Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing her claims for conversion and replevin on the ground that the claims were time barred under the six-year statute of limitations governing actions fоr the taking of personal property, ORS 12.080(4). On appeal, plaintiff contends that, although her action was not commenced within six years of the date her property was taken, her action was nevertheless timely because the statute of limitations in ORS 12.080(4) incorporates a “discovery rule,” which tolls the statute until a plaintiff has actual or сonstructive knowledge of the injury. We conclude that ORS 12.080(4) does not incorporate a discovery rule and that plaintiff’s action, therefore, was time barred. Accordingly, we affirm.
Because the trial court decided plaintiff’s claims on a motion to dismiss, we summarize the relevant facts as they are alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. Gladhart v. Oregon Vineyard Supply Co.,
Plaintiff inherited the outfit from her husband in 1972. The outfit remained on display in the Hall of Fame until 2000, when defendant — an heir of Lieuallen — demanded that the Hall of Fame give her possession of the outfit. The Hall of Fame did so. Plaintiff, who has been legally blind for many years, was unable to visually verify whether the outfit was still on display. In 2007, when the Hall of Fame was relocating, she finally discovered that the outfit had been removed by defendant. Plaintiff then demanded return of the outfit, and defendant refused. .
Whether a statute of limitations incorporates a discovery rule is a question of legislative intent, which we resolve using the usual methodology set forth in State v. Gaines,
“[a]n action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including an action for the specifiс recovery thereof, excepting an action mentioned in ORS 12.137[,] shall be commenced within six years.”
The statute does not, on its face, contain a discovery rule. By cоntrast, some of the other statutes in ORS chapter 12 contain express discovery provisions, including ORS 12.137, which is referenced by ORS 12.080(4) itself. See ORS 12.137(l)(a) (actions for damage to property caused by radioactive material shall be commenced within two years “from the time an injured person discovers or reasonably could have discovered the injury to property and the causal connection between the injury and the nuclear incident”).
Plaintiff nevertheless contends that a discovery rule is impliedly incorporated into ORS 12.080(4) by operation of ORS 12.010. That statute provides that “[ajctions shall only be commencеd within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where a different limitation is prescribed by statute.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff observes that the term “accrued” in ORS 12.010 has beеn interpreted to incorporate a discovery rule, see Berry v. Branner,
In Berry, the Supreme Court addressed whether the limitations period for a medical malpractice action, as provided in ORS 12.110(1), commenced at the time of the negligent medical treatment or only upon discovery of the defendant’s wrong. Although that statute did not expressly impose a discovery rule, the court nonetheless interpreted ORS 12.010 to incorporate a discovery rule into ORS 12.110(1). In other words, it determined that a malpractice action “accrued” when the plaintiff “obtained knowledge, or reasonably should have obtained knowledgе[,] of the tort committed upon her person by defendant.” Id. at 316. Since Berry, the court has applied a discovery rule to various claims under ORS 12.110 and other statutes. Cole v. Sunnyside Marketplace, LLC,
Plaintiff argues that the reasoning in Berry applies with equal force to this case because conversion is
“the kind [of action] that precisely fits the Berry analysis: Just as tort victims will sometimes not know they have been damaged (or the source of their damage) for some*608 years after the tort has been committed, so will those who convert property sоmetimes remain undiscovered for long periods of time.”
Plaintiff’s argument, however, is at odds with our subsequent opinion in Waxman,
“Plaintiffs’ reliance on Berry is misplaced. Berry simply does not stand for the proposition that a discovery rule applies to all actions for which ORS 12.010 is implicated. Although ORS 12.010 provides that an action must be commenced within the applicable period after the cause of action accrues, it is well settled that a contract claim accrues on breach.”
Waxman,
The same result obtаins here under ORS 12.080(4). It is well established that a conversion claim accrues at the time the defendant exercises wrongful dominion or control over property in a manner that seriously interferes with the owner’s rights. Everman v. Lockwood,
The facts, as alleged by plaintiff, indicate that defendant exercised wrongful control over plaintiff’s personal property in 2000, nine years before this action was commenced. Plaintiff did not bring her action within the time prеscribed by ORS 12.080(4). Thus, the trial court properly dismissed her claims.
Affirmed.
Notes
Although plaintiff’s original complaint also alleged a claim against Pendleton Round-Up & Happy Canyon Hall of Fame, that claim was dismissed and is not at issue on appeal. Consequently, all references to “defendant” refer only to defendant Rabb.
Nor did plaintiff allege that defendant’s initial possession of the property was lawful, in which case a conversion would not have occurred (and plaintiff’s
