104 Mich. 371 | Mich. | 1895
Lead Opinion
Plaintiff recovered verdict and judgment against the defendant, her father-in-law, for the alienation •of her husband's affections. Plaintiff and her family were Catholics; her husband and his family were Protestants. Her husband was defendant's only son. Both families were farmers, living about two miles apart. Plaintiff and her husband were of the same age, and 21 years old when
“Q. Do you think you could try the case as fairly and impartially between the parties as you could if you hadn't, heard of it, and formed those impressions?
“A. Possibly not.
“Q. Ton think you could not?
“A. I presume I could not."
The juror was challenged for cause, and the challenge-overruled.
Even in criminal cases, the formation or expression of opinion not based upon actual knowledge, or upon conversations with those cognizant of the facts, does not disqualify a juror, provided the juror shall declare on oath that he believes he can render a fair and impartial verdict. Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 224; Ulrich v. People, 39 Id. 245. In a civil case, the disqualification of a juror must clearly appear in order to justify a reversal by an appellate court.. It does not appear that this juror had conversed with! either of the parties or their friends, or with any one
-“Did you know that your church did not recognize a marriage as binding between a Protestant and Catholic, by jsl Protestant clergyman?”
This was ruled out, under objection, and plaintiff’s counsel remarked:
“ There is no law of this State that permits a father-in-law to take away a husband.”
Another witness for the plaintiff was asked, on cross-examination:
“You know that in that church that [the marriage] meant no salvation for her [the plaintiff], and you did mot object to that?”
The statement of the plaintiff’s counsel was ill advised, but it is not of sufficient importance to justify a reversal of the case.
“So that the extent of her sinning at that time against the Eice household was by attending church again?”
The answer was allowed under objection and exception. This was followed by the question:
“Didn’t you think a person in this country ought to be allowed, under reasonable restrictions, to embrace what religion as seemed to them to be proper?
“A. Yes, sir.”
After it was answered, counsel for defendant objected to it as immaterial and irrelevant, and the court held the question to be improper. Both questions should have been excluded.
“Do you recollect having a conversation with her in which you said that you were waiting for Lem to come and take you home; that you supposed Julia had got a*378 hold of him somewhere, and was trying to coax him to live with her again, but that was all the good it would do her, — that Lem should never live with her any more?"
This was answered under objection, and she denied saying that her son should never live with plaintiff again. Mrs. Owens was called in rebuttal, and testified to this conversation. She did not, however, testify that Mrs. Rice said that her son should never live with his wife again, but that she did say:
“I presume that Julia has got him cornered somewhere, but it will never do her any good."
She also testified to other statements which she said Mrs. Rice had made, but about which Mrs. Rice had not been questioned, and they were therefore inadmissible.
The court admitted the testimony for the sole purpose of shoAving the feeling of the witness Mrs. Rice towards the plaintiff. The substance of the ruling was to hold it competent as affecting her credibility. Any statement made by her of her prejudice or feelings against plaintiff was proper for the jury to consider in determining Avhat weight they should attach to her testimony, and, if she denied making such statement, it would be proper to contradict her by other witnesses. Attorney General v. Hitchcock, 1 Exch. 91; Tolbert v. Burke, 89 Mich. 145. The difficulty is that the statement testified to by Mrs. Owens does not tend to show any ill feeling or prejudice against the plaintiff. At most, the statement only means that her son would not return to his wife. It does not naturally show any ill will towards her. It was a mere statement of fact, which may have been based upon what her son said and her knowledge of his character.
In view of a new trial, we deem it proper to remark that the proper method of impeachment by proving contradictory statements was not pursued in this case. Time, place, and person must be fixed by the impeaching ques
“When an attempt is made to impeach a witness, there should be no reasonable doubt but that the questions asked the impeaching witness and the witness sought to be impeached are one and the same. It is so easy for witnesses to misunderstand each other, or to forget what was really said, that there should be no chance for dispute in this respect. Fairness to both requires this.”
The unfairness of the opposite course is well illustrated-in this case. It is fair to remark that no objection to the course pursued was made.
It was not error to refuse to instruct the jury that the ■defendant must have been the sole cause of the separation. It was sufficient if he was the effective cause. If it were shown that defendant’s wife had also used her influence to cause the separation, this would not relieve the defendant
9. The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that there was no testimony entitling the plaintiff to recover more than nominal damages, and that there was no facts u$on which they could determine what, if any, loss she had sustained, either of the society, assistance, or support of her husband. This request, as a whole, was properly refused, because it left out entirely the damages resulting from mental anguish, mortification, and injured feelings. In those actions where damages may be awardeds for these and for loss of society, the amount of damages lies in the sound discretion of the jury. They are not capable of accurate measurement, and it is not necessary to introduce any evidence of value. When the jury have before them the social standing and character of the parties, and the circumstances surrounding the wrong done, they have all that is proper and necessary upon which to find a verdict. ' Had the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that there was no evidence upon which they could find a verdict for loss of support and maintenance, it would have been error to refuse it, because there was no evidence of the value of such support. The sole evidence was the fact that they lived together for siXy months in a house owned by defendant. The court instructed them that she was entitled to recover for mental anguish and suffering, mortification and embarrassment, for the loss of her husband's society, and for the loss of his support and maintenance. It is true that the court said to them that “all these elements of damage, except the loss of support and maintenance, are such that it is not possible to figure them out on any mathematical basis;'' but he did not instruct them that there was no basis afforded by the evidence upon which they could determine
The judgment must be set aside, and a new trial ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur except as to the last point. As there was evidence that plaintiff had in fact been supported by her husband, I think the withdrawal of such support should be considered as an element of damage.