Rich v. R.L. Casey, Inc.Rich v. R.L. Casey, Inc.
Plаintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary
We note initially that this appeal is interlocutory since plaintiff amended his complaint on 10 November 1993 to include as a defendant, Guy M. Turner, Inc. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant but the claims against defendant Turner were not decided. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) deals with judgments involving multiple claims or parties. Under Rule 54(b), a judgment that is final as to one or more of the parties оr claims, but not all, may be immediately appeal-able if the trial court makes an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.
N.C. Railroad v. City of Charlotte,
The following facts are undisputed. Defendant was the principal contractor for the construction of the Colonial Heritage Center. Plaintiff’s employer, Mark Moore Construction Company, was a subcontractor on the project responsible for completing all rough carpentry, finish carpentry and truss erection. Although Moore’s Construction Company was required by statute, G.S. 97-19, to furnish defendant with proof of the company’s workers’ compensation insurance, at the time of the accident, Moore’s Construction Company had not furnished the required proof and did not have workers’ compensation insurance for its employees. Pursuant tо G.S. 97-19, plaintiff applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits through defendant’s workers’ compensation carrier.
The sole issue beforе us is whether defendant, as a principal contractor, is plaintiff’s “statutory employer” pursuant to G.S. 97-19 and entitled to benefit from the exclusivity provisions of the Workеrs’ Compensation Act (hereinafter Act). G.S. 97-9, 97-10.1. We conclude that defendant is plaintiffs statutory employer and that the workers’ compensation benefits availаble to plaintiff through defendant’s workers’ compensation carrier constitutes plaintiff’s exclusive remedy against defendant for plaintiff’s injuries.
The “statutory employer” statute, G.S. 97-19, provides in pertinent part:
Any principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor who shall sublet any contract fоr the performance of any work without requiring from such subcontractor or obtaining from the Industrial Commission a certificate, issued by a workers’ compensation insurance carrier, or a certificate of compliance issued by the Department of Insurance to a self-insured subcontractor, stating that such subcontractor has complied with G.S. 97-93 hereof, shall be liable ... to the same extent as such subcontractor would be if he were subject to the provisions of this Article for the payment of compensation and other benefits under this Article .... If the principal contractor, intermediate contractor or subcontractor shаll obtain such certificate at the time of subletting such contract to subcontractor, he shall not thereafter be held liable to any such subcontractor, аny principal or partner of such subcontractor, or any employee of such subcontractor for compensation or other benefits under this Article.
Any principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor paying compensation or other benefits under this Article, under the foregoing provisions of this section, may recover the amount so paid from any person, persons or corporation who independently of such provisiоn, would have been liable for the payment thereof.
G.S. 97-19. G.S. 97-19 applies only when two conditions are met. First, the injured employee must be working for a subcontractоr doing work which has been contracted to it by a principal Contractor. Second, the subcontractor does not have workers’ compensation insurance coverage covering the injured employee.
Zocco v. U.S. Dept. of Army,
Larson on Workers’ Compensation Law states:
Forty-four states now have “statutory-employer” or “contractor-under” statutes — i.e., statutes which provide that the general contractor shall be liable for compensation to the employee of a subcontractor under him, usually' when the subcontractor is uninsured . . . doing work which is part of the business, trade or occupation of the principal contractor. Since the general contractor is thereby, in effect, made the employer for purposes of the compensation statute, it is obvious that he should enjoy the regular immunity of an employer from third-party suit when the facts are such that he could be made liable for compensation; and the great majority of cases have so held.
2A Larson,
Workmen’s Compensation Law,
§ 72.31(a). In
Zocco v. U.S. Dept. of Army,
The rationale behind the district court’s holding and the holdings of other states following this rule is that the principal contractor as statutоry employer “steps into the shoes” of the subcontractor, plaintiff’s immediate employer. Since the general contractor is subjected to no fault liability under G.S. 97-19 and is required to compensate the subcontractor’s injured employee, the principal contractor becomes the injured employee’s immediate employer for purposes of the Act and is entitled to the benefit of the Act’s exclusivity provisions. The plaintiff is not harmed by this construction because he still receives the same workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries, albeit, from the principal contractor or its carrier.
Even though plaintiff arguably may have alleged in his complaint that defendant Casey knowingly violated its non-delegable duty to ensure that safety precautions were followed when undertaking an inherently dangerous activity, we do not find any forecast of evidence in the record and no argument in plaintiff’s brief that any of the well-established exceptiоns to the exclusivity rule for intentional conduct are applicable to the facts of the case.
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant contractor is entitled to the Act’s exclusivity provisions for employers and may not be sued based on the subcontractor’s employee’s injuries. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.