Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association v. Brenda Ricci et al.Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association v. Brenda Ricci et al.
O P I N I O N
Justice Long, for the Court. The defendants, Brenda and Ernest Ricci (Mrs. Ricci and Mr. Ricci, respectively) (together, the Riccis or defendants), appeal from a final judgment of the Superior Court entered following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association (RIJRA or plaintiff), on count I of RIJRA‘s complaint for declaratory judgment and on all counts contained in the defendants’ counterclaims. The Riccis also appeal from the denial of their motions for a new trial.1 This action arose as a result of a dispute regarding insurance
Facts and Procedural History
We glean the following facts from testimony elicited at trial and the record of proceedings in the Superior Court. In February 2014, Mrs. Ricci2 purchased a property at 876 Ten Rod Road in North Kingstown (the property) for $21,000 at a foreclosure sale. Subsequently, Mrs. Ricci obtained a dwelling and personal liability policy from RIJRA for the property for the period of February 27, 2014, to February 27, 2015. At the time of purchase, an individual named David Christian (Mr. Christian) lived in the property; he had purchased the property via quitclaim deed in 2012. The Riccis opted to allow Mr. Christian and his family to remain in the house and pay them rent; the parties executed a two-year lease on March 1,
Mr. Christian paid rent for March but refused to pay the April rent. In the midst of this dispute over rent, Mr. Christian sought an inspection of the property. The inspection occurred on April 29, 2014, after which the building and zoning official for the Town of North Kingstown issued a notice of condemnation to Mr. Christian detailing the code violations. Specifically, the inspector noted electrical, mechanical, and plumbing systems in “a hazardous condition“; a lack of sanitary work surfaces and kitchen floor; missing windows on the second and third floors; openings in the eaves and soffits; and the possibility of exposed lead paint and asbestos.
Mrs. Ricci filed a complaint for eviction for non-payment of rent in District Court on April 23, 2014. Mr. Christian then filed a verified complaint and motions for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction for protection from unlawful eviction on April 29, 2014. The temporary restraining order was granted that same day and stipulated that Mrs. Ricci must “pay for all lodging and living
When Mr. Ricci visited the property on June 15, 2014, the house was empty, and he discovered damage he believed had been caused by Mr. Christian and called the police. Mr. Ricci had only visited the house once previously, after his bid had been accepted at the foreclosure sale; at no point had Mrs. Ricci ever set foot on the property. As part of the police investigation, an officer questioned Mr. Christian, who stated that “[e]verything he took out of the home he had a receipt for” and that he was “within his right to leave the home as he did.” On June 30, 2014, Mrs. Ricci filed an insurance claim with RIJRA on the property, alleging that the damage had occurred as a result of vandalism.
RIJRA hired Flanagan Claims Service (Flanagan), which inspected the property for the reported damages on July 8, 2014; Flanagan, in a letter to Mrs. Ricci, summarized its conclusions: “Our inspection revealed the damage to the dwelling was the result of unfinished remodeling and we found no evidence of vandalism.” The letter also expressly stated that RIJRA “fully reserves unto itself all defenses * * *.”
On October 19, 2015, RIJRA filed a single-count declaratory judgment action, seeking a judicial determination about the parties’ rights and obligations under the policy. The Riccis answered the complaint and added counterclaims for declaratory
The Superior Court held a weeklong jury trial in late October and early November 2022. Mrs. Ricci was represented by counsel, and Mr. Ricci represented himself. Before the trial began, the trial justice heard motions in limine on October 25, 2022. The relevant motions will be discussed where appropriate.
Trial began on October 26, 2022. The Riccis presented their case first.4 They called Mrs. Ricci; Gary Tedeschi, the building official and zoning enforcement officer for the Town of North Kingstown; Patrick Dowling, Jr., an attorney who represented them in a number of real estate transactions; Officer Michelle Kinney, a
The jury reached a verdict on November 2, 2022, answering “No” to the question, “Do you find that Brenda Ricci and Ernest Ricci have proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the alleged damage occurred between February 27, 2014 and June 15, 2014?” Because they answered no, they did not have to reach the other two questions on the form: “Do you find that Brenda Ricci and Ernest Ricci have proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the damages alleged were caused by vandalism?” and “Do you find that Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association has proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Brenda Ricci or Ernest Ricci or both intentionally concealed or misrepresented
The trial justice entered judgment in favor of RIJRA on November 10, 2022. The judgment stated that (1) Mrs. Ricci‘s insurance policy for the property did not cover claims relating to the alleged vandalism loss; (2) RIJRA had no obligation to reimburse defendants for any claims related to the alleged vandalism loss; and (3) RIJRA is entitled to deny coverage for and disclaim liability for any claim related to the alleged vandalism loss at the property. The trial justice also entered judgment in favor of RIJRA with respect to all counts contained within Mrs. Ricci‘s counterclaim, as well as Mr. Ricci‘s counterclaim.
The Riccis separately filed motions for a new trial; the trial justice held a hearing on December 14, 2022. She denied the motions, and the Riccis each appealed both the judgment and the denial of their respective motions for a new trial.
Issues Presented
On appeal, the Riccis allege a litany of errors.5 They argue that the trial justice erred by: (1) denying several of their motions in limine; (2) declining to admit
Motions to Preclude RIJRA from Presenting Evidence of Fraud
The Riccis argue that the trial justice erred in denying their motions in limine to preclude RIJRA from presenting evidence on its fraud claim and admitting evidence of fraud. During the hearing on the motions in limine, the Riccis cited Optical Works and Logistics, LLC v. Sentinel Insurance Company, Limited, 525 F. Supp. 3d 295 (D.R.I. 2021), for the proposition that an insurer cannot present evidence about arguments it did not make to the insured when it refused to cover a claim, but the trial justice found the facts in this case distinguishable. She also noted that “[t]hese arguments most probably should have been made at that time [i.e., the time RIJRA moved to amend their complaint] in this [c]ourt‘s opinion.” The trial justice continued that, to suggest that RIJRA is “trying to pull a fast one and add a fraud count here is,” in her opinion, “completely unfounded.” She then denied the motions.
We review “the grant or denial of a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion.” Salvatore v. Palangio, 247 A.3d 1250, 1258 (R.I. 2021) (quoting State v. Marte, 92 A.3d 148, 150 (R.I. 2014)). Here, it is evident that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the Riccis’ motions in limine to preclude RIJRA
Through this claim of error, the Riccis attempt to relitigate (or rather, litigate for the first time) something that should have been argued when RIJRA first moved to amend its complaint to add the counts for fraud. To argue for the first time in the weeks leading up to trial after years of discovery that RIJRA should be estopped from litigating a central part of their amended complaint defies logic. It was well within the trial justice‘s discretion to allow RIJRA to present evidence related to the claims in its amended complaint, especially after there had not previously been any sort of registered objection. The Riccis also had the opportunity to rebut evidence
Denial of Request to Send the Matter to Appraisal
The Riccis also argue that the trial justice erred in declining to order that the matter go to appraisal between RIJRA and the Riccis. During the hearing on the motions in limine, the issue arose in the context of the Riccis’ motions to allow them “to [i]ntroduce, [p]resent and [a]dmit [e]vidence on [i]ncreased [c]ost to [r]epair [p]roperty [b]ased on [p]resent [c]ost [v]alue and [r]eplacement [c]ost.” The trial justice sought confirmation from the parties that if the Riccis prevailed at trial, the case would be submitted for appraisal; counsel for RIJRA agreed, but counsel for Mrs. Ricci disputed that they had reached an agreement. After some discussion, the Riccis agreed to pass the motions without prejudice.6 Counsel for Mrs. Ricci brought up the issue of appraisal again when trial began and asked whether it would be permissible for him to mention it during his opening statement. The trial justice responded that appraisal was beyond the scope of what should be covered, given that “[t]his is about liability, not damages.” She noted, “It‘s not an issue. * * * [A]s I
The Riccis again allege on appeal that the insurance policy contained a provision that afforded “either party the right to have disputes over the amount of loss resolved through an appraisal process.” They claim that RIJRA “refused to submit to an appraisal.” By filing a complaint for declaratory judgment, the Riccis allege that RIJRA reframed the dispute to be about the “scope of coverage” rather than the “scope of loss,” which was improper. Despite the Riccis’ numerous attempts to convince the trial justice to order the matter to appraisal, she refused, which they allege is reversible error. We interpret defendants’ assignment of error as a question of the admissibility of evidence, namely, whether the trial justice erred in preventing them from presenting evidence related to interest on the cost of repair. To the extent that the Riccis also challenge the trial justice‘s decision rejecting their
“The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial justice.” Estrella v. Janney Montgomery Scott LLC, 296 A.3d 97, 103 (R.I. 2023) (brackets omitted) (quoting Cappuccilli v. Carcieri, 174 A.3d 722, 729 (R.I. 2017)). “[T]his Court will not interfere with the trial justice‘s decision unless a clear abuse of that discretion is apparent.” Berman v. Sitrin, 101 A.3d 1251, 1259 (R.I. 2014) (brackets omitted) (quoting Morel v. Napolitano, 64 A.3d 1176, 1179 (R.I. 2013)). This Court will uphold a trial justice‘s decision to admit evidence unless the trial justice clearly abused their discretion and the evidence is both prejudicial and irrelevant. Accetta v. Provencal, 962 A.2d 56, 60 (R.I. 2009).
By the plain language of the insurance policy issued by RIJRA to Mrs. Ricci, “either [party] may demand an appraisal of the loss” if the parties “fail to agree on the amount of loss.” After the Riccis requested the opportunity to present evidence on interest, the trial justice evaluated the scope of RIJRA‘s claims and the Riccis’ counterclaims and concluded that appraisal fell outside the scope of issues at the
Motions to Preclude RIJRA from Introducing Evidence of Fraud in Mr. Christian‘s Deposition
The Riccis also argue that the trial justice erred in admitting allusions to or discussions of fraud that appeared in Mr. Christian‘s testimony. The Riccis first moved to preclude RIJRA from introducing any evidence of fraud in the deposition of Mr. Christian or, in the alternative, from introducing the deposition transcript at all, during the hearing on the motions in limine. They argued that they were not prepared to cross-examine him on the issue of fraud at that deposition because RIJRA had not yet filed its amended complaint to include the fraud claim at that time. The trial justice queried whether counsel for Mrs. Ricci was at the deposition, to which he answered affirmatively. The trial justice then denied the motions to exclude the transcript. The parties revisited the issue during trial once the Riccis rested and RIJRA endeavored to read Mr. Christian‘s deposition transcript into evidence. Both sides submitted objections to certain pages or lines, asking those
The Riccis argue here that “RIJRA first raised fraud allegations * * * almost a year after having taken Christian‘s deposition.” They claim they were “blindsided” because “[f]raud was not a pleaded defense when the deposition occurred.” They continue, “RIJRA clearly had fraud in mind * * * [covering] the topic extensively in the deposition, addressing all the information it knew for years but had held back from Ricci. Yet the Ricci‘s [sic] had no prior knowledge RIJRA would elicit such testimony and were unprepared to address these unpleaded allegations.” As a result, Mrs. Ricci objected to the introduction of the deposition at trial because “she lacked opportunity to cross-examine Christian on the later-added fraud count.” Because her objections during the hearing on the motions in limine and during trial were denied, the Riccis conclude that there was prejudicial error.
We consider whether the trial justice‘s decision to allow the discussion of fraud in Mr. Christian‘s deposition transcript into evidence was an abuse of discretion. Estrella, 296 A.3d at 103. The Riccis do not allege a specific basis for error before this Court, nor is one at all apparent from the record. The admission of this deposition comports with both
Introduction of the Text Messages
The Riccis assign error to the trial justice‘s rulings not to admit text messages Mr. Christian sent Mr. Ricci, which illustrated the increasing animosity in their relationship. The Riccis first attempted to introduce text messages between Mr. Christian and Mr. Ricci while Mr. Dowling, the attorney, was on the stand. Counsel for RIJRA objected on hearsay grounds, which the trial justice sustained. Counsel for Mrs. Ricci noted his objection to the trial justice‘s decision to bar the admission of the texts. While Mr. Ricci was on the stand, counsel for Mrs. Ricci once again tried to introduce the text messages by asking him to read them into the record; counsel for RIJRA objected again on hearsay grounds. The trial justice queried whether the messages had been authenticated, to which counsel for Mrs. Ricci
Counsel for Mrs. Ricci broached the issue of introducing the text messages a final time when court resumed after breaking for the weekend. He presented several avenues for admission of the texts, arguing for their introduction under the present sense impression exception to hearsay, as a declaration of state of mind, or a business record. The trial justice rejected the first justification because “[t]hese text messages refer to the past tense, not the present tense” and, as to the latter two, concluded that those exceptions did not apply. She sustained the objection. Ultimately, the only text message conversation admitted at trial was a brief exchange between Mr. Christian and Mr. Ricci about which counsel for RIJRA asked Mr. Ricci during his cross-examination. The Riccis did not object to the questioning of Mr. Ricci about these texts, nor when RIJRA sought to admit this brief conversation in full.
The exclusion of the text messages is a question of admissibility of evidence, so we consider whether the trial justice abused her discretion. See Estrella, 296 A.3d at 103. The rule of completeness does not apply here. The Riccis sought to introduce hundreds of texts between the two men over a period of months.
Introduction of the Eviction Proceeding Transcript
The Riccis also submit that the trial justice erred in refusing to admit the entire transcript of the eviction proceeding when she permitted RIJRA to impeach Mr. Ricci with certain portions of the transcript. Counsel for Mrs. Ricci first broached this issue on the morning of the second day of trial. He anticipated that RIJRA would use the transcript to impeach Mr. Ricci when he took the stand; counsel argued that under
Before this Court, the Riccis aver that “it was error to allow RIJRA to use only portions of a transcript from the [eviction] trial to impeach Ernest Ricci, without allowing Ricci to introduce the entire transcript for context or rehabilitation.” They seem to renew their Rule 106 argument raised by the failure to allow in the text messages between Mr. Christian and Mr. Ricci.
The exclusion of the full eviction proceeding transcript is another question of admissibility of evidence. See Estrella, 296 A.3d at 103.
On appeal, the Riccis argue that the trial justice committed two distinct reversible errors related to the jury instructions: (1) by declining to instruct the jury on the definitions of “vandalism” and “fixtures” and (2) by refusing to include an instruction that the loss could have occurred from theft. We will address each assignment of error in turn.
Counsel for Mrs. Ricci noted before the jury entered on the last day of testimony that their proposed jury instructions offered “several definitions of vandalism.” After the close of testimony and after both sides rested, the trial justice gave the parties the opportunity to weigh in on her jury instructions. After counsel for RIJRA made his suggested additions and deletions to the instructions, counsel for Mrs. Ricci made his. Specifically, Mrs. Ricci‘s counsel asked the trial justice to include language that the damage could have occurred as a result of “malicious[] mischief, or theft.” The trial justice declined to do so because “the original claim was for vandalism,” which is “the way the claim was presented to the insurance company.” Mrs. Ricci‘s counsel noted his objection.
We review jury instructions de novo. Armour v. Bader, 316 A.3d 1164, 1173 (R.I. 2024). “This Court examines jury instructions in their entirety to ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinarily intelligent lay people would have understood them.” Mangiarelli v. Town of Johnston, 289 A.3d 560, 566 (R.I. 2023) (brackets
Refusal to Instruct on Definitions of “Vandalism” and “Fixtures”
The Riccis assign error to the trial justice‘s “refus[al] to instruct the jury on ‘vandalism’ and ‘fixtures.‘” However, neither counsel for Mrs. Ricci nor Mr. Ricci ever objected on the record to the trial justice‘s decision not to include definitions of vandalism and fixtures in the jury instructions. Indeed, there was no mention whatsoever about the definition of fixtures during any of the discussions on jury instructions. As such, this argument is waived. See
Refusal to Include Instruction on Theft
The Riccis further allege that the trial justice erred in rejecting their request for a theft instruction, arguing that it is possible that the damage could have occurred as a result of theft during the period between condemnation and Mr. Ricci‘s June visit.
The jury instructions stated, “The insured, Brenda Ricci, bears the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the loss occurred within the policy period; and (2) that the loss was a covered loss under the insurance policy.” The first question on the verdict form asked the jury whether “Brenda Ricci and Ernest Ricci have proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the alleged damage occurred between February 27, 2014 and June 15, 2014[.]” This was the only question the jury answered, as there was no need to go any further given that the failure to prove that the damage happened during the period of coverage defeated the Riccis’ case. However, the second question asked whether they proved that “the damages alleged were caused by vandalism[.]”
Although the Riccis properly objected to the trial justice‘s decision not to include language about theft in the final jury instructions, their argument fails. There is no evidence to suggest that the trial justice‘s decision not to include a theft
Motions for a New Trial
The Riccis argue that the trial justice erred in denying their motions for a new trial. In their motions for a new trial, they argued that the verdict was (1) “contrary to the credible weight of the evidence, and not supported by sufficient evidence“; (2) “contrary to the unbiased and uncontradicted evidence of multiple witnesses“; (3) “contrary to applicable case law“; (4) “contrary to the law, the evidence and the weight thereof“; (5) “ignores and is contrary to all reasonable inferences“; and (6) “fails to respond to the merits of the controversy and fails to administer substantial justice” and that “the charge to the jury was improper * * *.”
“We review a trial justice‘s decision on a motion for a new trial with deference.” Kazarian v. New London County Mutual Insurance Company, 331 A.3d 984, 990-91 (R.I. 2025). We “will affirm a trial justice‘s decision on a motion for a new trial as long as the trial justice conducts the appropriate analysis, does not overlook or misconceive material evidence, and is not otherwise clearly wrong.”
During the hearing on the motions for a new trial, after hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial justice began her decision by reciting the correct legal standard and the process of her review. She recited the procedural history and summarized the Riccis’ arguments.
The trial justice evaluated each of the Riccis’ assignments of error in turn. She first considered the relevant evidence and testimony presented at trial. After discussing the witnesses’ testimony, she observed: “An exhaustive review of the record evidence points to one conclusion. With respect to Mr. Ricci‘s testimony, there‘s not enough ink in the pen to document his inconsistent statements and false statements contained in his testimony.” She determined that the jury‘s verdict was supported by the weight of the evidence, concluding, “[a]fter independently assessing the credibility of the witnesses and affording the testimony the appropriate
We note that defendants failed to properly transmit the hearing on the motions for a new trial transcript to this Court. Article I, Rule 11(a) of the
Our review of the trial justice‘s decision reveals that she properly performed her function. She applied the appropriate standard, conducted the correct analysis, and accurately evaluated both the facts and the law. As such, we affirm the trial justice‘s decision denying the Riccis’ motions for a new trial.
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Finally, the Riccis argue that “the acts and omissions of RIJRA constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the insurance contract between the parties, such that a new trial is warranted.” However, the Riccis do not cite to any specific action of the trial justice or a defect in the trial process related to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Article I, Rule 16(a)(2) of the
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial justice‘s decision on the defendants’ motions for a new trial and reject all of their specific claims of error. We therefore affirm the judgment in favor of the plaintiff and remand the papers to the Superior Court.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK‘S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
| Title of Case | Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association v. Brenda Ricci et al. |
| Case Number | No. 2023-251-Appeal. No. 2024-246-Appeal. (WC 15-518) |
| Date Opinion Filed | July 30, 2026 |
| Justices | Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, and Indeglia (ret.), JJ. |
| Written By | Associate Justice Melissa A. Long |
| Source of Appeal | Washington County Superior Court |
| Judicial Officer from Lower Court | Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter |
| Attorney(s) on Appeal | For Plaintiff: Gail M. Ryan, Esq. For Defendants: Richard A. Pacia, Esq. |
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)