This is an action for damages for assault and battery. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Defendant appeals from the resulting judgment. We affirm.
This is the second time this case has been before this court. After a previous trial and judgment in favor of plaintiff, we reversed that judgment because of error in the admission of improper evidence and remаnded the case for a new trial.
Rhodes v. Harwood,
Defendant first assigns as error the sustaining of objections by plaintiff to questions asked by defendant on cross-examination of plaintiff. It appears that plaintiffs husband had filed a similar action and that after the previous trial plaintiff and her husband were divorced. In the cross-examination of plaintiff, and for the purpose of impeaching hеr credibility, defendant was permitted to ask whether the incident giving rise to these actions had any effect on her marriage. When рlaintiff answered in the negative, defendant was permitted to impeach her by her deposition, in which she had made a contrary statement. Defendant was also permitted on cross-examination to inquire whether plaintiff and her husband were both afraid of guns, to which she answered in the affirmative. The incident giving rise to the assault involved the use of a gun by defendant.
Defendant then asked if on a sрecified date her husband and a friend were shooting a shotgun. Plaintiff objected to that question as involving a collateral *402 mattеr unless it was shown that plaintiff was present at that time. Instead of showing that plaintiff was present, defendant asked if she knew that he had fired a gun.
The court sustained plaintiffs objection to that question upon the ground that it was a collateral matter involving plaintiffs husband’s case. Defendant contends that it was not collateral, but was relevant to support defendant’s theory that the incident giving rise to this action "did not oсcur” and that "the whole thing was manufactured by plaintiff and her husband in a conspiracy to make two identical false claims.”
We аgree with plaintiff’s contention that whether plaintiff knew that her husband had fired a shotgun was a collateral matter within the test stated in
Coles v. Harsch,
Defendant next assigns as error the failure of the court to sustain defendant’s objection to a question by рlaintiff on cross-examination of defendant’s husband asking whether he had been at the house on the day the alleged assault by defendant upon plaintiff took place and whether he had an altercation with plaintiff at that time in which he told her to "get the hеll” off the roof of that house and that he "was going to kick her rear end.” Defendant’s objection was that these questions went beyond the scope of the direct examination and were an attempt to impeach the witness on a matter outside the scope of the direct examination.
It appears from the record, however, that on the direct examination of dеfendant’s husband, he had been asked, "At any time during that afternoon did *403 you go over to the rental house?” and had answered, "Yes.” Thus, the crоss-examination did not go beyond the scope of the direct examination. The questions were also proper to show thе bias or hostility of the witness toward the plaintiff. See McCormick on Evidence 78-79, § 40 (2d ed 1972). In permitting these questions the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in сontrolling the scope and extent of cross-examination in such a case.
Defendant’s third assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion to strike a question asked by plaintiff’s attorney, to instruct the jury to disregard it, and to grant a mistrial.
Plaintiff tеstified that in a complaint filed by her previously she had made a claim for permanent injuries, but that "I don’t think they are [permanent] now.” Plaintiffs attorney then asked the following question:
"Q There was a prior trial in this case in October of 1974, and at that time did you testify that you did nоt think the injuries —.”
At that point defendant made the motion subject to this assignment of error. Defendant says that by asking this question plaintiffs attorney viоlated a previous ruling by the trial court that no reference was to be made to the previous trial. Plaintiff, however, contеnds that after that ruling he had informed the court of his desire to "bring out to the jury [that] in a prior pleading there was a claim of permаnent injury” and that defendant then said that he had "no objection.”
It may be that the question by plaintiff’s attorney, insofar as it refers to "a prior trial,” was not necessary to "bring out” the prior claim of permanent injury and that, as a result, it was contrary to the previous ruling by thе trial judge. Ordinarily, however, the decisions whether to admonish a jury to disregard an improper question and whether to allow a motion for a mistrial
*404
are matters within the discretion of the trial judge, in the absence of some showing of abuse of discretion.
Cf. Troutman v. Erlandson,
Defendant’s final assignment of error is that the trial. court erred in granting рlaintiffs motion to separate her case and her husband’s case for trial. The two cases had been consolidated fоr the purposes of the previous trial. Defendant says that plaintiff’s attorney is now claiming collateral estoppel in the companion case and that "this all could have been avoided had the cases been consolidated for trial.”
Nо claim of collateral estoppel appears of record in this case and that question is not before this court on this appeal. In any event, the question whether to grant separate trials or to consolidate civil cases for trial is another matter ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, in the absence of some showing of abuse of discretion.
See Weiss v. Northwest Accept. Corp.,
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.