33 Ga. App. 153 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1924
The first headnote alone needs elaboration. The defendant was tried under an indictment charging rape, and was convicted of an assault with intent to rape. The undisputed evidence in the ease shows that on December 22, 1923, Docia Thompson, who had just turned eighteen, years old, attended, in company with Mattie Burns and two other girls, a Christmas-tree celebration at Ivy Log Schoolhouse in Union county; that the defendant was also there; that when the. party broke up, the defendant and Docia started walking along the public road towards her home,
On cross-examination Docia admitted that she first told her father and mother about the assault on the 25th of December (three days after the alleged assault), and that she at first swore out a warrant charging the defendant with an assault with intent to rape; that at the preliminary trial she testified, that when she saw Mattie Burns shortly after the assault, Mattie asked, “What makes you so muddy?” and she said, “1 fell down;” and as they went on a little further Mattie wanted to know how she came to be so muddy
When I told Mattie Burns that the defendant did not accomplish his purpose, I meant that he did not finish. There was a penetration.”
Mattie Burns in her testimony corroborated the testimony of Docia as to attending the Christmas celebration, and as to the defendant and Docia walking together towards Docia’s home, and as to their getting out of sight of her. This witness swore that about an hour afterwards she saw Docia again; and she testified as follows : “When I saw her coming down the road I did not recognize her. The reason was when I last saw her with Clovis Rich she had on a dark brown dress, and as she came on down the road it appeared to be a white dress, but that proved to be her underskirt. Her underclothes were muddy and the coat she had on was muddy. Her dress was very muddy. She appeared to have been crying and looked nervous. She came up and I saw there was something wrong with her dress, it was torn and was muddy, and she appeared to be crying and looked to be very nervous, and I asked her what was wrong. Her head was muddy. She said to me then that she fell down at the time there at Mr. Daniel's. We went on down the road as far as my home, and she stated that she did not tell me the truth; said she had trouble with defendant and that she did not think he was the fellow that he was. She said that he was the one that muddied her and tore her clothes. She said he took hold of her and threw her down and muddied and tore her clothes. At my house she washed the mud from her hands and face. At first she said she fell down, and then I said to her, after she told me different, to go home and tell her father, and she said she did not know what to do. Asked her if the defendant accomplished his purpose, and she said he did not. ”
The defendant in his statement to the jury said that he accompanied Docia from the Christmas-tree celebration; that they were walking in the public road, and that he had to help her across a mud hole, “and we got on the bank of the road and we came to where there was a stump on the side of the road, only a few inches from the bank of the road, and I was walking arm in arm with her, and I fell behind and let her pass the stump, and I slipped and started to fall off, and naturally grabbed hold of her, and then we both fell off the bank and down in the road. I rose up as soon as I could and helped her up. If her clothes were torn and in the condition they are now, it might have happened then, but I never noticed it then—I never noticed her clothes being torn. We both goj; á little bit muddy, and we walked out a ways in the road there, and she says, Tt looks like it is going to rain hard/ and says, ‘Would you mind running down to your house and getting your car and carrying me home ?’ And she also said, T don’t want to be seen like this;’ and I told her that I would do that. . . I went on down to the house, only two or three hundred yards, and she said she would wait until I got back, and when I got there I found out I couldn’t run the car, it wasn’t fixed, and I went back up to the road to tell her and she wasn’t there. . . I learned that she 'had first swore out a warrant charging assault with intent to rape, and later a warrant charging rape, and I was advised by friends to get
An uncle of the defendant testified that on the day of the alleged assault he saw the defendant and a girl, who was unknown to him, walking arm in arm upon the public road, and that he saw them fall off the bank into the road; that there was a stump on the bank of the road, and that a trail ran between the stump and the road, and that they were walking the trail single file, the girl in front, when “all of a sudden they fell in a pile in the road. They got up and got on the bank. Defendant came on down across the woods into the trail and I spoke to him. He was muddy and I asked him if he had been taking a swim in the road. He laughed and I asked him why he did not go on home with her, and he said he was going home and get his ear and take her home. . . After they fell I don’t know where the girl went, did not see her leave; . . saw them get up. . . I saw the girl get up from the road on the bank. . . I was present- at the commitment trial, was not sworn as a witness.” This witness admitted on cross-examination that he had subpoenaed witnesses in the case and had conferred with the defendant’s counsel, and that he had studied law.
The State introduced in evidence the statement made by the de
It will be noticed that in this first statement (which was made about three months before his statement to the jury, and when his memory about the events was fresher than at his trial) he said nothing about their walking single file along the trail on the bank between the stump and the road, or about their falling off the banlc into the road. On the contrary'-, he stated that they slipped and fell while they were crossing the road, and that he helped her up and carried her across the road to the dry ground. In view of these material contradictions between the two statements, the jury were amply authorized to reject both statements, and also to reject the testimony of the defendant’s uncle about seeing them fall off the bank into the road.
Dpon a trial under an indictment charging rape, it is well settled that where the evidence demands a finding that the carnal knowledge was realized, and the only possible question is as to the force and the consent, a verdict for an assault with intent to rape is unauthorized (Kelsey v. State, 62 Ga. 558); and where the alleged victim is a mature woman and testifies that her sexual organ was penetrated by the sexual organ of the accused, and there is no such material contradiction in her testimony, nor any such contradiction between her testimony and the other evidence, as would have authorized a finding that only an assault with intent to rape had been committed upon her, a verdict for that offense is contrary to law and the evidence. Welborn v. State, 116 Ga. 522 (2) (42 S. E. 773). However, where the alleged victim, as in the instant case, a. young and innocent country girl, testifies that the accused, with violence and force; and against her will and consent, threw her upon the ground, tore her clothing, and made a violent assault upon her, that she struggled and resisted and tore out some of his hair, and struck him with a rock, and finally escaped
In view of all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, this court can not hold that the jury were not authorized to conclude that this young girl, who is presumed to be innocent and virtuous until the contrary is shown (and it was not so shown in this case) was mistaken when she testified that her privates had been penetrated by the defendant’s privates. Under the excitement and terror occasioned by the defendant’s violent assault upon her person and virtue, when she was screaming and struggling to throw him off, and pulling his hair, and striking him with a rock, and being ignorant and innocent concerning the act of sexual intercourse, she might have thought that his sexual organ had penetrated her sexual organ when it was merely violently pushing against it and causing her pain, or had penetrated her rectum, instead of her sexual organ. In such a struggle such a supposition is not improbable. In other words, the jury were authorized to find that this innocent little country girl had not been raped, but that she had been violently assaulted with intent to rape. See, in this connection, Jones v. State, 68 Ga. 760 (4); Dalton v. State, 27 Ga. App. 288 (108 S. E. 122); Byrd v. State, 28 Ga. App. 504 (111 S. E. 924); Whiddon v. State, 31 Ga. App. 776 (4) (122 S. E. 243).
The decisions cited and relied on by the plaintiff in error are distinguished by their particular facts from this case. In Kelsey v. State, supra, the alleged victim (as shown by the original record of file in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court) was a grown woman, 22 years old, and, at the time of the alleged rape, was engaged to be married to the accused, and she testified positively and unequivocally that the complete act of sexual intercourse had been accomplished; and there was no conflict in her testimony as to this question, and no other evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to cast a doubt upon this part of her evidence. The
In the instant case it clearly appears from the brief of the evidence, and especially from the cross-examination of the prosecutrix, that the defense was contending before the court and jury, first, that no offense against Docia had been committed by the accused; and, second, that if any offense had been committed, it was an assault with intent to rape, and not rape. The first contention was negatived by the evidence as to the girhs torn and muddy clothes, the signs of a violent struggle upon the ground, and the imprint of a head in the mud, and mud upon her head, her tearful and nervous condition, and the flight of the defendant from the State, soon after the warrant against him was issued, and his escape and second flight from the officers, after he had been arrested in North Carolina. There remained then but one issue in the case, to wit, whether the defendant had committed rape or an assault with intent to rape; and under all the facts of the case this court is of the opinion that the jury were amply authorized to find that the girl was mistaken when she testified that her privates had been penetrated by the privates of the defendant, and to return a verdict of an assault with intent to rape.
Judgment affirmed.