Rhodes v. EckelmanRhodes v. Eckelman
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Gillette
This case of a dismissed notice of appeal raises the single question of the application to be given Oregon Laws 1985, chapter 734, section 5, to appeals pending at the time it went into effect. That act amended the heretofore implacable standard of
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the amendment to
In determining the effect to be given to a statute — whether denominated “prospective,” “retroactive” or something else — the function of the court is to “discern and declare” the intent of the legislature. Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or 475, 480, 632 P2d 782 (1981). Unfortunately, that is easier said than done.
In this case, the legislation resulting in the amendment to
In the absence of express statutory text or indications of legislative policy in the measure’s history, this court in other cases has resorted to various labels and formulae. For example, we assume that the legislature wanted remedial or procedural statutes to apply to pending cases.
See, e.g., Perkins v. Willamette Industries,
273 Or 566, 570-71, 542 P2d 473 (1975). Petitioners, of course, contend that
Another familiar test focuses on whether allowing the later-enacted amendment to cure the technically defective notice of appeal would affect legal rights and obligations arising out of past transactions. See, e.g., Fish & Wildlife Department v. LCDC, 288 Or 203, 603 P2d 1371 (1979); Mahana v. Miller, 281 Or 77, 573 P2d 1238 (1978); Kempf v. Carpenters & Joiners Union, 229 Or 337, 367 P2d 436 (1961). Petitioners argue that the parties’ obligations are fixed; the amendment merely facilitates obtaining review of those obligations on appeal. Respondents argue that jurisdiction is a substantive, not a procedural, matter.
As is usual with labels, we find them less than dispositive. Neither is our problem wholly solved by considering only the measure’s purpose. The 1985 amendment was meant to alleviate the harsh consequences that often occurred when an otherwise timely notice of appeal was found to be defective because one of multiple parties — usually, one that had been removed from the case at the pleading stage — had not been served.
See, e.g., McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc.,
296 Or 653, 678 P2d 1222 (1984);
Jacobson v. Mountain Park Home Owners Assn.,
65 Or App 269, 670 P2d 633 (1983). But, even given this purpose, should we assume that the legislature intended that the Court of Appeals, faced with a notice of appeal that was insufficient under the law applicable at the time it was filed and during the entire 30-day period an appeal in that case could have been filed,
We think not. Labels notwithstanding, we require more than linguistic and historical silence to persuade us that the legislature even contemplated, much less intended to create, a class of appeals that were or became invalid before HB 2205 became law, but could be revived if only no one noticed until after the effective date of the new legislation. The legislature knows how to direct retrospective application; it knows how to write emergency clauses. In this case, it did neither. Because it did not, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the present notice of appeal was insufficient.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Notes
Prior to its 1985 amendment,
“The serving and filing of the notice of appeal as provided inORS 19.023 , 19.026 and 19.029 is jurisdictional and may not be waived or extended.”
As amended, that statute now provides, in pertinent part:
“The following requirements ofORS 19.023 , 19.026 and 19.029 are jurisdictional and may not be waived or extended:
“(a) Service of the notice of appeal on all parties identified in the notice of appeal as adverse parties or, if the notice of appeal does not identify adverse parties, on all parties who have appeared in the action, suit or proceeding, as provided inORS 19.023(2)(a) , within the time limits prescribed byORS 19.026. ”