OPINION BY
¶ 1 Appellant, Costas G. Acrivos (“Acri-vos”) appealed from the September 5, 2001, Order finding that the parties lived separate and apart fоr a period in excess of two years and that the marriage was irretrievably broken. For the reasons that follow we affirm the order of the trial court.
I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2 Acrivos and Elizabeth M. Rich (“Rich”) were married in 1985. In 1999, the parties separated and Rich obtained a Protection From Abuse order against Acrivos based on allegations of verbal and psychological abuse. Acrivos’ claim for spousal support was denied. During the sаme year, Rich also filed a Complaint in Divorce which contained counts for divorce and equitable distribution. Acrivos never filed a counterclaim or a complaint for a fault divorce under 28 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a), although his Response to the Complaint alleged adultery and desertiоn. On February 27, 2001, after the parties had been separated for a period in excess of two years, Rich filed an affidavit stating that the parties had lived separate and apart for at least two years, and that the marriage was irretrievably broken. Acrivos filed a countеr-affidavit contesting Rich’s affidavit, and denied that the marriage was irretrievably broken. On September 5, 2001, following a hearing, the trial court found that the parties had lived separate and apart for a period in excess of two years and that the marriage was irretrievably broken. Acrivos filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal on October 15, 2001. A divorce decree pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(d) was entered on October 19, 2001. 1
¶ 3 Acrivos raised the following questions for our review:
1. Was [Acrivos] denied a court appointed attorney* and did the judge abuse her discretion?
2. Was [Acrivos] wrongly denied the required marriage counseling in violation of the divorce code?
3. Was [Acrivos] wrongly denied the motion that the divorce should be entered on grounds of desertion?
4. Was [Acrivos] wrongly denied the motion that the divorce should be issued on grounds of adultery with Father Rameas?
5. Is the adultery issue of divorce able to rеsolve and bring back husband and wife?
II. DISCUSSION
¶ 4 Our standard of review in divorce actions is well settled. “[I]t is the responsibility of this court to make a
de novo
evaluation of the record of the proceedings and to decide independently of the ... lower court whether a legal cause of action in divorce exists.”
Jayne v. Jayne,
*1108
¶ 5 The first four issues present questions of law well settled by the courts. The last issue is barely cognizable as a legal question, and the аrgument that follows, fails to set forth how the trial court erred in finding the marriage irretrievably broken. “While this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a
pro se
litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage because [ ]he lacks legal training.”
O’Neill v. Checker Motors Corp.,
¶ 6 We could easily find Acrivos’ other issues waived as the major portion of the argument section of his brief сan only be described as a rambling diatribe in which appellant sets forth various complaints about his wife’s relationships with members of her church.
See Com. v. Rice,
¶ 7 Acrivos first alleges error because he was denied appointed counsel. The law is well settled that there is no right to counsel in civil cases.
Witt v. LaLonde,
¶8 Acrivos next alleges that the court еrred by denying marriage counseling in violation of the Divorce Code. There are only three situations that present the court with an opрortunity to order counseling. Section 3302 of the Divorce Code provides:
(a) Indignities. — Whenever indignities under section 3301(a)(6) (relating to grounds for divorсe) is the ground for divorce, the court shall require up to a maximum of three counseling sessions where either of the parties requests it.
(b) Mutual сonsent. — Whenever mutual consent under section 3301(c) is the ground for divorce, the court shall require up to a maximum of three counseling sessiоns within the 90 days following the commencement of the action where either of the parties requests it.
(c) Irretrievable breakdown. — Whenevеr the court orders a continuation period as provided for irretrievable breakdown in section 3301(d)(2), the court shall require up to a maximum of three counseling sessions within the time period where either of the parties requests it or may require such counseling where the parties have at least one child under 16 years of age.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3302(a), (b) and (c).
¶ 9 The law is clear that the trial court is under no obligation to order marriage counsеling if no reasonable prospect of reconciliation exists.
Liberto v. Liberto,
*1109 ¶ 10 Aerivos’ final two issuеs allege the trial court erred by granting divorce on no-fault grounds when Aerivos desired to proceed on a fault theory for adultery and dеsertion. Section 3301(e) of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code reads as follows:
(e) No hearing required in certain cases. — If grounds for divorcе alleged in the complaint or counterclaim are established under subsection (c) or (d), [no-fault sections] the court shall grant a divorce without requiring a hearing on any other grounds.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(e).
¶ 11 This Court has held that with the passage of no-fault divorce' in 1980, “ ‘the vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs’ is expressly proscribed in the Divorce Code’s legislative findings and intent.”
Perlberger v. Perlberger,
¶ 12 It is apparent from his pro se filings that Mr. Aerivos is consumed by the perceived injustice of his former wife’s actions and distressed by her ability to obtain a no-fault divorce. As difficult as it may be, Mr. Aerivos needs to accept the fact that his marriage ended in divorce, stop his relentless pursuit of his еx-wife and move forward with his life.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 13 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the trial court finding that the marriage was irretrievably broken.
¶ 14 Order affirmed.
¶ 15 ORIE MELVIN, J., concurs in the result.
Notes
. The entry of the decree rendered the September 5, 2001 order finding the marriage irretrievably broken a final, appealable order.
See
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(6);
Campbell v. Campbell,