135 So. 472 | Ala. | 1931
Lead Opinion
The bill was filed under the statute to quiet title. That pleading contained the required averments as to nonpendency of suits for land, that the complainants were in peaceable possession, etc., under the statute, § 9905, Code, and the decisions. Cooper v. Brown Sons Lumber Co.,
The application of common judgment has evolved cardinal rules of construction of testamentary instruments. Steele v. Crute,
The will of Mrs. Mattie B. Rice was construed in Hatcher v. Rice,
In Mrs. Rice's will it is provided, among other things, as follows:
"First: I give to my husband, Septimus Decimus Rice my storehouse on Court or any property that I own at the time of my death with all money I may have. * * *"
"Third: At my husband's death, all property of mine to go to my nieces V. E. Hatcher and E. I. Park, unless one of myhusband's sons are (is) needy, in that case to go to that one,this to be left to my husband's judgment." (Italics supplied.)
The will of Mr. Rice contains words of devise and bequest as follows:
"Florence, Alabama. October 12, 1912.
"First: I give to my son, Pryor Rice, to have and to hold forever, my storehouse on Court Street, in Florence, the said storehouse being bounded on the south by the property of Mrs. Laura Frierson; on the north by the property of R. N. Harris, on the west by Court Street, fronting on said street twenty-two (22) feet and running back between parallel lines one hundred sixty-six (166) feet to an alley.
"Second: My stock in Rice Hardware Company, money and other property that I may own at my death I give and bequeath, share and share alike to my four sons, Pryor O., William C., Edward T., and Septimus H. Rice." (Italics supplied.)
This and other matters were not before the court or considered on appeal in Hatcher v. Rice,
The nature and method of proof in the construction of wills as to the power of disposition and the delegation of power of appointment, and in the execution of the power, should not be confused. Sections 6928, 6941, 6942, Code; Braley v. Spragins,
In the will of Mattie B. Rice the ambiguous clause was contained in the gift to the husband, as affected by the power of appointment, and another devise contained in a subsequent item held the life estate only in the husband with the devise of remainder subject to execution of power to contrary purport by the husband in the exercise of his judgment.
In the limitation of resort to extrinsic evidence — to show circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of the execution of the will — it is important of observation, that it is when there are latent ambiguities to be explained and construed in the ascertainment of testamentary intent and meaning of the whole will. Patch v. White,
The manner, time, method, and persons by whom there may be an execution of the power of appointment under wills has been the subject of much discussion. 4 Kent's Comm. 328, et seq.; 3 Thompson on Real Prop. § 38, et seq.; 2 Washburn on R. P. § 685, et seq.; 2 Page on Wills, §§ 814, 1166, et seq.; 28 R. C. L. p. 233. In Blagge v. Miles, 3 Fed. Cas. pages 566, 567, No. 1,479, Justice Story said:
"Three classes of cases have been held to be sufficient demonstrations of an intended execution of a power: (1) Where there has been some reference in the will, or other instrument, to the power; (2) or a reference to the property, which is the subject, on which it is to be executed; (3) or, where the provision in the will or other instrument, executed by the donee of the power, would otherwise be ineffectual, or a mere nullity; in other words, it would have no operation, except as an execution of the power. Langham v. Nenny, 3 Ves. 467; Bennett v. Aburrow, 8 Ves. 609, 616. It seems unnecessary to refer at large to the cases, which establish these propositions. They will be found collected, generally, in Mr. Chance's Treatise on Powers (volume 2, c. 13, §§ 1591-1714), and in Sir Edward Sugden's Treatise on Powers (volume 1, c. 6, § 2, p. 257 etc.; Id. § 7, p. 373, etc.; Id. § 8, p. 430, etc.), and in the opinion of the court, delivered by Lord Chief Justice Best, in Doe v. Roake, 2 Bing. 497. * * * There is no pretence to say, that, because no other cases have as yet occurred, there can be no others. That would, in fact, be to say, that the cases governed the general rule as to intention, and not the rule the cases. Lord Chief Justice Best has put these classes of cases upon the true ground. They are instances of the strong and unequivocal proof, required to establish the intention to execute the power; but they are not the only cases. Doe v. Roake, 2 Bing. 504. On the contrary, if a case of clear intention should arise, although not falling within the predicament of these classes, it must be held that the power is well executed."
And this subject has been well considered by this court. Gindrat v. Montgomery Gas-Light Co.,
In Lee v. Simpson,
"The question of the execution of a power is very fully discussed by Mr. Justice Story in Blagge v. Miles [Fed. Cas. No. 1479], 1 Story, 426. The rule laid down in that case is that if the donee of the power intends to execute it, and the mode be in other respects unexceptionable, that intention, however manifested, whether directly or indirectly, positively, or by just implication, will make the execution valid and operative; that the intention to execute the power must be apparent and clear, so that the transaction is not fairly susceptible of any other interpretation, but, if it be doubtful, under all the circumstances, then that doubt will prevent it from being deemed an execution of the power; and that it is not necessary, however, that the intention to execute the power should appear by express terms or recitals in the instrument, but it is sufficient that it appears by words."
And in Warner v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
"The supreme court of Illinois in the case of Funk v. Eggleston,
"The rule as adopted by this court was tersely stated by Mr. Justice Strong in delivering its opinion in Blake v. Hawkins,
"In the case of Munson v. Berdan,
"And in White v. Hicks,
The foregoing is a sufficient adversion to the general authorities. In our court the recent case of Burton v. Jones,
The insistence on this appeal would somewhat tend to limit the rules that obtain as to (1) the intention of testamentary disposition, where there is ambiguity that may be aided by other proof, as affecting the delegation of the testamentary power of appointment; and (2) the intention and act of the exercise or execution of such testamentary power. The proof of these respective and different intents is not subject, in all respects, to the same rules of evidence. 2 Story's Eq. Juris. § 1062; 7 Mayfield's Dig. 961; Doe ex dem. Gosson v. Ladd,
The law leans against a construction of an instrument which would render ineffectual the "attempted execution of a power contained in" such instrument. Campbell v. Woodstock Iron Co.,
The will of Mattie B. Rice (who departed this life August 16, 1912) was of date of January 5, 1909, and duly probated September 16, 1912; she was the second wife of Mr. S.D. Rice. The latter's will is of date of October 12, 1912 (he died November 4, 1923), and was probated November 23, 1925, after the adoption of the present Code on July 17, 1924. The statute therein provided that wills, to be effective, were required to be "filed for probate within five years from the date of the death of the testator." Code, § 10608. The bill avers that after the execution of the will by Mr. Rice (in 1912), if he had acted under the power, he revoked the same by making a deed to said property (it is exhibited and of date of December 27, 1917) to his third wife, Georgia D. Rice. It contained the following provision:
"This deed of conveyance is made, if Georgia D. Rice dies before I do this property will revert to me, and if I die before she *322 my wife, Georgia D. Rice, it shall be in full force. I am to have all privileges from said property so long as I live.
"Together with the appurtenances thereunto belonging.
"To have and to hold to the party of the second part, — heirs and assigns in fee simple forever. And the party of the first part hereby agrees to warrant and defend the title to the lands herein conveyed against the claims of all persons whomsoever."
In the case of Hatcher v. Rice,
The ultimate question of fact then presented was whether, under the deed of W. E. Harrison in 1902, the land was conveyed to Mr. Rice or to his second wife, Mrs. Mattie B. Rice, the testatrix in the will partly set out above, and was so disposed of by her.
Under the terms of the will of the second Mrs. Rice, the power of appointment may have been exercised and accomplished by deed or will. If by the deed, and there was a due exercise and execution of the power and effective delivery of the conveyance under the law, the same could not be revoked — after the due and full exercise of power. Such is the law of conveyances. Powell v. Pearson,
The evidence admissible to the end in question is not confined to the circumstances surrounding that testator at the time of execution of his will on October 12, 1912, but was properly extended to the execution of the deed to his last wife in 1917.
The whole course of conduct shown by the record of Mr. Rice, in his dealing with this property from its purchase from Harrison in 1902 to his death in 1923, before the Supreme Court's decision of date of October 25, 1925, declaring in him a life estate rather than the fee, was consistent with that of owner of the fee, and, taken as a whole, his acts and conduct were inconsistent with the execution of the power or the intent to so execute. His acts and conduct in dealing with this property, in respects we have indicated, support the view that the will of Mr. Rice using the expressions "my storehouse" and "my hardware stock" was that of absolute ownership, and refutes the view that, however and whenever he acted, it was his intent to act under the second wife's will. It all shows that Mr. Rice all the while treated the property as his own and did not intend to act under and execute the power contained in the second wife's will.
The conclusion reached by the trial court and embodied in the final decree rendered was without error and is affirmed.
Affirmed.
ANDERSON, C. J., and SAYRE, BOULDIN, BROWN, and FOSTER, JJ., concur.
GARDNER, J., dissents.
Concurrence Opinion
It is but a matter of common sense that if Septimus Decimus Rice entertained the belief that by the first clause of the will of Mattie B. Rice, to wit: "First, I give my husband, Septimus Decimus Rice, my storehouse on Court Street, or any other property that I may own at the time of my death, with all money I may have," he acquired the title in fee to the storehouse property, and acted on this belief, intending to pass such title to his son, Pryor O. Rice, by his will made in 1912, in disposition of his own property, and not in the exercise of the power of appointment conferred by the will of Mattie B. Rice, then he failed to exercise such power, and the property passed and vested in the nieces of Mattie B. Rice, named in her will.
Viewing his conduct and dealings with the property, as shown by the evidence, the conclusion is inescapable that such was the belief and purpose of said Septimus Decimus Rice, and that in making his will he was not attempting or intending to exercise the power of appointment.
The decree of the circuit court is in accord with this view.
ANDERSON, C. J., and THOMAS, BOULDIN, and FOSTER, JJ., concur. *323