person At the outset we note no city’s bulldozer. right has a to erect or maintain constitutional public way. In a structure on the Lubavitch House, Chicago, Inc. v. Chabad (7th Cir.1990), had a structure used to ad- F.2d decorat Lubavitch involved Airport speech religion. ed with Graff neverthe- O’Hare Christmas trees vance precedent speech less maintains that Court actual content issuing before per- a newspaper entitles structures distribution mit. protection.

to constitutional In Lakewood a argues Graff that newsracks and news newspaper challenged ordinance that stands should receive identical First Amend mayor grant deny permits allowed the or protection. ment But Lakewood does not so publishers place their newsracks on easily bridge gap between newsracks and mayor property. The had to state They significantly newsstands. are different specific application; reasons if he denied the methods of distribution and we must assess granting permit, mayor could add them on uniquely standards suited to each. such terms and conditions he deemed reason- Promotions, See Southeastern Ltd. v. Con necessary. newspaper able and elected rad, 546, 557, apply permit, bringing not to for a instead (1975) (“Each L.Ed.2d 448 medium of ex challenge facial to the ordinance. 486 U.S. at course, pression, must be assessed for 754, 108 S.Ct. at 2142. First purposes Amendment by standards challenge facial [A] lies whenever a licens- it, suited to for each present its own ing gives government law official or (citations omitted). problems”) agency power substantial to discriminate based on viewpoint the content or large, Newsstands are permanent- speech by suppressing disfavored type They constructed, structures.2 speakers.... or disliked The law must place once in easily are not moved. enough expression, have close nexus to present Newsstands do not viewpoint; one or to commonly conduct associated with they supply many rather varying editori expression, pose a real and substantial opinions. al Newsstands shelter a business threat censorship of the identified risks. operator operation; and his they do not 759,108 (in Id. at S.Ct. at 2145. Court merely dispense newspap hand deliver decision) four to three found that the First Newsstands also likely are more ers.3 implicated Amendment was spe- because the pedestrians obstruct the views and auto cific ordinance newspapers involved short, and re- mobile drivers. newsstands com quired them to renew their pared newsrack licenses larger, newsracks are much more annually. The printing permanent Court saw the occupy signifi structures that *7 a newspapers circulation of as “conduct com- portion cant of space.4 limited sidewalk monly Thus, expression” associated with building and the operating a newsstand is periodic licensing regu- conduct, scheme as speech, closer to a not which the can law lation that government allows the fully proscribe: to view newspaper publisher In argument Lakewood the insisted this applied was not successful as to newsracks, seeking permanently that it was not permanent to rent or sidewalk; newsstand structures present build a structure on the the imposing problem. newsrack a much more newsboy, was characterized as similar to a Id., the newsrack his “mechanical cousin.” disagree Judge Cummings 4.We with that “size U.S. at 778 n. 108 S.Ct. at 2155 n. 6. This suggests nothing selling itself about whether the large, permanent immobile and newsstand is newspapers magazines from a stand is precisely publisher implied what the in Lakewood speech Cummings, opinion or conduct.” J. unacceptable. relevant, 1336. Size is because at a certain size city's ability regulate the unfettered to structures Lakewood, In eclipses U.S. at ability regulate speech. S.Ct. at limited its to White, dissent, equat- Justice feared city place The dissent will concede that the can a ing newsboys “prior newsracks with and conduct com- restraint" on the a construction of ten monly expression associated story building public with could property, allow on even if the newspaper publishers right public building happens the to take newspaper to have a store on property private use. He concluded story the first floor. The same is true for a five comparison ignored governmen- such a building story building. also the or a one We submit that allowing tal interests at stake: all public members of the same is also true for a newsstand on sidewalks, public the property use of their streets and even if it is not true for a newsrack insuring public's matters, safety the public property. and aesthetic inter- Size and a newsstand ests, especially closely building where alternative methods of is more related to a than it is to a newspaper Although distribution are available. newsrack. authorities, discretion over newsracks

Municipal as trustees for the official unfettered duty commu- keep possibility their is to raise that the official— public, have the the for move- open particular and available nities’ streets because dissatisfaction over property, primary severely the people policy might ment of ban limit editorial — the streets are dedicated. purpose particular publication. to which the of a newsracks does long legislation this end not instance, by, lampooned So For if the official is liberty of abridge constitutional one Tribune, the say, his boss Chicago the as he or impart infor- rightfully upon the street to bid, he have an makes a re-election would through speech or the distribution mation to limit their At the incentive newsracks. literature, may regulate lawfully least, might very Chicago Tribune limit using For conduct of those the streets. its editorial because of fear of such efforts example, could person not exercise this censorship. liberty by taking his in the middle of stand The same threat of restraint does not street, regu- contrary to traffic a crowded They exist for newsstands. are structures lations, position maintain his particular publications. all not at tied to traffic; group distribu- stoppage of all hypothetical, Chicago our official—even if upon insist constitutional tors could not against not he wanted to—could retaliate right to form a cordon across street by regulating Tribune newsstands. pedestrian pass and to allow no who did Only likely under least would a scenario leaflet; accept does a tendered nor target able to a certain official be or of guarantee of freedom targeting a publication by certain newsstand. deprive municipality power press city accomplish type For a official to regulations against throwing litera- enact censorship, large need he would staff Prohibition ture broadcast streets. city all of check the newsstands in the find abridge such would not conduct disseminating objectionable ma- the ones liberty activity constitutional since such deny permits terial. Then he would have to necessary relationship no to the free- bears To dis- to those newsstands. “chill” similar write, print speak, dom to or distribute others, he have to tribution would make opinion. information or closing public that certain he was newsstands State, 147, 160-61, Schneider objectionable distributing were (1939); 150-51, 84 ac L.Ed. 155 hardly material. scenario is This similar to —Lee, at-, cord nixing the news- one official all of (“The principal purpose of and side streets publication by racks of a certain the stroke of walks, airports, transpor like is to facilitate pen, safely hidden his while behind walls tation, (emphasis add discourse.” unlikely hall. is the former scenar- So ed) J., (Kennedy, concurring)). io that First Amendment does not re- *8 the Court concluded the ordi- Lakewood quire the ordinance to be drafted to avoid it. implicated speech required nance it Further, closing of the newsstands would periodic licensing license renewal and the publications affect all of the the newsstand system narrowly specifi- was “directed Chicago equally, and the would still Tribune commonly cally expression at or as- conduct have its other methods dissemination— expression: sociated with the circulation of newsracks, newsboys, in-building news- newspapers.” at 760. This case stands, papers. etc.—to sell simply circulation neither concerns protections provided newsracks are printing newspapers nor common- conduct peculiar tailored their characteristics. ly expression. associated with This case in- Judge Cummings’ Judge dissent and Flaum’s newsraek, A volves a structure. as a source position news, concurrence that the take same inextricably publication tied fit instance, protections tailored to newsracks should Chicago it contains. For has news- upon Tribune, Chicago placed newsstands. But Chicago racks for be newsstands Sun-Times, tar- Today, are not newsracks. The same threat of the Wall Street USA Journal, publication regula- publications geting one inherent in the and whatever other city. regu- might give city present popular be To tion of newsracks is Judge Cummings’ lation of newsstands. dis- struck City’s down the ordinance because it sent offers remote scenario where a vested too much discretion in the hands of a might target government publica- official certain “off-beat official. 486 U.S. at “pornographic” publications by tions” or argues tar- S.Ct. at 2152. Graff that such a geting danger certain Cummings, viewpoint newsstands. J. discrimination also exists dissent at But 1337-38. the First Amend- this case. require ment does not that we create unlike- licensing “[A] placing statute unbridled ly censorship scenarios for the speech discretion in the government hands of a offi

require city governments regu- to draft their cial agency constitutes a restraint lations to Only avoid these scenarios. when in censorship.” result Id. at the ordinance at presents issue an obvious major 108 S.Ct. at premise 2143. A in Lake censorship and immediate threat of in—as wood was that “the requires Constitution the case of the newsrack ordinance Lake- establish neutral criteria to challenge wood—should we allow a facial to insure that the decision is not based possibility censorship. head off the When on the viewpoint content or censorship the threat of derives from the being considered.” Id. at 108 S.Ct. at target- unlikeliest of scenarios —such as the 2146. The Court struck down the Lakewood ing “pornographic” publica- of “off-beat” or specifically ordinance because there were “no issuing permits tions when newsstand fa-—a explicit Mayor’s limits on the discretion.” challenge inappropriate. cial The threat is Id. at at denying 2150. In speculative. too remote and permit application, mayor required only to state “it is not in the interest.” right Given there is no constitutional Although the required mayor ordinance to build or maintain a newsstand on the reasons, to state his the Court found trou public way, properly the district court re- bling specificity the lack of required and the enjoin Chicago removing fused from mayor limitless reasons the could assert. Id. Graffs newsstand. But is not inter- at 108 S.Ct. at 2150-51. In granting removing ested in Graffs newsstand because permit, mayor require could the news- occupies public land. Rather rack to be located “in an inaccessible location wants to remove Graffs newsstand because providing any without explanation whatsoev Thus, permit. he has no parties in this er.” Id. This constituted “unfettered dis case did not arguments focus their on the cretion” abridging the First Amendment. propriety of whether the district court should FW/PBS, See at U.S. injunction. They have issued an wanted a 603; Freedman, ruling constitutionality on the of the new (party “challenge can a statute on the obliged, ordinance. The district court ground delegates overly that it broad licens upheld by granting Chicago’s ordinance discretion”); ing Alabama, Thornhill v. appeal motions to dismiss. On Graff claims 88, 97-98, 736, 741-42, 84 L.Ed. gives too much discre- (1939) (the offending subjected statute tion, time, imposes place unreasonable the defendant discriminatory to “harsh and restrictions, manner provide does not suffi- officials”). enforcement prosecuting local judicial review, cient equal protec- and denies In this case by treating transpor- tion the commissioner of newsstands and sidewalk tation differently. considers six exclusive criteria cafes willWe address each of *9 grant deny permission which to or challenges. these constitutional to build a newsstand: (1) design, Whether the materials and col-

B. The Commissioner’s Limited Discretion or newspaper comport scheme of the stand argues Chicago’s Graff quality news with and enhance the and character stand ordinance violates the First streetseape, including nearby Amend devel- by vesting (2) ment opment uses; too much discretion in existing the land Wheth- official, government newspaper here the commissioner of er complies the stand with this (3) transportation. code; In Lakewood the applicant previ- Court Whether the has to enough expression, or con- at that close nexus to newspaper stand ously operated (4) commonly expression, location; services to The extent to which duct associated with newspaper by the threat the pose that would be offered a real substantial area; (5)' already available censorship stand risks.” 486 at identified daily proposed added). publications (emphasis The number S.Ct. at stand; newspaper the from to be sold Chicago’s in criteria set out in ordinance The (6) to stand relative The size pose a no sense “real or substantial threat” open days the will be stand number Against censorship. v. Rock See Ward operating.5 Racism, at 491 U.S. 781 10-28-160(a). as (upholding § or- 2746 at 2755-56 content-neu- Chicago Mun.Code achieving regulations number of technical tral aimed at best also contains a dinance forms, considerations, application appropriate id. or such as musical volume and sound - -150, regulations, surrounding id. at quality neigh- and location in light at size sound - borhoods). Crivaro, at requirements, id. and maintenance F.2d Jacobsen specifically alleges (8th Cir.1988) that the com- 1067, (upholding 180. Graff as non- given not discretion to should be missioner discretionary restricting news- ordinance “endangers a newsstand that sizes). remove give rack locations and The criteria safety property,” that “interferes or with authority proper to ad- the commissioner pedestrian the flow of or vehicular impedes city’s permit a given vance the desire traffic,” as placed “in such a manner or is of newsstands. At the same time number impede or interfere with the reasonable use they help avoid of someone the threat build- (b). -185(a) & display window].” Id. [aof size, ing permanent of whatever newsstand to consider By requiring commissioner design and he chooses. location limited, factors, his discretion is these problem still with what he Graff finds adequate give The criteria unbridled. terms the commissioner’s unbridled discre- as well guidance to the commissioner specific determining permits in tion the number applicant anticipate for the as reasons caps But the issue. number of denying particular granting or basis for may permits the issue to the commissioner permit If a permit to build newsstand. already number of newsstands located on denied, express these a newsstand were build § Chicago’s streets. Mun.Code 10- (and the commissioner’s written standards (“No permit newspaper 28-130 new for a -160(c)) reasons, plaintiff give id. at see stand shall be issued on or after effective challenging applica- adequate guidance ordinance”). permits expire, date of As case, particular of the ordinance to his tion revoked, or have been the commissioner upon judicial allow an informed review - that a Id. advertise is available. inquiry into whether commissioner made may compete 130 & -135. Graff and others manner, in an decision unconstitutional his for those commissioner chooses reis- speech. disfavoring certain such -160(e).6 sue. Id. though the com- Even the ordinance allows True, discretion, the commissioner has discretion to use Lakewood missioner some required determining many permits have the law to “a how reissue. nevertheless ordinance, existing newspaper complied with the 5. Under the new all news- stand has code. -135(a) permits expired January -160(b). 1992. Chi- stand cago & Id. at Although § Graff Mun.Code 10-28-135. operated his since he has newsstand has brief, argues reply Graff In a footnote his Presumably operated permit. under a he the first time that the current restrictions on the compete permit on the must now for a same permits number of issued is a codification of such, any person. "when basis as other As two arbitrary practices under the old ordinance. application equally qualified otherwise or more 28(f) (“A argument Fed.R.App.P. This waived. preference given pending ... be to the are application shall reply reply.”). brief shall be limited to matter offering newspaper for the stand parties also addressed the extent to have not largest daily publications.” number of different *10 having permit the old which under -160(e). Once is issued a Id. at Graff newsstands. affects the locations of future These ordinance, under new the Commissioner's appeal. properly us on issues are before renewing only consideration in not it is whether

1319 government.” Renton, But that is “the business of This City case resembles 475 Observer, 41,106 925, City Chicago, Inc. v. U.S. 89 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 29. There (7th Cir.1991). 325, Renton, City Washington, 929 F.2d 329 Not all enacted a zoning discretionary implicate prohibit ordinance to decisions the First adult motion — Cincinnati, picture from locating theaters within Amendment. See a cer- (the residential, church, tain at-, distance from City may at 1517 U.S. S.Ct. 43, property. school Id. at 106 S.Ct. at 926. limit the total number of newsracks for safe Court reasons). determined that the or- ty aesthetic Since the limited dinance given discretion to the commissioner Chi

cago’s any way ordinance does not in limit appear neatly does not to fit into either the speech opera content of the newsstand “content-based” or the “content-neutral” tor, sure, category. To censorship there is no threat or risk of be the ordinance treats specialize theaters that in adult which violates the First Amendment. films dif- ferently from other kinds of theaters. Ne- vertheless, concluded, as the district court Time, C. Reasonable Place and Manner the Renton ordinance is aimed at the Restrictions content of the films shown at “adult motion theatres,” picture but rather at the second- government speech If the seeks to control ary effects of such theaters on the sur- viewpoint, without reference to ordinances rounding community. time, place can contain and man reasonable restrictions, Id. at 106 S.Ct. at 929. The ner restrictions. These howev Court ana lyzed er, by looking time, the ordinance at the significant government must serve inter tailored) place and manner (narrowly regula restrictions in the ests and leave alternative tion. The Court held that the ordinance was avenues communicate the same informa justified content, without Racism, reference to Against tion. See Ward v. Rock “content-neutral,” thus 781, 798, id. at 106 S.Ct. at S.Ct. 929, and Clark, government served a substantial (1989); L.Ed.2d 661 468 U.S. 288 at allowing interest while reasonable alter 3065 at 82 L.Ed.2d 221. natives of communication. Id. at If, however, the ordinance discriminates on Surely S.Ct. at 933. if a can restrict viewpoint, allowing the basis such as speech through planning, regulation, particular political communication of or reli zoning property secondary because of the gious messages, government would face a pictures neigh effects of adult motion on the near insurmountable burden. See borhood, id., — Young v. American Mini The Network, Inc., Discovery Cincinnati v. atres, Inc., 50, 62, —, —, (1976), Chicago 49 L.Ed.2d 310 should (1993) (noting prohibiting L.Ed.2d 99 that regulate property be allowed to on which the use sound trucks because of noise newsstands could be located. Accord Corne apply equally “music, political must lius, at 3447- speech, advertising.”). alleges Graff that (“Nothing requires the Constitution speech the ordinance controls content in sev freely grant Government access to all who ways. eral permits Because the ordinance right wish to exercise their to free carry only pe the newsstand to newspapers, every type property of Government without publications, riodicals and similar and favors regard property to the nature of the or to the applicant carry daily who will the most disruption might that be caused publications, he claims it eliminates vendors activities.”). speaker’s time, place Here the carry expressive who other materials. He entirely and manner restrictions are reason complains also limi the newsstands’ size able. magnifies impermissible tation these restric dispute tions. does not these char showing asserts that there is no Graff acteristics; argues rather accommodating multiple pub uses of the necessary time, place way public safety requires reasonable lic an arbi trary manner restrictions. size limitation on newsstands. The *11 1320 types of news- that produced not evidence newsstand that requires speech caused twenty distributing commercial racks one-hundred than occupy more distributing in nine feet more than distinct from newsracks nor stand effects

square feet In § clogging 10-28-170. of down- Chicago Mun.Code as the height. newspapers, such always allow must addition, streets, the newsstand have ... the ordinance town passage, feet of clear secondary least six pedestrians at ef- under the constitutional been three feet of within Network, located and cannot be Discovery 946 fects doctrine.” -185(b). “the This is line. Id. property affirming, In at 472 n. 12. F.2d Observer, Chicago government.” of business City to that contrast Court also noted of position to are not We 929 at 829. F.2d distinguishing second- were no Renton there In concerns. city council’s second-guess the contain- ary to newsracks effects attributable eminently event, are restrictions any these compared to publications as ing commercial certainly should Pedestrians reasonable. would containing newspapers that newsracks enough space to walk on have access City justify differing treatment. Cincin- of part of block structures Where sidewalks. — -, nati, 113 at 1517. S.Ct. U.S. sidewalk, have an inter- pedestrians also reasoning, following *12 640, 101 fron, 452 69 L.Ed.2d late.” The manner in which this ordinance Also, regulates operation browsers would block access to the newsstand allows necessary quick purchase to make a access. those who wanted newspaper. Gannett Satellite See Info. finally time, argues Graff place A, Transp. Net. v. Metro 745 F.2d 773-4 and manner narrowly restrictions are not Cir.1984) (2d (upholding as content neutral a governmental tailored to serve the asserted regulation newspapers which allowed but not Ward, interests. See operated other vendors to install coin vend 2756; City S.Ct. at Angeles Los v. Pre machines; priv ing newspapers “the are in a ferred, ileged position and are not and will not be (1986). Specifically, L.Ed.2d 480 ar Graff discrimination”). come the victims of gues the ordinance an arbitrary cap sets permits given the number of and that many That the ordinance considers how provision requiring minimum clearance carry publications the newsstand does will newsstand, around the there is no reason for infringe, promotes not but rather First arbitrary size limitation. He wants fur clearly Amendment interests. The ordinance discovery ther to show there are less restric applicant higher, favors who has the not tive alternatives. lower, proposed publications number of to be sold from the newsstand. This conceiv- “requirement tailoring of narrow ably only operator the newsstand “censors” long is regulation satisfied so as the pro might publica- who himself eliminate certain government motes a substantial interest that addition, tions from distribution. In an ordi- effectively would be achieved less absent the publications nance directed at the number of Ward, regulation.” at quantity, quality concerns not or content. (citations omitted). S.Ct. at 2758 This test is pro- Graff cites no case where an ordinance heightened not as as Graff would have us (in moting general) infringes more believe. the First Amendment. long So as the means chosen are not sub- stantially necessary broader than promoting Graff asserts that the dailies interest, government’s achieve the ... message serves to advance less controver regulation simply not will be invalid be- greatest people. sial to the number of This cause a govern- court concludes that the ignores reality marketplace. adequately ment’s interest could be served only dailies succeed sell to the by less-speech-restrictive some alternative. greatest people, notwithstanding number of government’s perceived 800,109 agreement at with Id. S.Ct. at 2758. Because Chica- any particular viewpoint. newsstands, Any go ability notion that has the all .ban promoting providing the dailies because comprehensive per- for some past experience likely agree based on people it is mit scheme serves viewpoints mitigated by with their future compet- well. The ordinance accommodates favoring opera ing the ordinance the newsstand pedestrians interests where wish room to walk, operators tor who sells the most dailies—an obvious several newsstand desire the attempt variety, location, not indoctrination. Chi same and tourists wish take a cago argued in the district picture court that of a famous landmark without a encouraged pro Court has newsstand front and center. Without daily publications ordinance, motion Chicago’s over the sale of interests would “expressive only effectiveness, other materials.” As stated in be achieved with less Lakewood, 771, 108 U.S. at but fail. The would restrictions also leave fungible. is not open “News stories be alternative Some channels communication particularly publica well covered certain of the information. Id. S.Ct. at tions, providing newspaper with a 2760. ads and “teems with Observer, unique opportunity develop readership. publications,” Chicago with event, paper easily order to benefit from that F.2d at one can discern that the public time; particular problem picking newspa- needs access at a up has no per, videotape, eventual access would come too little and too it in book be stores that safety protecting or from A state’s interests in property their actually own own using pub- persons and convenience of yelling the headlines. newsboys out objective. governmental is a valid lic forum *13 reasons, we conclude foregoing the For and function of The characteristic nature time, restrictions place and manner that the assessing the forum must be considered are reason- in the new ordinance contained regulation.... constitutionality of the the specif- able, justified reference to are without Rochford, held in the has valid As content, to narrowly tailored serve ic expediting processing about the concerns Chicago. people interests the of significant of travelers, and or- maintaining the free to are also available Alternative channels traffic, derly avoiding the dis- flow any speech restrict- otherwise communicate normal Prohi- ruption airport activities. ed. signs on the use of banners or bitions body storing the exceed the width and on Propriety Dismissal Versus D. The materials, carry bag except in a Judgment Summary harnessed, carried are reason- must be or district dismissed two The court ably City’s legitimate inter- related the complaint part the on the counts of based ests. time, place of the ordinance’s reasonableness Caucus, at International 816 F.2d 339-40 argues and manner restrictions. Graff (citations omitted). quotations As we stage pleading place for such an is no seen, many have asserted that government inquiry, especially apply well. these interests in this case as In Preferred, on issue. See has the burden Caucus, International we concluded that 2038; 496, 476 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. at accord context, in the First even Amendment Randall, 513, v. 78 S.Ct. Speiser require- plaintiff is not excused “from the (1958) 1332, (invalidating 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 alleged that the must state ment facts as procedure placed because it the burden state action.” cause of Id. at 340. restriction on on the individual show the Chicago, In Rothner v. 929 F.2d unjustified). speech was No doubt the norm (7th Cir.1991), the dis- we also affirmed summary judgment stage is to wait until the challenge trict court’s dismissal of a facial ques litigation to address the ultimate prohibited ordinance. had should tion of whether ordinance stand. playing games minors from video while FW/PBS, 602; at 493 U.S. at 110 S.Ct. school was session. the caveat that With 927; Renton, 475 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. at proceed cautiously “courts should when Vincent, 2122; at at plead- on asked to dismiss the basis Young, 427 at 2445. And pur- ings,” id. at we that the concluded Chicago does not that it bears the dispute ordinance, encourage pose of the students Contrary on these burden issues. Graff’s high discourage tru- complete school and assertions, however, in this case the district ancy, Also, was unrelated to content. resolving was correct in this matter. court narrowly the ordinance was tailored to serve interest, governmental namely important an Labor In International Caucus of “insuring adequate that children receive an City Chicago, v. 816 F.2d Committees Id. at And education.” alternative (7th Cir.1987), district court dis open channels of communication were —the missed a facial attack on an ordinance that play games were free to video children tables, setting up prohibited persons from There, their own time. we concluded that hanging signs storing literature require First us to Amendment did previ Airport. International had O’Hare We beyond “try pleading stage. the statute” ously upheld parts of a similar ordinance (citations omitted). at 304 Id. Society International Krishna Con sciousness, Preferred, Rochford, Cau Inc. 585 F.2d International From Cir.1978). (7th court, quoting gather important from Rothner we Su cus and several merely precedent, principles. assume preme gave Court credence Courts should stage: ordinance the state’s inter- government’s pleading ease at the that an advances Preferred, iting government 106 S.Ct. at engaging ests. from in cen the Court remanded to sorship. But if even properly Preferred the district court because it needed to “know discretion, limits an administrator’s theoreti present more about the uses of the cally government could still act improper utility poles rights-of-way and how re- ly subject where its decision is not to review. spondent proposes to install and maintain its question procedural whether sufficient facilities on them.” Id. at 106 S.Ct. at safeguards exist to dangers “obviate the of a case, however, ques- 2038. In this no one is censorship system.” Southeastern Pro tioning present newspapers uses of motions, 95 S.Ct. at 1247. Chicago. sidewalks on the streets of How *14 In Maryland, Freedman 58- of proposes Graff to use his newsstand we ac- 734, 738-39, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 cept complaint. City as true from his See of (1965), the Court set out certain “safe Renton, 475 U.S. at 106 at 931. guards,” later (City summarized does not have to conduct studies or Justice Bren produce independent evidence on issues that nan as follows: elsewhere). developed are well here or (1) any prior restraint of advance a final already upheld Where the courts have a simi- judicial determination on the merits must governmental lar ordinance because of the longer necessary be no than that pre- stake, litigant interests a future should not serve quo pending judicial the status reso- challenge governmental be able to similar (2) lution; prompt judicial determination showing interests without some distinction at (3) pleading stage. E.g., available; the International Cau- must be the would-be cus, 816 F.2d at 340. censor must bear both the going burden of to court and proof the burden of in court. disputed

In this case no there are issues of material fact that need to we resolve. Nor FW/PBS, 611.9 Chicago are the interests that raises in this Graff, Of concern to permit, since he no has unique case It different. has not relied on procedures are the Chicago follows remov- independent findings. research studies or ing permit. a newsstand without a Once the Rather, Chicago has relied on a common commissioner operat- discovers a newsstand approach sense and the desire to best allo- ing public property permit, without a valid public property spirit cate within the authority give commissioner has the C, First Amendment. As discussed in Part operator days posting fifteen after the we conclude that aas matter of law public proper- removal notice to restore the reasonably selling can restrict newsstands to ty Thus, original to its daily condition. Mun. newspapers. the district court 10-28-190(c). properly pleading stage § dismissed at Code Within that time the arguments Graffs that the ordinance should operator may request hearing owner or operate larger allow him to newsstand transportation, before the commissioner books, videotapes which to sell and other thirty days. which will be scheduled within expression. methods of if Even the commissioner to rule unfa- were

vorably, operator would not have to re- Adequacy Safeguards E. The Procedural days move his until newsstand fifteen after the commissioner’s final decision. Whether Graff asserts that the ordinance is com- removed, is newsstand ordered or a pletely safeguards devoid for review of the renewed, granted, denied or the ordinance Chicago responds commissioner’s decision. solely leaves these final determinations judicial review, provides that state law for transportation. hands of the commissioner Primarily, which in itself is sufficient. protects speech by First Amendment prohib- opportunity But there is much input for 9. (O’Connor, plurality Stevens and decision whether to issue license within a FW/PBS JJ.) Kennedy, specified period during found that "the first two safe and reasonable time guards quo are essential: the licensor must make which the status is maintained and there Illinois, final The of the State of determination is Constitution discussion before (1970), Article delineates Section made.10 (which explicit powers units of home rule argues that the ordinance does Graff parties dispute Chicago). includes do not judicial “expeditious review” for provide Mun. See v. State & Team decision. See FW/ the commissioner’s sters, Ill.App.3d Ill.Dec. PBS, 239,110 S.Ct. at 611.11 (1984). “A home rule N.E.2d no mention the role of contains any power perform unit exercise reviewing the judiciary in commissioner’s any government pertaining function to its matter, initial it is not clear As an decisions. Const, 6(a). 7, § art. affairs.” Ill. Freedman set out why the Court Illinois took little time in Court of requirement ordinance such apparent holding power pro that this does not include judicial provide prompt explicitly as this viding judicial review of administrative always judicial fo person A has a review. Paper Supply Co. v. agency decisions. allegedly infringed. his rum when 3, 16-17 Chicago, N.E.2d 57 Ill.2d City argues nor Neither Graff (1974); Cummings Daley, 58 Ill.2d challenges

judiciary cannot hear to this ordi *15 22, (1974). In each of N.E.2d 23 those cases not have a simply nance does rejected Supreme of Illinois a Court designating pro specific provision a review attempts municipality’s home rule to deter procedural lack of these additional cess. The jurisdiction of the mine “both the circuit any safeguards way not in increase the does municipal court to censorship. review its administrative speech The “safe threat of procedure to determinations and the be fol guards” the absence thereof neither ex or judicial in seeking lowed review of pand jurisdiction from the those nor detract courts’ v. determinations.” Nowicki Evanston Fair questions. But we are over constitutional Bd., Housing 11, Review 338 writing on a clean slate. 62 Ill.2d N.E.2d ning possibility prompt judicial development. and then be the of review He submits a re- must erroneously port transportation, license is de the event that the the commissioner of who 228, gives 110 S.Ct. at 606. Jus previous nied.” recommendations “due con- sideration,” Scalia and Justice Rehn thirty tices White and Chief days and acts on it within of apply any "safeguards.” quist of the And did not -160(a). receipt. All are Id. at bound Brennan, would Marshall Blackmun considerations, Justices supra. the six listed enumerated applied all three. The considered the have Court application total The time from to decision can and the nature of discretion thirly-fíve be no and no less than more than determining to when what extent the ordinance denied, sixty-five days. application If the Thus, safeguards necessary. were if Freedman applicant request hearing before can the com- procedural protections Freedman are the full of transportation missioner which must be held necessary sexually in the context of oriented not licensing (a thirty days quasi-motion within the next for FW/PBS, schemes, 228, 493 110 reconsideration). -160(c). Id. at 606, open question S.Ct. at it is an whether necessary regulates in an ordinance are city In the Court held that the FW/PBS building public property. on of newsstands going Dallas the burden of need not bear to court proof nor the burden of once in court two Chicago proce- case utilizes In this the usual presumptively reasons: ordinance was not The ruling permit application up on a dure in —set pass invalid because the decisionmaker did not inquiry get many level of more than one as "judgment any protected the content of on process pub- people possible; involved in the as Also, "[bjecause speech.” [or license in this course, hearings, necessary, are at least lic case, permit] applicant's key is the to the process, politically. begin To commis- business, obtaining maintaining a there is transportation sioner of advertises the availabili- every applicant pursue incentive for the (in ty permits newspaper, of newsstand through license denial 229-30, the court." 493 U.S. at course) shortly accepts applica- thereafter at 606. These same reasons § Copies Mun.Code 10-28-135. tions. apply already We held this case. have that the plan- to the are soon distributed commissioner give unfet- does not the commissioner ning development and the alderman any tered and that content discretion restrictions appropriate city council ward affected. The are newsstand is reasonable. Graff's also as holding public involved in committee is also much a adult book store. business as an There- hearings permit. persons, All interested fore, Chicago prove given need not its case in court including applicant, opportunity an application ruling before speak. council its on a remov- committee submits plan- ing a recommendation to the commissioner of newsstand.

1325 (1976); Quinlan 186, 187 Tyson, see & Inc. v. First some other Amendment cases Evanston, 324 Ill.App.3d require Court seemed to ordi- (1975). judicial Just because provide review, N.E.2d nance even separate authority avail lacks the to make when the writ common law certiorari FW/PBS, “expeditious judicial review,” However, able available. the Court has not been 110 S.Ct. at does not presented directly argument with the that such review does exist. mean review, certiorari was itself sufficient es- pecially where state makes the common law appropriate method to review Chica practice, writ the current common and in fact go’s agency administrative decisions any forbids other kind of review. con- We law writ of common certiorari. Holstein v. clude that such review is sufficient. Illinois Chicago, F.Supp. judicial has shown that forum is available (N.D.Ill.1992); Stratton v. Comm’n Wenona agency to review administrative decisions. Dist. No. Unit Ill.2d 141 Ill.Dec. judicial The state maintains uniform review 453, 458, (Ill.App.1990); 551 N.E.2d procedures by forbidding home rule units Nicholson, 1046, 135 Ill.App.3d Norton such commenting from on the Ill.Dec. 543 N.E.2d expect matter. As such the state can such (1989). excused, Unless claimants have six procedures expedite uniform cases and file, extremely months wherein review “is better the interests of serve Graff in a case scope, questions broad and extends to all such as one. of fact law contained in the record before court, including any de novo review Equal F. Protection Holstein, F.Supp. issues.” constitutional *16 Lawton, 210, citing 22 Howard v. Ill.2d two, In alleges count Graff that 556, (1961). 331, N.E.2d 557 differently newsstands are treated than other court the [T]he determines from record permitted public way, of the uses such as any fairly alone whether there is evidence hope sidewalk cafes. One would so. Differ reviewed, tending support to the order and per requires ences are obvious. Each use cannot mit, the court set aside the order unless separate pro necessarily but ordinances contrary weight it is to the manifest the issuing vide criteria different for them. [Findings evidence.... conclusions Where, here, as the newsstand ordinance questions prima on of fact are true passes scrutiny strict under First the facie correct. It is not the court’s function Amendment, certainly it most pass will the conflicting to resolve evidence. test equal protection rational basis under analysis. Norton, Ill.App.3d 135 Ill.Dec. court, “If [E]qual protection

543 N.E.2d 1059. the circuit on is not a license writ, fairness, wisdom, of the judge the return finds from the record the courts to proceeded logic legislative that the inferior tribunal accord choices. In areas law, however, ing quashed; statutory the writ is if policy, to social economic proceedings compliance proceeds along the are not in with that classification neither law, judgment proceedings suspect infringes lines nor fundamental quashed.” rights shown return will be upheld constitutional must be Stratton, against equal protection 133 Ill.2d if challenge Ill.Dec. any reasonably at 645.12 N.E.2d there is conceivable state Aid, Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, 11-8.7, Department par. por case 12. The of Smith v. Public ch. and a stamp program, 67 Ill.2d 10 Ill.Dec. 367 N.E.2d tion of the federal food 7 U.S.C. (1977), helps (1970), importance deprived plaintiffs pro § illustrate the of due protection equal law writ of common certiorari in the constitution cess and under the Illinois Con county public depart al context. In Smith a aid the Fifth stitution and and Fourteenth Amend Constitution, purchase price increased ment for food United States ments to the stamps. department public they provide judicial A state aid af did for sufficient not review. that firmed decision. On writ of certiorari the 67 U1.2d N.E.2d at 1292. The reversed, holding trial court declared certain federal stat state and Court of Illinois that the com particular, provided utes unconstitutional. In the trial law of certiorari mon writ sufficient Code, oversight. court found that the Aid Illinois Public Id. gives tion even more basis 4-384-060 provide that rational of facts could permit refusing grant classification. a cafe for the discretion (as refusing per- a newsstand compared to v. Beach Com Federal Commun. Comm. — mit). mun., Inc., —, —, (1993). 2101, 124 have L.Ed.2d We really not matter. These distinctions do in already explained why the ordinance require- Varying taxes different fringes no First Amendment fundamental obviously do uses not ments for different time, place If and man right.13 reasonable by judges word-by-word scrutiny who merit free outweigh right Graffs ner restrictions might prefer regulate to tax and some other pass they certainly are sufficient speech, way. question is whether the different “rational.” as “conceivable” and occupying cafes treatment of newsstands and argues news- taxes Graff public sidewalks are for “conceivable” public way. not other uses of the stands but and “rational” reasons. can conceive of We Chicago responds that the ar- Graff waived differences,14 many reasons rational ques- gument because in the district court he (a of which one serves food the least only propriety of a newsstand fee tioned highly regulated enterprise) other under First an invalid restraint similarity does real is that not. Amendment, an he has not raised on issue arguably occupy the sidewalk. It would appeal. argues Graff that newsstands also completely be irrational to treat these differ- differently and sidewalk cafes are treated fact, purposes way. equal ent In same respect approv- to landmark with commission proba- would treatment with sidewalk cafe Chicago disputes argues It this. Chica- al. bly in much limita- result more burdensome Municipal 2-120-740 sub- go Code section anyway. tions has for a newsstand jects property all structures fact, argues mandating very see- rational basis for different equal treatment. facility alleged eating complaint and Graff in his amended rant that seeks extend its appeal the facts section of his brief on fresh air. It is reasonable for believe operated and now have on the then newsstands ordinarily will that newsstands attach to *17 way permits only public Graff has without They standing nearby buildings. are free on the Why targeted eviction. was this not been pursued for sidewalk, requiring thus limitations so as to size response Chicago's in to motion to dis- adjacent pedestri- For accommodate structures. allowing If with- miss? newsstands wishing ans to determine whether it is safe permits, surely seriously argue it could not out that it could remove a newsstand that had not street, wishing or for to avoid cross drivers hitting pedestrians, pose less serious cafes Community secured one. See Clark v. Crea- for conceivable, safety. It is not but threats Non-Violence, 6, 104 tive 295 n. probably certainty, many cafes are that located (1984). 82 L.Ed.2d 3070 n. 221 property already in as a front of in use restau- Obviously there be no need for the district would Extending type part that onto rant. of business constitutionality court to rule on an ordi- of compromise of the would landmark sidewalk being applied on its it was in nance face when property operating no more than restaurant Indeed, such a random fashion. the record Newsstands, contrast, place. by there in the first shows that Graff received notices remove his out; Chicago stick could feel that such structures la- which for whatever reasons were newsstand however, aesthetically Graff, pleasing. They sepa- are are equal not ter rescinded. raised the analysis only arguing usually having nothing protection in rate entities to do with that by other, of adjoining property. Chicago given discriminated compared its treatment newsstands as should be nonexpressive of the uses asserting patrons deference in that lack of would public way. explicitly implicitly business, He did giving cafes run unattractive out of argue any disparity requiring per- in newsstand ample aesthetically them incentive to maintain thus, appeal; mits to the district court or on premises. merely wanting pleasing Persons is; Kolb, v. F.2d issue waived. Brookins newspaper probably regard beauty do not of (7th Cir.1993); Banking Textile Co. any consequence. Cafes re- newsstand Rentschler, (7th Cir.1981). F.2d quire space sitting sufficient to accommodate proceeded assump- We have in this case Newsstands, and tables food. customers contrast, Chicago evenhandedly that enforces its ordi- tion radically space differ in the amount nances. necessary, employ people. Eating es- fewer regulated heavily and taxed in tablishments reasonably feel that news- could right. their own impede pedestrian stands the flow of traffic more so than sidewalk cafes. Cafes involve a restau- permit requirements very 750, 759, for these different (1988). uses. L.Ed.2d 771 Accordingly, Chicago’s (hereinafter licensing ordinance “the Ordi- nance”) Conclusion IV. implicates the First Amendment’s protection expression, see id. at right Graff does not have constitutional S.Ct. at and a challenge against facial property. to build newsstand on if lies the Ordinance carries with it signifi- This ease involves a structure which in itself cant risks self-censorship post- Thus, protection. has no First Amendment difficulty decision detecting whether cen- properly the district court refused to enter a sorship clandestinely motives prompted li- injunction, preliminary notwithstanding the denials, cense see id. at 108 S.Ct. at validity of a if permit ordinance. Even news- Chicago’s 2145. Because scheme at the out- speech, Chicago’s stands involve new ordi- set discretionary system establishes a gov- passes nance muster. The ordinance does ern the permits, issuance of specter allow for content based discrimination these risks looms and a facial review of the giving transportation the commissioner of too Scrutiny ordinance is order. of the Ordi- ruling permit. much discretion in on a To provisions, however, nance’s reveals that the the extent the ordinance restricts danger of content-based censorship present- speech, Chicago has articulated reasonable ed such schemes is in this ease time, place justify and manner restrictions to sufficiently mitigated to allow the Ordinance any infringement. The ordinance is also sub- addition, to survive facial attack. I do not ject adequate procedural safeguards; feel that the Ordinance is the kind of scheme therefore court the district was correct in for which the lack special provision of a dismissing count one. Because the ordinance prompt judicial review is fatal.1 Equal is constitutional under Protection anal- ysis, the court dismissing was correct

count two. I.

The district court is AFFIRMED. respectfully I suggest majority asserting misses the mark in that “[t]his case FLAUM, Judge, Circuit with whom simply neither concerns the circulation and CUDAHY, Judge, joins, concurring. Circuit printing newspapers nor conduct common- I judgment concur in majority ly Ante, expression.” associated with separately emphasize my newsracks, but write belief 1316. Like newsstands are in the newspa- the erection and maintenance of of circulating expressive business materials. per qualifies commonly Lakewood, stands as “conduct See expression.” City associated with Lake- larger 2149. That do so on a *18 Co., scale, wood v. Publishing Plain Dealer greater variety2 486 with up and take 780-81, necessary (White, J„ I majority do not think it is for the at with id. 108 S.Ct. at 2156 question dissenting) reach the (stating of whether or not there is an that there is no First Amend independent right right streets) city constitutional to erect news ment to erect newsracks on and Network, Inc.,U.S. public property. City Discovery stands on Because did Cincinnati v. of -, -, 1505, 1525, not enact an absolute ban on 113 S.Ct. newsstands and the (1993) C.J., (Rehnquist, majority today capping permits dissenting) L.Ed.2d 99 that finds at their (same). restriction, pass historical level is a reasonable ing question necessary on this is not for the resolution of this case. Comment on the nonex majority suggest 2. The seems to that because right may tempting istence of such a be but is many newsstands facilitate the distribution of probably by unadvised as the issue is no means publications they different are somehow less as- Compare City settled. Providence Journal Co. v. expression sociated with than newsracks which 107, (D.R.I.1987) Newport, F.Supp. typically only single publication. offer for sale a newsracks, (intimating prohibition ante, that a total majority apparently See at 1316. The be- newsboys may newsstands and tional), be unconstitu shutting lieves this follows from the fact that Lakewood, and 486 U.S. at 762 n. displeasure down whole newsstands because of 7, (declining pass 108 S.Ct. at 2147 n. 7 publication with one is a more awkward and less city may constitutionally prohibit whether a censoring publication effective means of that placement public property), targeting directly. of newsracks on than its individual newsracks based space performing dis- sidewalk cafes on considerations their physical

more flow, access, safety pedestrian not alter funda- building function does and tributive newsstand, aesthetics). maintaining a by licensing that targeting fact But mental newsrack, maintaining is an activi- just inextricably like to the business connected exer- expression. freedoms, ty peculiarly linked Chicago’s cise of First Amendment candy like a is not ma- respect a newsstand possibility of those identifi- scheme raises the any dog hot other mere or a stand chine commonly associate risks that we with able 760-61, at at See id. 108 S.Ct. “structure.” prior restraints. an instrument for A newsstand is 2145-46. Firstly, just of newsracks as licensure materials, expressive dissemination newspaper’s pursue can chill a zest to issues special catego- as such falls within licensor, displeasing opinions to the see regulation implicates ry activities whose 757-58, Lakewood, Amendment values. First S.Ct. licensure of newsstands has at licensing is scheme “directed Since spurn potential prompt vendors narrowly specifically at ... conduct com- (or publications licensor's his offensive to the 760, monly expression,” associated with id. constituents’) politics. Only sensibilities and 2145, challenge 108 S.Ct. a facial challenge adequately addresses a facial such appropriate means to test for constitutional Secondly, discretionary licensing a risk. infirmity by when its nature scheme does ground frequently provide schemes fertile the “identifiable risks to free not foreclose “post rationalizations hoc 757,108 2144, expression,” id. at S.Ct. ..., making it difficult for courts to official prior engenders system restraint any particular determine in case whether the “effectively that can be alleviated favorable, permitting sup- licensor is challenge.” Id. through a facial Now the unfavorable, pressing expression.” Id. at does not fit the traditional mold of Ordinance 758, applied” at 2145. In an “as 108 S.Ct. directly it does restraint since challenge, applicant an unsuccessful for a See, qua regulate speech speech. e.g., South- discretionary permit newsstand would face Promotions, Conrad, Ltd. v. 420 U.S. eastern struggle demonstrating kind of same 95 S.Ct. 43 L.Ed.2d 448 rejection that his which motivated (1975) (city preventing performance of rock publications disappointed he sells news- “Hair”); Birming- v. musical Shuttlesworth paper showing it lost its newsrack would ham, 147, 150-52, 938- of what it writes. The Ordinance (1969) (city requiring 22 L.Ed.2d 162 basically discretionary sets out what parade); to conduct a Freedman v. system licensing, system the sort of 51, 57, 734, 738, Maryland, 380 lurk, appellants can which such risks (1965) (movie censorship sys- 13 L.Ed.2d 649 “enjoy have alleged that under it officials tem); Minnesota, Near v. 713- deny permits ... (1931) unfettered discretion to 625, 630-31, 17, 51 75 L.Ed. 1357 Racism, altogether.” Against Rather, Ward Rock (newspaper censorship). it is one Chicago’s keep aspect of rea- effort within (1989). “Thus, waiting usage for an pub- bounds L.Ed.2d sonable businesses’ ways. alleged considering § ... a lic See Mun.Code 4-384- abuse before chal- *19 (establishing discretionary licensing lenge nothing except would achieve ... 060 Tribune, way While this observation buttress an eventual to censor the but has the potential against Chicago's weapon honed a war that mechanism for licens- to be a in conclusion ing muster, including passes operator who con- newsstands constitutional lone insists unpopular single publications that characteristic renders troversial or in his selec- conclude any Judge Cummings' put- in the maintenance of newsstands less conduct tion. ting dissent succeeds hardly intimately expression finger panoply tied to on the fanciful fallacious. The its logical leap dangers expression from such to free that can be the bedfel- result its concomi- hasty regulation of the dimen- of the of even mere newsstands. tant dismissal constitutional lows potential dangers post, this case the full See at 1337-38. sions of failure consider These by acknowledged turning of First risks to address breadth Amendment occasioned must be before Chicago’s discretionary procedural adequacy licensing over Admit- control newsstands. system. tedly, licensing clumsy of newsstands is a

1329 censorship expression during of free public space risk allocate limited in way. a neutral 11,108 Moreover, interim.” Id. 486 U.S. at 770 n. S.Ct. provide these criteria definite and Therefore, n. I appro- at 2161 11. feel it is guidelines against finite which the Commis- priate to examine under the lens of a facial denial, sioner’s written reasons for a see Chi- challenge whether the Ordinance is charac- cago 10-28-160(c), § Mun.Code can be mea- terized standards and other features ade- comparisons sured and made from case to quate to rein in the exercise of discretion safeguard case—a sys- that the standardless minimize risk of content discrimination. Lakewood, in tem Lakewood lacked. See 486 Freedman, 56-57, at See 380 U.S. 85 S.Ct. at 771, at U.S. 108 S.Ct. at 2151. (“Although we have no occasion to decide spite presence of these exclusive whether the vice of overbroadness infects the factors, their malleability may residual still statute, ... appellant’s think that we asser- proven unacceptable have had the ordinance danger apparatus tion of a similar in the ... apply permit been written to them to renewal censorship always fraught dan- with —one just and not the initial decision to issue. The ger suspicion gives with him viewed — range fact that the full discretionary crite- standing challenge.”). to make that apply ria does not to renewal —renewals are long existing automatic so as newsstands are

II. compliance Code, with the see Chica- 10-28-160(b) go Mun.Code to me Ordinance, Turning to the details —indicates that the Ordinance neither was intended to upon none of the six factors which the Com- promote dangerously nor in fact missioner of facilitates Public Works’ decisions content discrimination facially him based vest with unbridled distressing newsstands. One of the accepting rejecting appli- discretion in features Thus, of the newsrack grant cants.3 the Ordinance Lakewood was does annually city reapply need to officials the sort of carte for licenses. standardless periodic requirement blanche This that the Court has unfail- enabled the li- See, ingly e.g., routinely discipline condemned. censor to newspapers Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, Lakewood, speech already 89 S.Ct. uttered. See (1969), L.Ed.2d Maryland, Freedman v. U.S. at 108 S.Ct. at 2145-46. In the 13 L.Ed.2d 649 system context of newsstands such a would (1965), Alabama, Thornhill v. type allow the licensor to monitor the (1940). sale, recog- publications L.Ed. 1093 I do effectively pre- offered for factors, senting nize some of the enumerated speech the more “direct ... threat to having well as allowing scheme where six are [of] licensor to view the actual combination, weighed in allow a measure of content of the to be licensed.” Id. at remember, however, Then, flex. We must under the “perfect clarity precise guidance discretionary making, have cloak of decision required regulations easily reject never been even of applica- licensor could a renewal Ward, expressive activity,” restrict tion because disapproves he of what Chicago’s pro and these are after stand sells. renewal forma legitimate contrast, all process, by the kinds of concerns would one does not afford that expect weigh deciding opportunity ongoing when how to kind of censorship. (CPW) (3) applicant previously oper- The Commissioner of Public Works whether the has (as his ultimate location; decision well as the Commission- newspaper ated a stand at that Planning making er of when his recommendation (4) the extent to which services that would be Council, making to the CPW and the recommendation to the if newspaper already offered stand are CPW) can consider: area; available in the (1) design, whether the materials color (5) daily publications proposed the number of newspaper comport *20 scheme of the stand stand; newspaper to be sold from the quality with and enhance the and character (6) the size of the stand relative to the number streetscape, including nearby develop- of the days open operating. the stand will be uses; existing ment and land 10-28-160(a). § Mun.Code (2) newspaper complies whether stand Code; with this possible renewal, at 738-39. The ques- 85 S.Ct. the discrete application On requirements to the Freedman replaces the modification the Code compliance with tion of FW/PBS, anticipated in Inc. permit decision. Fur- have been initial discretion Dallas, 110 S.Ct. thermore, applicants, who are sub- time first (1990), three as- where Justices discretionary process, do not L.Ed.2d ject to the full licensing aimed at scheme publica- serted that application a list provide in their Therefore, sexually operation of oriented businesses they intend to sell. tions that safe- not include the third Freedman overall, offers few need Chicago’s mechanism at 110 S.Ct. oblique- guard.4 id. 493 U.S. can See content motives routes which permit process. ly infiltrate the satisfies

I not doubt that the Ordinance do rapid and certain requirement III. the first action. The Commissioner administrative Seemingly most difficult feature of days between 35 and 65 must make decisions Ordinance, prece- light Supreme Court in applications and filing for first time after dent, any provision for is the absence applications. days for renewal See within 10 judicial review of the Commis- expeditious 10-28-160(c). longer Chicago Mun.Code However, I believe that decision. sioner’s delay start-up period is not an unreasonable sepa- not involve the Ordinance does accounted for a new business and can be unprotected speech rating protected from period planning, and the shorter sound presents little risk of by its terms own timely importantly, more if is brief and both discrimination, it can sur- facilitating content commenced, interrupt have to does not despite the lack of a vive constitutional attack Further, existing newsstand. operation of prompt judicial provision for self-contained FW/PBS, likely it seems that Freed- after review. requirement the licensor third man’s —that ap- burdens —does not bear all court-related A. Chicago’s ply in this case. ordinance is distinguish protected designed to between Court’s decision Since and, unprotected speech, like Dallas’ or- Maryland, 380 U.S. Freedman v. FW/PBS, prerequisite out a (1965), sets it has become dinance L.Ed.2d businesses, maintaining whole thus creat- accepted to examine practice challenge adverse ing strong incentives to activi- regulate related schemes that supra note 4. See procedural decisions. presence for the of three ties 1) safeguards: administrative decision B. allowing forbidding speech must be 2) require- time; and third Freedman’s first forthcoming a short and fixed While within the ordinance can ments are obstacles which prompt judicial review of a license denial 3) clear, available; requirement plainly is not. licensor must the second must be prompt judi- Simply provision is made for going to court and no bear both the burden of majority finesse tries to proof in id. at 58- cial review. the burden of court. See at, FW/PBS, (Brennan, obscenity censors in Freedman et Marshall unlike the three Justices and, second, Blackmun) required Dallas a li- thought that because that all three Freedman operate business necessary, cense to an adult entertainment requirements 239-42, see 493 U.S. at were all, (Brennan, J., applicant every "there is incentive for the con- 110 S.Ct. at 612-13 court,” (O’Connor, through pursue license denial id. curring judgment), while three agreed just dicta Justices Kennedy) All this is of course since six were content with Stevens and two, the other ordinance must fall because S.Ct. at that the first see id. 493 U.S. at O'Connor, J.). requirements apply justify did and were (opinion two Freedman To 606-07 However, pro- who safeguard, satisfied. the three dropping Justice the third Freedman reading pounded the more narrow of Freedman distinguished ordinance from O'Connor Dallas' proge- the Court as well as one Justice licensing systems and its are still on in Freedman observed, first, ap- (Rehnquist) who believed Freedman did not ny grounds. two She ply U.S. at 110 S.Ct. at purport at all. See id. 493 did not under its ordinance Dallas J., (White, dissenting concurring part and any protected "pass[ judgment ] on the content part). speech,” id.

1331 case, apply shortcoming by suggesting that the com were to this there can be little stands an mon law writ of certiorari ade doubt that the Ordinance must fall. quate explicit system an substitute However, I that a look at believe close in judicial swift review set out holding and of Freedman rationale shows Professing law. confusion about the ratio apply that it does own not here of its force. nale behind the Court’s insistence Moreover, uncritically extending Freedman’s review, majority glosses over prompt reach to strike down the Ordinance for lack both that there is no indication in the record review, judicial by attributing signif- broad any quicker that writ of certiorari Illinois’ to language icance in later cases that dealt judicial process than other law common substantially with schemes dissimilar from review of actions and that administrative here, upon the one at would embark us issue highly findings of fact is deferential Illinois departure a senseless from the core logic Nicholson, v. on certiorari. See Norton 187 undergirding holdings in Freedman and 1046, 485, 491, Ill.App.3d 135 Ill.Dec. 543 progeny; purpose its for neither the nor (1989), denied, 1053, appeal 129 N.E.2d Ordinance, of the effect unlike the laws chal- 673, 558, Ill.2d 140 Ill.Dec. 550 N.E.2d cases, lenged in that line of is to involve the 938, 110 denied, 3217, 110 cert. 496 U.S. S.Ct. in any decisionmaking licensor of constitu- (1990). clearly This is L.Ed.2d 665 not the proportion. tional sort Freedman That of review envisioned. offspring Freedman explicit its and its immediate in Court was about concerns and attempts volved holding: various administrative Typically, obscene ban materials. bodies [Bjecause judicial only a determination up through set were to cull the contents of adversary proceeding assures the nec- expressive or materials to decide whether sensitivity essary expression, to freedom If dissemination. an administra judicial only procedure requiring a deter- finding obscenity like tive or the impose mination suffices to valid made, issue, license would not Any imposed restraint restraint.... legally promulgated material could not be judicial advance of a final determination on Freedman, the desired forum. similarly be See U.S. the merits must limited to (Board 2,n. n. 2 quo at 521 at 736 preservation of the status for the S.Ct. approving are period compatible Censors films which “moral shortest fixed with proper” judicial disapproving those which sound resolution.... admin- [A]n license, “obscene, signifying ... tend ... to debase istrative refusal or crimes”); unprotected, corrupt film is moral censor’s view or incite to Teitel Cusack, discouraging Corp. have a effect on the ex- Film v. 390 U.S. Therefore, (1968) procedure 754, 755, (per hibitor. must S.Ct. 19 L.Ed.2d 966 decision, curiam) judicial final prompt examining also assure a (licensing system films Rizzi, in- obscenity); minimize the deterrent effect of an 400 U.S. Blount possibly 411-14, 423, 425-27, terim and erroneous of a denial 27 L.Ed.2d 498 S.Ct. (1971) license. (postal censorship inspecting scheme obscenity); Thirty mails for States v. United Freedman, at 85 S.Ct. 363, 365-66, Photographs, seven omitted). (citations FW/PBS, 738-39 Jus- (1971) 1400, 1402-03, S.Ct. 28 L.Ed.2d 822 reemphasized judicial tice O’Connor re- (custom agents confiscating imported ob promptly forthcoming view must be “so as Promotions, materials); scene Southeastern speech minimize the suppression Conrad, Ltd. v. FW/PBS, U.S. denial.” event of license 1239,1241, (municipal 43 L.Ed.2d 448 theater at 606. This idea “Hair” rejecting performance directors be speech delayed denied and the lieving show and thus “in was obscene recognition censor’s that “the business is to community”); Freedman, censor,” the best interest of the cf. Co., 445 Vance v. Amusement Freedman’s Universal underlie clear demand 14, 100 n. system judicial 316 & n. 1161 & 14 specialized prompt for a (1980) curiam) (state (per authorizing if the merits. And Freedman law review on *22 anticipated restraining expressive content of temporary ment on the judges to enter state solicitation, limit injunctions of indefinite duration neither did it set a time orders and but adju- without a final against pictures required motion which the licensor was within obscenity). dication of permit requests. id. at upon decide See possibility at 2680. Because of the 108 S.Ct. post- emerged from the themes Several delay, nothing “effectively eon- of indefinite necessity regard to the Freedman cases with discretion,” the licensor’s and the strain[ed] first, initially procedural safeguards. procedur was down for lack of statute struck permeated Freedman itself. theme dominant safeguards. also involved al Id. focused on the concerns FW/PBS There the Court’s provision requiring that censorship an administrative tendency of boards to institutional engage particular censor’s business those wished to “Because the who overcensor. censor, danger maintaining that he is to there inheres line of business —in this case responsive than court— procure well be less adult entertainment establishments — govern- independent branch of part of an regulatory special Here too “[the] license. constitutionally protected inter- ment —to the postponement of scheme indefinite allow[ed] Freedman, 380 expression.” ests free FW/PBS, the issuance of license.” Prompt at 738-39. U.S. at 85 S.Ct. Expanding at 110 S.Ct. at 606. U.S. procedural require- judicial review and other Court, Riley intimated Jus what was unac- required to ameliorate the ments were pointed opinion7 out that tice O’Connor’s ceptable suppression speech. of risk of undue granting a licensor unlimited time to issue a at at 738.5 This distrust See id. S.Ct. vesting him license and with broad discretion judicial anything a full-blown de- of short of really making two the decision issue are protected character of termination sides of the same coin: <cWhere licensor through that fol- speech carried the cases has unlimited time within which to issue together general dis- lowed6 and with the license, arbitrary suppression is as the risk of unnecessary delay speech under- taste for great provision as the of unbridled discre judi- continuing prompt laid the insistence on 227, 110 at 605. tion.” Id. at S.Ct. cial review. danger posed The common licensors not different, second, A theme and somewhat by either standards or time con anchored gleaned can from the two most recent be opportunity for the content straints invoking cases did cases Freedman. These Lakewood, suppression speech. based See not involve laws under which ad- 763-64, 108 By S.Ct. at 2147-48. overtly charged officials were ministrative by delaying manipulating loose standards or making of constitutional di- with decisions action, suppress a licensor can Riley Federation mension. In v. National risk, disapproves. grave which he This see Carolina, the Blind North —Paul, —, R.A.V. v. St. (1988), L.Ed.2d 669 2538, 2543-44, —, Maryland re- Court examined (1992), presented by L.Ed.2d 305 quirement professional fundraisers be Riley processes non-time in both conducting charitable solicita- restricted licensed before purport pass judg- adequately and could be tions. The law did not abated FW/PBS problem body purports Note in Freedman was five to decide constitutes a consti- 5. basic hands, tutionally permissible preventing not unbridled discretion in administrative basis inadequacy processes Promotions, but the administrative speech. See Southeastern general to demarcate the correct line between But the Court 95 S.Ct. at 1246. protected unprotected speech. The Court inadequate procedural safeguards in the found however, recognize, veiy did that these two dif- case, it did not reach the issue of whether as a shortcomings danger: present ferent a common production kept matter a can be off a substantive oversuppression speech. See id. the risk of "culturally public stage because it is not deemed at 738. uplifting Id. at or healthful.” Promotions, the Court ac- Southeastern knowledged independent of an administra- writing supra for three Justices. See abilily correctly categorize speech, 7.She was tive board’s always necessary note 4. it is that what the administra- judicial IV. availability prompt only by the review. Furthermore, agree majority’s I with the *23 place and restric- conclusion that the manner that the these cases indicate I that believe imposes on licensed tions that the Ordinance trust to adminis- wisely do not judgments we fall within the limits of constitu- newsstands a the benefit of without trative officials acceptability. foregoing all of the tional For judgments judicial eye are those watchful reasons, I sur- believe that the Ordinance likely made in the to be are made or are that upheld. I vives facial attack and should be plane. Teach- First Amendment Cf. judgment. therefore concur Hudson, 106 475 U.S. v. ers Union (1986) (reasoning because that at 1077 RIPPLE, Judge, with whom Circuit non- impinges on the agency shop itself “the CUDAHY and ILANA DIAMOND inter- employees’ First Amendment union ROVNER, join concurring. Judges, Circuit by ests,” an “reasonably prompt decision a opinions already significant The number appropri- to the as impartial decisionmaker” would, in this case under most circum- filed col- mandatory to a contributions ateness of stances, disincentive to an- be substantial necessary). De- bargaining agent is lective by single member of the other contribution protected speech and what is terminations bar, eyes of the bench and court. according likely be made determinations certainly of the of the Su- those Justices favored of what is person’s view to one preme of the States who will Court United judgments. As speech involve those sorts work, undoubtedly be asked to review our then, abjure that such corollary, schemes fragile national resource. Under the are a Riley those in judgments FW/ —unlike here, unique presented circumstances howev- include a required to not be PBS —should er, dialogue justified an addition to the judicial review. system of Freedman Cf. presents this ease a most difficult Hudson, n. 106 S.Ct. 307 court, that, in problem problem for the proce- Freedman (suggesting n. 20 that only by addi- analysis, final can be resolved in- necessary in all situations dures are Supreme Court of guidance tional from the materials). Clear- volving First Amendment circum- the United States. Under such nonthreatening among ly included such stances, obligation to examine we have and allow those that ask schemes are matter it is before us. thoroughly the while kind of determi- to make the administrators frankly the source of our We must admit suited; especially they are nations for which difficulty. opinions Supreme of the aesthetics, traffic e.g. questions about Dallas, v. Court FW/PBS violations. flow or Code (1990), L.Ed.2d 603 110 S.Ct. catego- Certainly, is in that the Ordinance Publishing v. Plain Dealer and Lakewood specially ry which a of innocuous schemes Co., would judicial review mechanism mandated (1988), literally, appear applied L.Ed.2d 771 inef- only hamper through inappropriate and analytical framework for the provide an legitimate second-guessing of adminis- colleagues ficient My dissenting problem us. before discussed, the Ordi- As ap- trative decisions. of this thorough exposition have filed time and reasonable and, nance contains definite Supreme intends proach if the Court a struc- as as standards and constraints well be read and that and Lakewood FW/PBS any fashion, effectively opinion foreclose serious ture this which in such a formal applied contrast, By decisionmak- opportunity for content based it. has much recommend ap- the licensor the ing. put opinion apparently It does not before finds principal produce an unrealis- authority, proach information or mechanism of these cases to application First to avoid their make decisions of direct tic result and seeks which he could presented Consequently, by recharacterizing the Or- the situation concern. Amendment any expressive as devoid of implicate the kinds of risks this case does not dinance feat, accomplish activity. In order to this special provision which should necessitate place- opinion must declare that the principal judicial review. newsstand, Community Creative Non- opposed to a news- See Clark ment of a Violence, activity. rack, expressive implicate does (1984). L.Ed.2d 221 The Court has “often approach that respectfully I submit Lakewood, are valid noted that restrictions of this kind untenable. justified provided they are without ref regulatory expressly noted Court regulated “ex- erence to the content in that case involved at issue scheme they narrowly tailored to commonly speech, that pression conduct associated interest, significant governmental newspa- serve a the circulation of expression: with open ample leave alternate at 2145. pers.” U.S. at *24 of the informa circulation of channels for communication also involves the This case 293,104 3069; see also that one case involved tion.” Id. S.Ct. newspapers. The fact 569, 576, 61 small, Hampshire, v. New 312 U.S. stand and the other Cox mechanical (“If (1941) 762, 766, reality 85 L.Ed. 1049 larger, cannot alter the S.Ct. manned stand Indeed, municipality authority to control the use expression. has that both involve parades proces attempt public at a of its streets for plurality’s of the awkwardness sions, has, undoubtedly it cannot be problem readily as it quick fix to this difficult consideration, authority give with opinion’s subsequent reli- denied to apparent time, discrimination, ance, place, unfair the First out despite its declaration purposes in implicated, on a tradition- manner relation to the other Amendment is not streets.”).1 analysis time, place, al First Amendment — ultimately regulation resolve and manner —to apply approach If we are to this to the the merits of the case. us, frankly situation before we must deal which, view, frankly up our dis- my must face to the with and Lakewood In we FW/PBS us, senting colleagues appear to have difficulty This case does involve a remind before us. easy Judge application to this These two interest. Like case. First Amendment Flaum, that, analysis appear apply prior Lake- restraint I if cases believe FW/PBS decision, govern must be to fact situations that are the functional wood do not our we equivalent principled doctrinal distinc- of those situations that the Court able to discern a time, analyzed traditionally A tion them and the case before us. had under the between analysis. in unlocking analytical place, Specifically, conun- and manner key to useful Lakewood, is, believe, facially analysis down as drum I the established Court struck time, applicable place, requiring restric- invalid an ordinance a license to or manner place newspaper dispensing very long time the machines on tions. For FW/PBS, city Similarly, in deal with even-handed at- streets. Court has had to expression parts of an ordinance tempts regulate the exercise of Court struck down licensing requiring of adult businesses. public forums. Parade or demonstration cases, In permits the usual context in which these both the Court characterized imposed by the ordinance as a cases have arisen. The Court has evaluated restriction attempts by governments bring order restraint and determined that its fail- such commonly comply stringent ure to with the mandate of to the forum under what is time, analysis. Maryland, place, or manner Freedman U.S. known as time, (holding required place, rule that has used and man- state fair all distribu- The Court also expres- place analysis tion and sale of materials to take from ner to evaluate restrictions time, place, parade and demonstration con- fixed location was reasonable sion outside See, Racism, restriction); Against Virginia Pharmacy e.g., manner Bd. v. text. Ward v. Rock 2746, 2753, Council, 748, 771, 781, 791, Virginia 105 L.Ed.2d Consumer 425 U.S. 109 S.Ct. (1976) (ac- (1989) (upholding ordinance under 96 S.Ct. 48 L.Ed.2d 346 noise time, formulation); time, knowledging place, analysis place, manner Clark and manner Theatres, Inc., justified Playtime "that are without reference Renton v. restrictions (1986) speech, signifi- (stating that ... serve a to the content of 89 L.Ed.2d interest, governmental zoning limiting placement leave of adult cant and that ... ordinance time, open ample channels for communica- theatres was neutral and valid as alternative consent information,” holding inappli- place, regulation); but test manner v. Interna- tion of the Heffron Consciousness, prescription Soc’y cable to ban on advertisement of tional 640, Krishna content). (1981) drug prices made reference to 69 L.Ed.2d 298 which (1965), Furthermore, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 rendered evaluated. there is a time lim- city respond unconstitutional. it within which officials must application. way In no does the ordi- why, in must determine Lakewood We place nance unfettered discretion FW/PBS, the Court did not follow its usual result, hands of officials. As a there is treating approach of factual situations such censorship.2 no risk of either hidden or self time, susceptible place, as these as discretion, It is the absence of this and the analysis employed prior manner and instead it, risks inherent which allows us to evalu- analysis. distinguishes restraint What according ate guidelines the ordinance to the Court’s treatment of schemes Cox, Clark, and, mentions, plurality as the presence of cases is the these two sets Theatres, Inc., Playtime Renton v. In unfettered discretion. both Cox and 89 L.Ed.2d 29 Clark, the Court dealt with the administra- (1986). regulation pro- tion of an ordinance or which activity licensing authority. scribed the time, respectfully I therefore submit that fact, distinguished the Cox Court those place, analysis appropriate and manner is an *25 government cases in which officials were un- analytical tool for the assessment of this power grant deny restrained in their or and, my colleagues statute like who have 577, permits. 312 at 61 S.Ct. at 766. In joined principal opinion, the I believe that FW/PBS, however, both Lakewood and there question the ordinance in can be sustained on grant deny was unfettered discretion to or add, however, this basis. I hasten to pursuant the license —in Lakewood to the great there is a need for clarification of stan- very language of the ordinance and in FW/ area, respectfully suggest dards in this I pursuant way licensing PBS to the offi- deserving that this case is of further review decision, delay licensing pre- cial could in Supreme Court the United States. discretion, sumably indefinitely. type This ought officials to be able to address eyes, “gives government in the Court’s regulation matters as basic as the of news- agency power official or substantial to dis- city in expedi- stands on the streets a more viewpoint criminate based on the content or by litigation tious manner than afforded speech by suppressing speech disfavored this sort. Lakewood, speakers.” or disliked 486 U.S. presents at It also S.Ct. CUMMINGS, Judge, with whom Circuit possibility selfeensorship. Id. Be- BAUER, FAIRCHILD, Judge, and Circuit concerns, cause of these the Court in Lake- Judge, join, dissenting. Senior Circuit wood struck down the ordinance absent “neu- licensing tral criteria to insure that the deci- agree majority person I with the that no content,” sion is not based on the id. at right or under has inherent fundamental FW/PBS, 2146, and, in S.Ct. at struck pub- the Constitution to build structure on procedural down absent property, my agreement Judge lic but with Freedman, 228,110 guarantees of atU.S. opinion Manion’s ends there. The issue is S.Ct. at 606. may regulate municipality not whether a speech taking place The concerns the Court voiced both sidewalk —of present city Lakewood and are not course it what the must dem- FW/PBS —but justify regulation. Hague v. here. The ordinance sets forth cri- onstrate to CIO, 515-516, according teria which must be 307 U.S. S.Ct. yardstick except- expression provide 2. Lakewood hints at this distinction. will the courts a ing ing, permits building scope from the of its hold- with which to measure the licensor's occasional holding apply it noted that its did not speech-related decision.” Id. at general application "laws of that are not aimed Here, general we do not deal with laws of commonly expres- at conduct associated with text, applicability. As demonstrated in the how- Lakewood, sion." ever, we do deal with a statute whose structure that, although at 2145-46. It noted such laws of operation render content-based abuse at the abuse, general application subject governmental officials detectable in a hand easily gener- abuse al can be detected because "the relatively easy manner. application of the statute areas unrelated Today’s decision can respectfully dissent because the tiorari is available. 963-64. I jurispru- two recent majority’s is at odds with sow confusion First Amendment decision City Lakewood protections decisions: it affords Court dence and weaken the Co., Publishing operators v. Plain Dealer for newsstand and others as well. 100 L.Ed.2d FW/ erecting Because Lakewood held that Dallas, 215, 110 PBS v. public property speech pro- newsracks on case, In each 107 L.Ed.2d 603. Amendment, under the First the ma- tected municipal Court struck down jority explain must how newsstands differ regulated some form of schemes if it is to hold that from newsracks newsracks, speech Lakewood FW/ —in According speech. former do not constitute sexually oriented businesses —because PBS opinion, compared to the “newsstands power in the placed too much the ordinances larger, permanent much more newsracks are city official. The Court feared hands of a occupy significant portion structures city might abuse his authori that the official Thus, space. building limited sidewalk ty by discriminating against speaker conduct, operating a newsstand is speech. In the based on the content of his ” * * * 1315). (Opinion p. argument, case, present Chicago also seeks to license essence, less is that newsstands receive activity doing and in so First Amendment protection than First Amendment newsracks pow administrator with the has vested opinions hold more and are er of content discrimination. bigger. respect, With all due these distinc- ordinance, By upholding tions cannot remove newsstands from the majority ignores contradicts Lakewood *26 It that the size of First Amendment. is true respects. and least three FW/PBS inviting might newsstands make them a more First, Judge Chicago’s that Manion contends subject municipal regulation, although one implicate newsstand ordinance does large produces than newsstand less clutter merely it First Amendment at all because several newsracks chained various street conduct, insup- regulates speech. This is nothing lamps. suggests Yet size itself about regula- portable. struck down a Lakewood selling newspapers maga- whether the prior tion restraint under of newsracks as zines from a is or conduct. stand Amendment, and newsracks and the First And since the First Amendment is all about analogy is newsstands are as close an as one seeing it that citizens have access to a likely majority to find. Not even the seems information, variety opinions wide persuaded by of the First Amend- this view opinions fact that stands offer more than ment, opinion goes analyze since the on to suggest they racks would should receive challenge in Richard Graffs constitutional greater, protection. Whitney not lesser Cf. Second, Lakewood, terms. and a FW/PBS 357, 377, 641, California, v. 274 U.S. 47 S.Ct. long of earlier decisions review licens- series 648, (Brandéis, J., concurring); 71 L.Ed. 1095 ing schemes directed at Amendment First States, Associated Press v. United 326 U.S. activity prior speech that are restraints on 1, 20, 1416, 1424, 2013; 65 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed. only power valid if the licensor’s is checked Sullivan, 254, N.Y. Times Co. v. 376 U.S. majority, procedural safeguards. The 266, 718, 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686. S.Ct. however, Chicago’s frames ordinance as might Newsracks convenient tar- be more time, regulation, merely place and manner get they for content discrimination because restraint, subjects prior not a it to products, sell is also discrete but this fact Third, scrutiny. the most deferential FW/ judgment irrelevant in the initial about requires Chicago’s PBS ordinance like operation whether the of a newsstand is con- judicial provide prompt review of the speech. duct or deny decision to a license —and FW/PBS Johnson, truth, v. is both. Cf. Texas shows that common certiorari cannot law 2533, majority 105 L.Ed.2d requirement. meet Yet U.S. S.Ct. 342; California, upholds Chicago’s Cohen v. 403 U.S. newsstand (which 284; subject judicial S.Ct. 29 L.Ed.2d Tinker v. Des is silent on the review) District, ground on the that common law cer- Moines School majority majority 21 L.Ed.2d 731. As the for abuse is small. suggests out, points erecting a on a sidewalk structure both that lacks the means and will to physical act. But did not seek a Graff content, discriminate on the basis of and that merely to build a stand on the newsstands, they since are not associated pavement; permission he also wanted particular publication, with one likely are not up every morning show and hawk his news targets of such discrimination. This reason- confines, just papers magazines from its ing undoubtedly majority’s behind the fail- publisher like the in Lakewood who used recognize ure to of newsstand papers. newsracks to sell There is of course operators constitutes a restraint. But no inherent First Amendment value in the operators point newsstand do have a of view activity placing mundane metal boxes on publications they based on the choose to Nevertheless, street corners. the boxes peddle. Their decisions to sell or not sell protection Lakewood received constitutional pornography, religious political literature and made the distribution of First publications are judgment, matters of advo- Amendment material easier. Here the cacy discretion, and editorial like booksellers. argues papers that Graff can sell his Wilson, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. magazines from the sidewalk without 1098; Grosjean 96 L.Ed. stand, point. but this misses the The stand Co., American Press implement is an of commerce that facilitates 660; 80 L.Ed. California, Smith v. speech. the vendor’s free Graffs newsstand 147, 150, 4 L.Ed.2d location, gives greater visibility, him a stable 205. Recall that Graffs suit like FW/PBS ability variety and the to sell a wide challenge; Lakewood is facial thus the publications. publishers in Lakewood necessarily harm is theoretical. As the ma- papers could also have sold their without out, jority correctly points unlikely it is by simply leaving piles papers newsracks mayor pique in a over an unfavorable on street corners under rocks—-with honest municipal editorial would employees order purchasers depositing quarters their in small every selling revoke license of newsstand cups. long But the Court has rec (ie., every Tribune newsstand in ognized that protects the First Amendment *27 city). hardly imag- the But it is a stretch to expression the of ideas as well as ideas them city using threat, ine officials the of license selves, inseparable and that distribution is an prevalence porno- renewal to combat the of See, part expression. e.g., Smith v. Cali n graphic perfectly legal magazines but on the fornia, imagine sidewalks. Nor is it difficult to offi- L.Ed.2d 205. To hold otherwise would be to cials, substance; angry many over articles one of the might elevate form over one as smaller, say weekly publications publishing newspaper pure well a is less visible sold ly because, all, putting Chicago, threatening conduct operators after ink to newsstand Moreover, paper physical is a act. drop offending organ. the who refuse to the The speech city regulate the seeks to majority suggests here takes every that even if news- place on a traditional closed, forum: the side Chicago stand were the Tribune Hague, walk. 59 S.Ct. would have other methods of in- distribution suggest regula at 963-64. I do not that all cluding newsboys, in-building newsracks inappropriate. pretend tion is But to enough newsstands. This is true for the the First Amendment does not come into Tribune, but not so for the hundreds play at all is mistaken. As Justice Roberts other, smaller, publications off-beat Hague, right said in the of citizens to use the only are available at newsstands. To these absolute, sidewalk for “is not but publications, margin- newsstands —where the * * not, relative *. guise But it must carrying paper al cost of an additional or regulation, abridged be or denied.” Id. magazine represent the access low— all, marketplace; every pub- to the after fallacy A majority’s second underlies the lisher can afford to operators discussion. It is that blanket the with newsstand protections paying such as do not persuade Graff need the of newsracks or bookstores the potential premium product. First Amendment because the rents to sell its The also contains

Moreover, majority’s azines are sold. ordinance contrary to the asser- num- tions, does room maximum limit on the at issue leave no minimum or the ordinance punish newsstands based city officials to issued. Thus were the Com- permits for ber Though first blush the statute content. seeking punish to a stand for sell- missioner guidelines the procedural elaborate offers ing publication, a would not face specific he permits, are these and denial issuance having replacement to the find a obstacle 10-28-160(a) illusory. example, For Section expressly are instruct- vendor. Officials also hearings reports procedures for outlines give preference to to ed under the ordinance is to by a Council committee which daily newspapers. selling the most stands license. proposed on a newsstand comment provision as majority characterizes this entirely procedures optional. But these attempt variety, not indoctri- “an obvious the Council could the ordinance Under 1321). p. why But does (Opinion nation” applica- on newsstand not to comment decide compelled preference a feel state addition, in each case not at all. tions prompt marketplace when will itself landmark, involving an historical the Com- if, operators carry dailies newsstand more sole, is the Works unfet- missioner Public maintains, majority reach the It is measure of tered decisionmaker. like an people? most number of This looks city’s leniency of criteria that Graffs attempt by curry favor with the officials ultimately denied even application was press city. powerful most operated at though his stand has the same aggravated Each of these deficiencies is seventy years; approximately site subject on the silence of ordinance to con- instructs the Commissioner ordinance judicial Here is granting review. where longevity a stand’s before sider regulation runs smack into a constitutional denying permit, help this did not Graff. but majority Perhaps glaring deficiency in the wall. The tries to steer around the most ordinance, however, by holding wall that the ordinance is not is the lone reference to time, subject merely subsequent of the Commissioner’s de- restraint and review 10-28-160(c), analysis. majority’s place a vendor manner cision. Under Section days application is denied has whose ten view from its treatment of the Chica ensues given request hearing “at which he will be go regulation zoning as a ordinance rather opportunity prove majority that the determina- than scheme. Thus was in error.” The tion of Commissioner analogizes challenge City Ren Graffs specify Theatres, not define error or ordinance does Playtime ton person proof required. And the what who L.Ed.2d 29. In that case the the Commissioner of reviews decision municipal prohibit upheld Court *28 than Public Works is none other the Com- ing setting up shop from close adult theaters The of Public Works! ordinance missioner house, church, park The to a or school. merely to issue a instructs the Commissioner time, place a anal applied Court and manner promptly if his permit he “determines that is, justices only ysis the whether asked —that previous determination was incorrect.” Chi- designed the to serve a sub ordinance 10-28-160(c). § cago the Mun.Code Given governmental stantial interest and whether appeal, judicial genuine lacle of for or means of for reasonable alternative avenues allowed otherwise, optional purely and the nature of Id. at at 930. communication. 106 S.Ct. city’s procedures, the standards are these City a But in Renton was the ordinance of window-dressing prac- rather mere than a is, zoning restriction —that it established power tical check on of the administrator. the across to all applied rules that the board similarly enterprises. was no situated There city any attempt at con- The contends Renton, then, City threat that a deci- permit tent discrimination would fail because against would discriminate indi sionmaker applications contain a list do not of what vidual merchants based on the content a publications particular newsstand sells. scheme, officials, licensing they what sold. Under a hardly comforting. City This is contrast, city the they inclined, by a official is vested with so could stroll over to a were mag- power regarding make decisions individual stand and examine for themselves what applicants. Chicago 313, 322, ordinance— permit Baxley, Staub v. U.S. grants 302; or where official denies individual S.Ct. 2 L.Ed.2d Kunz v. New per- applications York, 290, 293-294, and then permit reviews the 71 S.Ct. periodically analogous 314-15, to the 280; State, mits 95 L.Ed. Schneider v. —is Renton but ordi- 161-162, ordinance to the 60 S.Ct. 155; and CIO, nances Lakewood. Hague L.Ed. FW/PBS prior A S.Ct. 954. restraint “avoids constitu licensing Chicago’s represents scheme a infirmity only place tional if it takes under prior classic restraint because it forces news procedural safeguards designed to obviate permit for a apply vendors to from local dangers system.” of a censorship Freed can sell newspapers officials before Maryland, man v. magazines; power itself assumes the 734, 738, 13 L.Ed.2d An 649. ordinance must regulate speech puts authority explicit contain limits on the decisionmaker’s of one As the denial the hands official. Lakewood, discretion. U.S. at Lakewood, challenge said in “a Court facial 2150. S.Ct. at It is clear that also these licensing gives govern- lies whenever a law limits must exist not a municipal whether or agency ment official power or substantial happens pass ordinance also muster as a on the discriminate based content or view- time, place and manner restriction. In FW/ speech by suppressing point disfavored PBS, example, plurality for did not even speakers.” or disliked 486 U.S. at time, place reach the question and manner 759, 108 at 2145. Court There the procedural safeguards in that recognized present two critical factors —both inadequate. were in this case as licens- well—that identified a ing First, subject challenge. scheme to facial apply businesses had to licenses It both surprising is thus and dismaying periodically were renewed the issuer. today Court’s decision focuses so Second, licensing system was “directed heavily on the merits of the ordi narrowly specifically expression or time, place nance as manner restric commonly expres- conduct associated with tion, to the failings. exclusion of its other newspapers.” sion: circulation Id. at procedural lack Given the of sufficient safe 760, 108 S.Ct. at ordi- guards, time, majority’s discussion of specifically nance is also directed at news- place interesting, manner is but beside operators: stand “It shall be unlawful FW/PBS, point. Under which any erect, locate, person to or construct way long from a setting follows line cases * * * any maintain newspaper stand without standards, city may forth similar li * * obtaining permit *.” Mun. cense a business associated with First § Code 10-28-130. first, if, Amendment freedoms the licensor is operates A obligated grant scheme that deny as within restraint, ordinance, opposed to a zoning specified during reasonable time which subject and, scrutiny quo second, to more intense mere than the status if maintained time, place analysis; regula prompt judicial and manner possibility there is the provide must adequate procedural tion also erroneously review event the license is *29 safeguards prevent city to from officials Id. at at denied. 110 S.Ct. 606. A abusing Supreme their discretion. denying The ministerial action a license is not long invalid, has in presumptively prior Court held a line of cases that most unlike re authority straints, to required justi exercised administer a and the is not to pre fy every scheme must be in bounded clear and its court on occasion. decision Id. power However, cise standards where officials have at 110 S.Ct. at 607. the ven speech places. to foreclose South dor denied license must be able to seek Promotions, Conrad, review, prompt judicial eastern Ltd. v. 420 U.S. and the absence of 546, 553, 448; 95 S.Ct. fatal. L.Ed.2d review is Southeastern Pro See 561-562, motions, Birmingham, Shuttlesworth v. U.S. at S.Ct. at 147, 150-151, 938-39; FW/PBS, 229, 110 1247-48; U.S. S.Ct. at 493 U.S. majority’s holding con- Freedman, to the at either. The 606;1 85 S.Ct. at Brown, Books, explic- trary at an 738; Kingsley Inc. v. this Circuit odds with puts cf. at 1325, 1328-29, 436, 442-443, 77 S.Ct. from the Su- oft-repeated it and mandate 1469. 1 L.Ed.2d preme Court. majority that in Freed- admits Even be- law certiorari is insufficient Common has Supreme “set out man the Court slow uncertain as a cause much too it is requirement that an ordinance such apparent It is an safeguarding speech. mechanism for judicial explicitly prompt provide as this fact of life in the modern court unfortunate 1324). (Opinion p. Since the Chi- review” at cost system years, it that take prompt mention cago makes no ordinance money, plaintiff great deal before his review, provides mech- indeed no

judicial complaint hearing on the merits. receives it, According invalid. to must be anism vigilance with the traditional Contrast that however, why majority, “it is clear” jurisprudence has shown First Amendment to that require chose the Freedman Court speech: on prior toward restraints explicit provision for licensing schemes make * * * judicial when law prompt review common Any prior system of restraint 1324). (Opinion p. at is available certiorari heavy pre- bearing a “comes to this Court majority its confusion an excuse The uses validi- against its constitutional sumption * * * stating ignore requirement by simply to against prior ty.” presumption law availability of common certiorari that degree of is heavier —and the restraints judicial adequate review when form of is against lim- protection broader —than major- is silent. an ordinance otherwise imposed pen- expression its criminal ity’s conclusion in direct conflict with is FW! theory the distinction is a alties. Behind PBS, In 110 S.Ct. at 606. 493 U.S. at society in our deeply etched law: free case, that a Court held rights prefers punish the abuse few who appeal municipal ordinance —where course than the law speech break after avail- by common law certiorari also and all throttle them others beforehand. part “fail[ed] invalid in because it able —was always It difficult to know advance is prompt judicial provide an avenue for say, will and the line what an individual suppression so as minimize review speech legitimate illegitimate between speech in the of a license denial. We event finely risks of is so drawn that the often provide hold failure therefore freewheeling censorship formidable. renders ordi- safeguards essential these Co., Inc., Vance Amusement v. Universal licensing requirement unconstitution- nance’s 13, 100 1156, 1161 13, n. 316 n. against those al insofar as it is enforced (citations omitted). To 63 L.Ed.2d 413 force engaged in First ac- businesses Amendment * * purveyor First Amendment materials *.” tivity whose has stifled wait been fact, struck the ordinance down months, pass years, court to if not for a judicial had a for want of review FW/PBS judgment on his case anathema procedure appeals more elaborate than Chi- Books, Kingsley restraint law. See ordinance, including the cago’s newsstand (upholding 1326-29 to a right to take one’s case procedural safeguards statute re where stay appeal and to an automatic license board day obscenity quired hearing within one during proceedings.2 Clearly, if the those days charge, judicial two decision within ever-present availability of common law cer- Moreover, hearing). under common law cure the was unable to ordinance tiorari Dallas, government general certiorari the is as a rule it cannot save the ordinance appen- reprinted majority suggests as an that reliance on The Dallas 1. The FW/PBS *30 part misplaced of Justice is opinion because O’Connor's dix decision in to the district court's FW/PBS. joined justices. by only two other Dallas, F.Supp. v. Dumas justices judg- three other concurred in the But ment and criticized Justice O’Connor's (N.D.Tex.1986). 1084-1085 position procedural safeguards pre- she strong enough! were scribed not enjoined prohibiting speech important from while newspaper sector of the industry, being appealed. Chicago profits particularly in big-city the case market such as Chi by delay speaker cago. Tribune, while the and audience Chicago See amici curiae of suffer. Sun-Times and Gannett Satellite Network, Inc., Information publisher of USA majority posits argument The the curious Today. city’s regulation thus strikes at prevents municipalities that Illinois law from the core of the First I Amendment. would judicial specifying what form of an review Chicago may hold regulate newsstands,3 administrative decision must receive. Per higher but that its burden must be than what haps. city gain spe But since when does a requires today the Court burden that the —a dispensation cial to violate the United States present ordinance in its form cannot Constitution because a state law contradicts meet judicial because of the absence of re clause, Supremacy it? Under the the state view. Because of the confusion that will give. law must Nor is it clear that Illinois inevitably decision, flow from majority I prevent Chicago specifying law does from respectfully dissent. prompt judicial form of review. The cases majority, cited Nowicki v. Evanston Board, Housing

Fair Review 62 ILL.2d (1975), Quinlan Ty

338 N.E.2d 186 & son, Evanston, Ill.App.3d Inc. v. (1st Dist.1975), 324 N.E.2d 65 stand

mainly proposition for the that Illinois cities power jurisdiction

lack the to alter the prevent state circuit courts. This would not America, UNITED STATES of municipality specifying expedited from Plaintiff-Appellee, procedure, petitioning legislature the state law, change setting for a minor or even up procedure an administrative review CAUSEY, Defendant-Appellant. Michael having least to blunt the unfairness of Commissioner of Public act Works as the No. 92-3515.

primary reviewer of his own decisions. Appeals, United States Court of majority’s approach to Graffs chal Seventh Circuit. lenge confusing today’s indeed. After de Argued cision, Oct. may it is bring unclear who facial challenges, whether schemes direct Decided Nov. activity ed at First Amendment are to be restraints, analyzed li whether a

censing purportedly only restriction aimed time, place and manner of must procedural safeguards,

include and whether safeguards encompass prompt ju

those must Indeed,

dicial review. it is not even clear today’s

after selling decision whether news

papers anything from other than a corner implicates

box the First Amendment. While newsstand,

regulation typical of the modern shabby mix magazines specializing

with its pornography, motorcycles, tattoos and passionate not arouse concern about the speech,

denial of free newsstands remain an question building, 3. The newsstand in harmonizes with the side of does not interfere with its sidewalk, appearance adjacent former Pub- maintenance and does block Library, unobtrusively edge lie is set at the of one notes Chicago, get around they must walk in how far est any represent not favored newspapers do reasonable, being these In addition them. or video- viewpoints represented books and do content-neutral restrictions are “simply an effort tapes. The restrictions prior restraint.7 constitute way, ... and public on the to reduce clutter newspapers from of “in facilitate the distribution readily that the admits obstruction of the merely without undue ordinance “is newsstand function” of the tended ways.” maximize public preference for newsstands Apparent newspapers sold.” the number Certainly city regulate can newsstands carry newspa than more ly wants Graff Taxpayers its streets. See reduce clutter on publications. and similar pers, periodicals 805, Vincent, 104 S.Ct. at content- the ordinance is He asserts that argu- But has advanced no 2128. it does not allow newsstands based videotapes clutter the ment that books relying on Dis videotapes, to sell books or newspapers. The any more than do streets Cincinnati, Network, Inc. v. covery clutter that newsstands themselves assertion Cir.1991).8 (6th dis There the 464 946 F.2d merely restates the issue. Chica- the streets an ordinance held unconstitutional trict court convincingly argues that books go more completely prohibited the distribution videotape would obstruct the flow sales public property. handbills on commercial city recognize that can pedestrians. safety its interests had asserted routinely purchase impulsively people aesthetics, although it allowed newsracks newspapers in seconds. The more time-con- court of publications. The carry all other videotapes, in suming purchase of books or was an that the ordinance appeals concluded im- contrast, congregation and would cause restriction. 946 impermissible content-based — others who would then have at—, pede the flow of aff'd, F.2d at U.S. Renton, only the newsstand struc- to walk around not distinguishing at 1516. See ture but the audience attracted. “Had Cincinnati stated: the Sixth Circuit Hef- Inc., 328; ness, Observer, 644 n. F.2d at Jacob See 1070; sen, (1981) (noting International Caucus was no First 851 F.2d at that there 2562 n. City Chicago, F.2d Comm. v. po Labor hundred violation when several Amendment Cir.1987) (7th (upholding on restrictions speaking prevented were from tential exhibitors message spread physical props based used cap and a "first come— because of the on booths safety); property public see the size policy). first serve” Books, Inc., Arcara v. Cloud also (1986) L.Ed.2d 568 106 S.Ct Network, Discovery was affirmed 946 F.2d ("the implicated by the is not First Amendment briefing parties completed had after the gen regulation of a health enforcement pending. City appeal was Cincinnati while the physical premises in application against eral - -, Network, Inc., Discovery books”); happen respondents to sell which Hef (1993). L.Ed.2d 99 Soc’y Krishna Conscious v. International fron

Case Details

Case Name: Richard Graff v. City of Chicago, an Illinois Corporation
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Nov 24, 1993
Citation: 9 F.3d 1309
Docket Number: 92-2352
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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