On Aрril 17,1965, Dorothy G. Stewart fell down a flight of stairs in defendant’s place of business suffering severe injuries. She died from these injuries on April 18, 1965, leaving a husband and two minor children. The administratrix of her estate, who was appointed on July 16,1968, brought this wrongful death action against the defendant on July 23, 1968, three years, three months and five days after the decedent’s death. The defendant moved for an accelerated judgment on the ground that the three-year statute of limitations for aсtions for “injuries to persons or property” applies to wrongful death actions with the statutory period beginning to run at the date of decedent’s death (MOLA § 600.5805 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5805 (7)]). The trial court granted defendant’s motion.
On appeal the administratrix contended that since the wrongful death act is not a personal injury action, the three-year statute of limitations for “injuries to persons or property” does not apply. Instead, she argued that since the wrоngful death act fails to specify a limitations period and since no statute of limitations specifically mentions actions for wrongful death the general six-year statute of limitations for “other personal actions” should аpply (MCLA § 600.5813 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A-.5813]). She also contended that, if the three-year period applies, then a statutory savings provision preserves this action since it gives the administrator an additional two years following the grant of letters оf administration to bring an action which *712 “survives by law,” (MCLA § 600.5852 [Stat Ann 1962 § 27A.5852]).
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in a
per curiam
opinion that the three-year statute of limitations on actions for “injuries to persons or property” applies to wrоngful death actions citing
Coury v. General Motors Corporation
(1965),
We granted leave to appeal because this Court has never specifically held that the three-year period of limitations applies to wrongful death actions and because
Szydelko
v.
Smith’s Estate
(1932),
I.
Michigan’s wrongful death aсt is premised upon a tort theory. The basis of liability under the statute is any “wrongful act, neglect or default” causing death which would have created an action for damages had death not ensued (MCLA § 600.2922 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2922]). Since the wrongful death act fails to specify a limitations period, the general tort statute of limitations contains the proper limitations period for wrongful death actions. The general tort statute of limitations is the three-year limitation for “injuries to persons or property.”
Our examination of the history of the wrongful death statute and prior case law confirms our observation that the wrongful death act is a tort action
*713
founded on injury to persons.
1
Until the law was changed in 1939, recovery for wrongful death in Michigan might be under the survival statute or under the death act,
In re Olney’s Estate
(1944),
The Michigan courts have assumed for a long time that the three-year statute of limitations for injuries to persons or property applies to wrongful death actions,
Szydelko
v.
Smith’s Estate
(1932),
II.
The statutory savings provision of MCLA § 600-.5852 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5852) reads:
“If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, аn action which survives by law may be commenced by or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person * * * at any time within 2 years after letters testamentary or letters of administration are granted * * * .” (Emphasis added.)
In arguing that a wrongful death action does “survive by law,” plaintiff points out Janes v. Sackman Bros. Co. (CA2, 1949), 177 F2d 928 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second *715 Circuit interpreted the Michigan sayings provisions as preserving an administrator’s wrongful death action brоught within two years of his appointment but more than three years after his decedent’s death. Of course, a Federal court interpretation of a state statute has no precedential force in a state court but is important as to the persuasiveness of its reasoning.
In Janes the Federal court found that the action was premised on the survival act element of the wrongful death statute since the plaintiff’s decedent, whose cowboy plаy suit took fire, did not die instantaneously. Arguing that under the old survival act this action would “survive by law” the decedent’s death and thus have the benefit of the savings provision the Second Circuit held that incorporating the survival act with the old wrongful death act did not change this result.
In re Olney’s Estate
(1944),
“[T]he amendment does not join in a single cause of action two separate causes of action for injuries and death (see
Beauvais
v.
Springfield Institute for Savings
[1939], 303 Mass 136 [20 N.E. (2d) 957,
The wrongful death act action is an independent action which arises solely on the date of and because *716 of the wrоngfully injured person’s death. It does not “survive by law” the wrongfully injured person’s death.
Plaintiff also argued that
Szydelko
v.
Smith’s Estate
(1932),
On its facts Ssydelko comes within the criteria established by the savings provision. The alleged tortfeasor died within the three year statutory limitations period for bringing the wrongful death action. The tortfeasor’s death does not terminate his potential liability, instead his potential liability survives. To decide otherwise would be to severely limit the statutory right of recovery for wrongful death.
But on the facts of the case before us, the criteria of the savings provision are not met. First we have already pointed out that the right to bring a wrongful death action does not survive the decedent whose
*717
death was wrongfully inflicted. Instead, it is an action independent оf the decedent which is created by statute and arises at the decedent’s death. Second, the decedent whose death was the result of a wrongful injury could not possibly have died during the time the three-year limitation periоd ran or within 30 days after the limitations period had run since the limitations period does not begin to run until the date of the decedent’s death.
Coury
v.
General Motors Corporation
(1965),
The Szydelko case is distinguishable for an additional reason. The Szydelko right of action arose in 1928. At that timе the only way to institute an action for tortiously caused injuries or death was by filing a claim against the tortfeasor’s estate. The only exception was provided by CL 1915, § 13878, 2 permitting suit in circuit against the tortfeasor’s fiduciary after, but not before, “the expiration of the time limited by the [probate] court for the payment of debts.” The administrator of Mr. Szydelko’s estate accordingly filed claim in the probate court against Mrs. Smith’s estate.
It was not until enactment of the Probate Code of 1939 that one having a claim or cause of action against a tortfeasor’s estate Avas given the alternative right of immediate suit in circuit against the latter’s fiduciary. 3 All language of the Court in the Szydelko case had to do with the filing and disposition of claims in probate against the estates of decedents, and the statutes pertaining thereto, as same stood when the Szydelko claim was filed in 1928 and was disposed of by the Court in 1932.
*718 For the reasons stated abovе we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Notes
Plaintiff cited. Drinan v. A. J. Lindemann & Hoverson Co. (CA 7, 1953), 202 F2d 271 in support of the proposition that a wrongful death action is distinguishable from a “personal injury” action. Drinan was a conflicts of law case. The action was brought in the Federal district court in Wisconsin and arose out of an oil stove explosion in Michigan which severely burned plaintiff’s decedent and resulted in her death. Wisconsin law had a two-year limitations period for personal injuries and a six-year limitations period for actions commenced upon a liability created by statute. Finding that the action was predicated upon the Michigan wrongful death act which created a statutory cause of action for wrongful death, the Federal court held that the Wisconsin six-year limitations period should be applied to the action brought in Wisconsin under the Michigan wrongful dеath statute. Had the action been grounded upon common-law negligence rather than statutory liability, then the_ two-year limitations period would have applied. The Michigan limitation statutes are, of course, different from the Wisconsin ones.
This section appeared later, Szydelho pending meanwhile, as CL 1929, § 15688.
See § 22 of Chapter VIII of the Code of 1939 (now MCLA § 708.22 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178(432)]).