151 Pa. 634 | Pa. | 1892
The first specification alleges that the court below erred in the answer to the defendant’s first point. The learned judge affirmed the point as a matter of law. He qualified this affirmance, however, by saying that “ if the facts be as Mr. Rodgers, the defendant, testifies to, there was nothing in the attitude of Mr. Rhodes to justify any belief or reasonable apprehension that ho, Rodgers, was about to be attacked when he, Rodgers, struck him.”
The defendant’s seventh point called upon the court to instruct the jury that in view of the fact that the defendant has been judicially convicted and sentenced for the assault and battery, which constitutes the foundation of the action, the jury should not allow anything in the way of punitive damages.
In Cornelius v. Hambay, a case from the western district, decided in July last, at Philadelphia, [reported in 150 Pa. 359,] we said that we did not care to enter upon the vexed question of punitive damages. They were allowed in that case, as they have been in. numerous other cases in this state. In Nagle v. Mullison, 34 Pa., at page 53, it was said by this court: “ In every case of oppression, outrage, and vindictiveness on part of the trespasser, the damages may be estimated and given in a punitive shape, rather than merely as compensatory.” This is the law of this state as it has been administered time out of mind by this court. The fact that the plaintiff has been prosecuted and convicted and subjected to a fine of five dollars and the costs of prosecution, does not alter the rule. The learned judge below submitted this matter to the jury in mitigation of damages, which would seem to be the proper practice: Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424.
The remaining specifications do not require discussion.
Judgment affirmed.