This is an action of contract on an insurance policy to recover the amount of loss resulting from damage to the plaintiff’s automobile. There was evidence that on Sunday, November 23, 1947, the plaintiff parked his automobile at about 8 a.m. in front of his house on Mon- *134 tebello Road, Jamaica Plain. The automobile was headed downgrade with its left front wheel “turned in as far as he [the plaintiff] could turn it” up against the curb and with the emergency brake “pulled up tight.” The automobile was in the same position two hours later at ten o’clock. The plaintiff, who was in his house, “heard the ordinary street noises with kids playing around the street there.” At about ten thirty o’clock he heard “a door slam” and in two or three minutes was told by a young boy that the automobile was at the bottom of the hill “smashed against a tree.” The automobile was found in a damaged condition down the hill with the brake on and against a tree some three hundred feet from where it had been parked.
The plaintiff was insured by a policy issued by the defendant containing a clause entitled “Coverage C” wherein the defendant agreed to pay for loss of or damage to the automobile “except loss caused by collision of the automobile with another object.” It was provided that “loss caused by . . . theft . . . [or] vandalism . . . shall not be deemed loss caused by collision . . ..”
To prove that the damage to the automobile came within the coverage of the policy, the burden was oh the plaintiff to show that the collision with the tree was caused by theft or vandalism.
Rosen
v.
Royal Indemnity Co.
The words “theft” and “vandalism” as used in the policy are to be given the “meaning attributed to them in common use.”
Bloom
v.
Ohio Farmers Ins. Co.
The evidence in the instant case would not warrant a finding by the jury that the plaintiff’s automobile was caused to collide with the tree by reason of either theft or vandalism. It could be found that the automobile had been caused to move from its position by reason of human intervention. But there was no greater probability that the force which caused the automobile to move was applied intentionally by a thief or vandal than, for example, by some negligent act of the operator of another automobile or the act of a child in play. The evidence leaves the cause of the impulse to the automobile a matter of speculation, conjecture, and surmise. Compare
Kansas City Regal Auto Co.
v.
Old Colony Ins. Co.
Judgment on the verdict.
