115 Tenn. 484 | Tenn. | 1905
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The complainant Mary J. Ricardi is the owner of an undivided one-half, and her co-complainant Kellie R. Gaboury of an undivided one-eighth, interest, while the defendants, who are minors and grandchildren, as well as wards, of Mary J. Ricardi, are the owners of the remaining three-eighths interest, in a certain lot fronting twenty-five feet on the west side of Gay street, and running back between parallel lines 102 feet to an alley, situate in the city of Knoxville. On this lot there, stands a business house now occupied under a five-year lease. The annual rental of this property is $1,350, from which after deducting the amounts expended for repairs, insurance, and taxes, a net sum of about $900 remains, which is divided between the parties in the proportions indicated above. The complainant G. H. Miller controls or owns a lot adjoining the one in question, and has re-
The purpose of the complainant Miller in obtaining this lease, as disclosed by the record, is to erect upon this and. the adjoining property a large and handsome building, of improved architecture, to meet the business needs of a growing city. The complainants Ricardi and Ga-boury, believing the contemplated lease to be an advantageous one for all parties interested, filed the present bill asking that the chancery court pass a decree authorizing it to be made so far as the minors are concerned. Their co-complainant, Miller, joins in the bill to indicate his good faith in the matter, and to submit himself, as well as the proposed contract, to the jurisdiction of the court.
As has been stated, the complainant Mrs. Ricardi is not only the guardian, but the grandmother, of the minor defendants, and she alleges in the bill that in agreeing to make this lease she has consulted alone the interest of these grandchildren; that she is an old woman, and intends thát her one-half interest in the property shall pass to these defendants under her will, so that they, during the remainder of her life, will be in part of the
“It is clearly established that it is to tbe interest and advantage of tbe minors that said lease be made, ratified, and approved by tbe court. Tbe proposed arrangement is particularly a desirable one, in view of tbe fact that four of tbe owners are females and that they will thereby get a safe, certain, and absolutely secure investment of their means, bringing a stated income upon which they can rely, not subject to fluctuations or depression in prices which bard times may bring about, and which cannot well be taken away from them by improvident marriages in case they marry spendthrift husbands.”
Tbe chancellor confirmed tbis report, and authorized tbe execution of tbe lease embracing these terms. Prom tbis decree tbe minor defendants, through their guardian <td litem, appealed to tbis court. Tbe case was then referred to tbe court of chancery appeals for adjudication, and, that court having reversed tbe chancellor’s decree, it is'once more before us upon an appeal prosecuted by tbe complainants from tbis decree of reversal.'
We think it clear that it is manifestly to tbe advan
As to the power of the court of chancery to authorize this lease we entertain no doubt. Section 5072 of Shannon’s Code provides that for and on behalf of persons laboring under the disability of coverture and infancy a court of chancery may consent to and decree a sale of the property, real or personal, of such persons. While we have this Code provision, yet it is well settled in this State that the chancery court has of itself jurisdiction to sell the real estate of a minor, where it is manifestly
The theory upon which the court exercises its jurisdiction in all such cases is that the infant’s real estate shall be so controlled by its decrees as to secure his best interest. In Lenow v. Arrington, supra, this court affirmed a decree of the chancellor authorizing a sale of unimproved property in which minors had an Interest, and at the same time approved the acts of a testamentary trustee, who, without express authority given in the will, had made mortgages upon real estate in which these minors were interested, the proceeds of which were used in its improvement with the view of enlarging the rental income. We think it equally within the power of the chancery court to authorize the making of a lease of
“We are of opinion that, during the minority of infants, the chancery court has jurisdiction to authorize or ■confirm leasehold contracts for the protection and preservation and for the enhancement of the real estate of such infants, when it is made manifestly to appear that •contracts for either of these purposes is for the interest of the minors. Whether such contracts could he authorized or confirmed producing incumbrances on the estate ■of minors after their maturity we are not now called upon to decide.”
The question thus reserved, because not necessary for determination in that case, has been answered by other courts of very high authority. In Hedges v. Riker, 5 Johns. Ch., 163, there was a devise to executors, in trust for C. for life, and, if she died without issue, then in remainder over, with power to the executors “to sell and dispose of so much of the real estate as should be necessary to fulfill the will,” and it was held by Chancellor Kent that this power was sufficient (the persons in remainder being infants) to authorize the executors to execute leases for years of the real estate for such terms ■and upon such conditions as were reasonable and necessary to carry into effect the intention of the testator expressed in the will. Hot content, however, to rest the case'alone upon an implication from the power given in the will, it was held that the court, having jurisdiction over the property of infants, could authorize the execu
The decree of the court of chancery appeals is therefore reversed,, and the cause is remanded to the qhan-cery court of Knox county, in order that that court may supervise and direct the execution of a lease by and with the complainant G. H. Miller of this property.