*1 majority of for teen, imposing years, totalling the effect three $3,600, had claimed to age eigh- females at males and accrued under upon both a divorce decree which order; to The amendment made no such teen. and which could not of clarify to further the status any logic or by has served reason in law or equity be of and establishes as a matter to provided. law construed have so for age majority of both public reiterate with I firmest possible con- age eighteen. at sexes my that judgment viction it would be holds, again purposes discordant to wholly The Court principles of equity impose only, case males are to be treated to such justice an of and unexpected than with- for age eighteen, at rather burden unplanned adults and the defend- post of adulthood to the an ex facto holding privilege change ant of the rules age entry in this lawsuit until person female after decree. To avoid here, support case shall have no retroactive ef- repetition of what I have I refer to the main fect. said herein and concur- ring opinions prior in our decision in this remanded with direction to Reversed and case, Utah, 1976, 552 P.2d and authori- judgment in favor of enter ties therein cited. only in the amount of costs $437.38. ELLETT, Chief Justice: (concurring and WILKINS, J., concurs. dissenting). (concurring with Justice: concur, except I that I think costs should decision, separate comments.) but with be awarded prevailing party pursu- I my conviction from which am 54(d)(1), to Rule ant U.R.C.P. The defend- unwilling depart, setting that the prevailing is the party ant and should have legislative a attaining majority is age of costs. Furthermore, as the long that so function. there is a has determined that legislature MAUGHAN, (dissenting). of basis for differentiation reasonable stated in my For reasons dissenting opin classes, persons within the same Stanton, Utah, ion in Stanton imper- treated there is no class are 112, 116 (1976), I again dissent. my discrimination. It is not under- missible “age standing majority that our statute” invalid, been declared but rather that I decision said that our statute
the Stanton applied without discrimination on of sex.
the basis court remanded
This this case our dis- under that That court court mandate. trict RICE, A. Plaintiff Glenn applying the statute equally that ruled Respondent, age majority should be 21. sexes the with the instant that agreement My ruling properly applied was not RICE, Kristie Lee First, the propositions: is based on two Appellant. therein. and more stated Second reasons No. something mind is which important forgotten or overlooked. to have been Court of Utah. seems controversy equity, is a ease in a This 5, 1977. May individuals, not as to current two between support money for a minor ongoing child, alleged an accumulation of but for month support money per
past due $100
306 Florence,
Brian R.
Hutchison,
Florence &
for defendant
Ogden,
appellant.
Wilson, Kaysville,
Melvin C.
respondent.
ELLETT, Chief Justice:
appeal
to this
The
were divorced
26, 1975, at
August
on
which time the fa-
ther, respondent here, was awarded the
care,
temporary
custody, and control of
two-year-old daughter.
their
then
The
subsequently, pursuant
to the terms
decree,
the divorce
requested
an order to
why
cause
she
show
should not be awarded
custody of the child. At the
hearing
second
lower court refused
the
to change the con-
of the minor child
trol
and left her with the
The mother appeals
father.
that decree.
precise
The
issue before this Court is
or not the district court
whether
abused its
by granting custody
discretion
of the minor
respondent.'
child
Our statutes and case law are con
respect
sistent and clear with
to the con
siderable discretion allowed the trial court
custody
in child
with the control
being
factor
ling
which is in the best
and welfare of the
interest
minor child.1
custody
Child
proceedings are and
equitable in
highest
the
degree.
hearing from which this appeal
At the
was
taken,
the
received evidence in
Family
the Division of
ter alia from
Serv
investigated
family
ices which
the
condi
appellant
tions
separate reports
filed,
Two
were
one en
dorsing
extremely
job
good
respondent
done in raising
daughter;
expressing
second
serious
reservations
present
about the mother’s
and future abili
ty
adequately
meet the child’s needs.
report
The first
concluded that to remove
daughter
present
from her
environment
adjust
ask her to
to a new
one would
30-3-10, U.C.A.1953,
Baker,
337,
Replace-
(1971);
2d
1. Section
25 Utah 2d
tion
divorce cases. recognize special prefer- that no
We also to the available
ence is comparatively are not factors
because to the Division of according equal4 Randy SMITH, Appellant, Plaintiff and and other evidence be- evaluation Services’ v. Court. fore this SMITH, Linda K. Jacobson standard rules favor- On basis Respondent. findings and determination of ing the in such the decree No. 14695. affirmed. court is Costs are the district Court of Utah. awarded to 6,May 1977. MAUGHAN, J., concurs main concurring opinion of CROCK- and also
ETT, J. HALL, JJ., in re- concur
WILKINS
sult. (concurring, with comment).
added court has out pointed true that U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10, ex- relates
that Sec. however, separation;1 to cases
pressly Steiger Steiger2 out in v.
clearly pointed McDonough apply-
through Justice Chief powers equitable granted
ing general 30-3-5, U.C.A.1953:
Sec. has stated a divorced
This court right custo- no absolute to the
mother has children . but
dy of minor give decisions has of our been things being that all the view
weight given
be
should
preference
v, Arends,
supra,
opin
See
Arends
1.
footnote 2 main
Note
2. Arends
v.
1.
ion,
including cited
and cases therein
550, exposition
U.C.A.1953,
Replacement
Vol. 3.
Wolfe.
thereon
Justice
Smith, Utah,
564 4. Smith