Rhoades v. StateRhoades v. State
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Glaze
Lead Opinion
On Dеcember 13, 1991, the appellant, Billy Wayne Rhoades, was arrested on a circuit court felony bench warrant for burglary, theft, and forgery. At the time of his arrest, Rhoades was sixteen years of age. He was jailed and later transported that same day to the sheriff’s office for questioning where he was read his Miranda rights. Prior to interrogation, Rhoades executed a juvenile rights form which was witnessed by the deputy, Norman Cornish, and an individual acting as а juvenile intake officer, Sandi Daugherty.1 Additionally, Cornish contacted Rhoades’ mother by phone, and the mother indicated she could not come to the jail until she got off work at 4:00 p.m. Nonetheless, the mother gave her oral consent for Rhoades to be questioned. Rhoades then was interrogated and gave inculpatory statements. Rhoades’ mother arrived at the jail shortly after 4:00 p.m., and was told that Rhoades had been questioned and he had confessed. On December 16, Rhoades was released on bond.
On January 13, 1992, Rhoades made his first appearance before the Bradley County Circuit Court, at which time counsel was appointed, and Rhoades was scheduled for plea and arraignment on February 28. However, on January 14, an order of transfer from circuit to juvenile court was entered, and on February 3, the prosecutor filed a petition in the juvenile division of chancery court to have Rhoades adjudicated a delinquent based on acts allegedly committed in a different case and which were later dismissed. The petition was amended on February 20, to inсlude the acts committed in this case. At an April 3 hearing, the juvenile court denied Rhoades’ motion to suppress his confession, and then it adjudicated Rhoades a delinquent, finding he had committed theft of property in exсess of $200 and forgery. The court committed Rhoades to the Division of Youth Services. Rhoades appeals from the court’s judgment, and for his sole point for reversal, argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to supрress his inculpatory, custodial statements.
Rhoades’ argument is based upon the state’s failure to comply with certain provisions of the Arkansas Juvenile Code after Rhoades was taken into custody pursuant to a warrant. For example,
The state responds by claiming that the Juvenile Code provisions relied upon by Rhoades are inapplicable because Rhoades was charged in circuit court with a felony as an adult, not in juvenile court as a delinquent juvenile. Consistent with the state’s argument here, we recently hеld in Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171, 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993), that the Juvenile Code and its provisions refer only to proceedings in juvenile court. This court further concluded that, when the prosecutor chooses to prosecute a juvenile in circuit court аs an adult, the juvenile becomes subject to the procedures and penalties prescribed for adults. Accordingly, the state suggests here that, since Rhoades’ constitutional rights as an adult were met when the officеrs interviewed and obtained his confession, the trial court was correct in allowing Rhoades’ confession into evidence even though the officers’ actions failed to comply with Juvenile Code provisions.
The state and Rhoades are both correct at least up to a point. As we stated in Boyd, the Juvenile Code provides that, when a case involves a juvenile sixteen years old or older, and the alleged act wоuld constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the prosecuting attorney has the discretion to file a petition in juvenile court alleging delinquency, or to file charges in circuit court and to prosecute as an аdult. 313 Ark. at 172, 853 S.W.2d at 264. However, felony charges in circuit court are required to be brought by indictment or information. Lowell v. State, 283 Ark. 425, 678 S.W.2d 318 (1984); see also
In sum, our review of the record reveals Rhoades had not been charged with a felony in circuit cоurt as an adult when the law officers interrogated him and gained his confession. Thus, under the circumstances presented, the Juvenile Code was indeed applicable at the time Rhoades gave his statement, and his statеment was therefore inadmissible at trial because the law enforcement officer’s conduct failed to comport with required Juvenile Code procedures when they obtained Rhoades’ confession.
For the reasons set out above, we reverse and dismiss.
Holt, C.J., dissents.Notes
The exact status of this individual is not clear.
The bench warrant does reflect in its top margin the typed words, “Information NO. CR” and the numbers “91-122-2 A and B” handwritten in. To confuse matters further, the term “indictment” is mentioned in the warrant. Of course, an information or indictment is unnecessary to issue a wаrrant, and unlike the dissenting opinion, the court is unwilling to speculate that a charging instrument was actually filed in this matter, especially since an information or indictment fails to appear either in the abstract or the trаnscript.
Lead Opinion
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING MARCH 14, 1994
Petition for Rehearing denied.
Tom Glaze, Justice.The state files its petition suggesting that our decision and opinion rendered on January 31, 1994 in this cause overruled this court’s earlier holding in Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171, 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993). In particular, the state points to this court’s concluding paragraph of its opinion.
In Boyd, we held that, when the prosecutor chooses to prosecute a juvenile in circuit court as an adult, the juvenile becomes subject to the procedures and penalties prеscribed for adults. There, the state filed charges against juvenile-Boyd in circuit court, so accordingly, we rejected Boyd’s argument that the waiver of right to counsel provisions of the Juvenile Code applied. As we stаted, Boyd was never prosecuted as a delinquent in the juvenile division of juvenile court.
In the present case and unlike in Boyd, the state chose to file its petition in juvenile court to adjudicate juvenile-Rhoades аs a delinquent. As a consequence, we concluded that the Juvenile Code provisions were applicable.1 For these reasons, we reject the state’s contention that the holding in Boyd has been overrulеd. Therefore, we deny its petition for rehearing.
The wording in the court’s concluding paragraph of its earlier opinion actually states that “the Juvenile Code was indeed applicable at the time Rhoadеs gave his statement.” This sentence is poorly written since the point we intend to make is that, when the state chooses to file its petition in juvenile court, the Juvenile Code provisions control. See also Justice Newbern’s dissent in Boyd, 313 Ark. at 174, 853 S.W.2d at 265. This supplemental opinion hopefully clarifies this point.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I would like to join the majority opinion because of its desired results; however, I note, in examining the transcript of trial, that the records reflect that Rhoades was charged as a result of an information or indictment with a felony in circuit court, and for this reason we cannot afford to him the protection provided by the Arkansas Juvenile Code with reference to the taking of his statement without the required waivers from his pаrent, guardian, custodian, or like figure.
The majority, in its opinion, circumvents this issue by stating that Rhoades was arrested on a circuit court felony bench warrant, but neither the abstract nor the transcript shows a copy of an indictment or information setting out the felony offenses for which Rhoades was charged. Granted, the abstract does not reflect these two instruments; however, we may go to the record to affirm. Haynes v. State, 314 Ark. 354, 862 S.W.2d 275 (1993). In doing so, I notе that the record contains a bench warrant which clearly reflects on its face that it was issued as a result of an indictment charging Rhoades with the offense of burglary and theft of property and forgery in circuit cоurt.
In further examining the transcript of the proceedings of the trial court, I find that one of the circuit judges of the district filed an instrument identified as “Probable Cause Finding and Authorization for Arrest Warrant”, which document contained a typed notation reading “Information No. CR-91-122-2 A and B.” The instrument was dated December 12, 1991, and, after it was filed, a bench warrant was issued by the clerk of the court on the same date. That document recited that appellant Rhoades was to appear in circuit court to answer an indictment in that court for the offenses of burglary, theft of property, and forgery.
Although there is ambiguity concerning the notation of an “information” number on the authorization for arrest warrant and the term “indictment” found in the warrant, the fact still remains that the clerk of the court formally issued a bench warrant to arrest Rhoades to answer an “indictment,” and we must accept the bench warrant — as it appears in the transcript — as properly issued unless the record reflects otherwise.
For these reasons, I can only conclude that Mr. Rhoades was arrested by a bench warrant which was predicated upon an indictment which charges him with a felony in circuit court. To hold otherwise, we would have to assume that the clerk utilized the wrong form in issuing a bench warrаnt or was mistaken in her action. This we should not do!
This being the case, we should invoke the provisions of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure as applied to circuit courts rather than interpose the protective shield of the Arkansas Juvenile Code.
I respectfully dissent.