BACKGROUND
¶ 1 This case involves two separate boundary disputes between adjacent landowners in Box Elder County. The Veibell family and the Ericksen family have owned adjacent properties in the county since the early 1900s. The parties to this case are J. Alton Veibell (Alton Veibell or Veibell), the successor-in-interest to the Veibell property, and the Leola J. Ericksen Family Limited Partnership (the Partnership), the successor-in-interest to the Ericksen property. The parties have raised claims based on boundary by acquiescence and deed reformation.
I. BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE CLAIM
¶.2 The first plot in dispute is a small triangle of land located on the north side of the 111.5 rod mark in Section 23 of Box Elder County. 1 The chain of title to this triangle and the surrounding property is as follows: Michael C. Ericksen acquired title to a large parcel of land in Section 23 of Box Elder County in 1901; in 1909, Michael conveyed the property north of the 111.5 rod mark (the Ericksen property) to Joseph Er-icksen, who in turn deeded the property to his son and daughter-in-law, Durell and Leola J. Ericksen, on January 19, 1965; Durell Ericksen passed away in 1978, and his wife, Leola, transferred the property to the Partnership in 1987 before she passed away in 1990.
¶ 3 On November 7, 1938, Michael Erick-sen conveyed the portion of the property south of the 111.5 rod mark (the Veibell property) to James Weibell, 2 father of Alton Veibell. The 1938 deed contained the following property description:
Beginning at a point 111.5 rods South of the northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 12 North, range 2 West of the Salt Lake Meridian, running thence South 208.5 rods; thence East 160 rods; thence North 208.5 rods; thence West 160 rods to the place of beginning, containing 108.5 acres.
¶ 4 Since before 1938, a diagonal fence (the diagonal fence) has run the width of the property along the boundary between the Ericksen and Veibell properties. The west end of the fence begins at a position south of the 111.5 rod mark on the Veibell property. The fence runs northeast, crosses the rod mark about half way down the property line, and continues onto the Ericksen property north of the 111.5 rod mark. For decades, the Ericksens and Veibells treated this fence, not the 111.5 rod mark, as the boundary between their respective properties.
¶ 5 The location of the diagonal fence and the record boundary line create two triangles of land that are in dispute. The Veibells are the record owners of the west triangle, but it is occupied by the Ericksens. The east triangle is owned by the Ericksens, but it is occupied by the Veibells.
¶ 6 The Ericksens have farmed up to the fence since the late 1930s. Durell Ericksen was not alive to testify at trial as to his belief concerning the boundary line. However his brother, Bryce Ericksen, who helped farm the family’s land until the early 1960s, testified that he believed that the fence was the true boundary line.
¶ 7 James Weibell, Alton Veibell’s father, farmed the Veibell property up to the fence from the 1920s until he passed away in 1951. His son, Alton, continued farming the land up to the fence until the time of trial. Alton Veibell testified that he believed the diagonal fence represented the true boundary line up until 1981, when he had his property surveyed. There is no indication in the record that either family ever objected to the fence as a boundary prior to the 1990s.
¶ 8 While Veibell testified that he did not discover the record boundary was not the fence line until 1981, there is some evidence that as early as 1979, he may have realized that the fence was not the record boundary. In 1979, Veibell sold a lot to his son on the north end of his property that was located precisely on the record boundary, not along the fence line. - In 1981, however, Veibell inconsistently deeded a right-of-way across the east triangle, the property he did not own, to Gregory Collings.
¶ 9 In 1999, Alton Veibell filed an action to quiet title in the east triangle.
II. DEED REFORMATION CLAIM
¶ 10 On April 10, 1967, Alton and Grethe Veibell conveyed by warranty deed (the 1967 deed) a portion of Section 23 south of the fence that ran along the 111.5 rod mark to J. Durell Ericksen and Leola J. Ericksen. The 1967 deed contained the following metes and bounds description of the conveyed property:
Part of the East-half of Section 23, Township 12 North, Range 2 West, SLM, described further as:
Beginning at a point in the N-S centerline of said Section 23, said point being South 2007.8 feet and West 2645.3 feet (South III.5 rods and West 160 Rods by record) from the NE Corner of said Section 23; thence North 81< 36' E 807.5 feet along an existing fence line; thence S 05 < 15' W 1091 feet; thence S 15 < 59' E 1089.5 feet; Thence S 07< 07' W 1332.0 feet more or less to the South line of said Section 23, thence West 927.7 feet along said South line of Section 23, to the N-S centerline of said Section 23; thence north 3348 feet (208.5 rods by record) to the point of beginning. Containing in all 75.8 acres, more or less.
¶ 11 The northern boundary of the conveyed property runs along a fence line that slants slightly to the northeast. The eastern boundary contains three slanted legs. The northernmost two legs run alongside Willow Creek, but the southernmost leg veers slightly west of the creek. The southern boundary runs due west along the south line of Section 23. The western boundary runs due north along the N-S centerline of Section 23.
¶ 13 Alton Veibell testified that he and Durell Ericksen negotiated the boundaries prior to the sale of the conveyed property. Regarding the proposed eastern boundary, Veibell testified that he placed four stakes to mark the three slanted legs of the boundary and that these stakes were originally all on the west side of Willow Creek, leaving the creek entirely on Veibell’s property. Alton Veibell further testified that he and Durell Ericksen walked the proposed eastern line and that at Erieksen’s request they moved the second stake from the north slightly eastward from its original position so that a small portion of Willow Creek lay on Ericksen’s side of the boundary. Ericksen desired this accommodation because he wanted access to the water on the north end of the conveyed property. The parties agreed upon this placement of the eastern boundary. Alton Veibell testified that he and Durell Ericksen never discussed a specific number of acres to be conveyed. Rather, he stated, “We were just selling from this point to this point and this point to this point.”
¶ 14 After agreeing upon the boundaries, Durell Ericksen hired Erwin Moser, a surveyor, to survey the property. The legal description of the conveyed property was taken from the metes and bounds description on the surveyor’s certificate created by Mos-er. Jeff Hansen, a licensed surveyor, surveyed the property again in connection with this litigation and found a survey pin that Moser had left in the ground in the exact place the eastern and northern record boundaries meet. Hansen testified that the location of the Moser pin indicated that Moser intended the northern boundary to be the length stated in the deed. When Hansen surveyed the property, he accepted the call of the northern boundary and resolved the inconsistency in the property description by shortening the call of the southern border.
¶ 15 Veibell and Ericksen negotiated a purchase price of $175 per acre. Believing the property . encompassed by the agreed upon boundaries contained seventy-five acres, they agreed upon a total price of $13,125. The parties executed a real estate contract memorializing the transaction. The contract recited the purchase price and contained the same property description as the 1967 deed, including the erroneous statement that the parcel contained “in all 75.8 acres more or less.”
¶ 16 The Ericksens have paid property taxes on 75.8 acres since the 1967 transfer. Joel Henry, an employee of the Box Elder County Recorder’s Office, testified that the county taxed the partnership for 75.8 acres in reliance on the acreage description in the 1967 deed.
¶ 17 Within a few years after the 1967 transaction, Alton Veibell hired Paul Palmer to erect a fence following Willow Creek along the length of the east side of the conveyed property. The northern portion of the fence Palmer built runs within several feet of the east record boundary line on the Ericksens’ side of the boundary. However, on the south end, the fence and the creek deviate to the east of the record boundary line onto Vei-bell’s land. At the southernmost point, the creek and the fence are over fifty feet east of the record boundary. Palmer testified that he began to build the fence “in the southeast corner of what Mr. Ericksen had bought from Alton,” but that at Durell Ericksen’s insistence, he eventually moved the fence to its current position at least fifty feet to the east onto Veibell’s property. Veibell testified that both he and Durell Ericksen realized that this placement of the southern portion of the fence did not trace the record boundary, but they agreed upon its placement on Vei-bell’s property so that the Ericksens’ horses could access the south end of the creek.
¶ 18 A large, deep gully runs across the southeast end of the property transferred to the Partnership in 1967. If the eastern boundary is located in the position indicated by the 1967 deed, the gully effectively cuts off the Ericksens’ ability to access the southeast corner of their property over their own land.
ANALYSIS
I. BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
¶ 19 The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly held that title to the east triangle, which is located north of the record boundary and south of the diagonal fence that the parties have treated as the boundary line, should be quieted to the Vei-bells under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
¶ 20 At trial, Alton Veibell asserted a claim for the east triangle under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Partnership made a claim for the west triangle under the same doctrine. The trial court found that “[t]he Veibells and Ericksens treated the fence line as the boundary between their properties for decades prior to the 1967 conveyance.” The court inferred from the testimony of Durell Ericksen’s brother, Bryce, and from the Ericksen family’s occupation of the land north of the fence line that the Ericksens believed that the fence represented the true boundary. The trial court also found that James Weibell and his son Alton Veibell had acknowledged the fence as the boundary line since the 1920s. Having established that there was mutual acquiescence in the fencé as a boundary for a long period of time, the court quieted title in the east triangle with the Veibells and in the west triangle with the Partnership.
¶21 On appeal, the Partnership argues that the district court’s ruling as to the east triangle should be reversed. We disagree.
¶ 22 The Partnership questions the trial court’s findings of fact as they relate to the boundary by acquiescence claim. We “ ‘will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are ... clearly erroneous.’ ”
Orton v. Carter,
¶23 “The eleménts of boundary by acquiescence are (i) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining landowners.”
Jacobs v. Hafen,
A. Mutual Acquiescence
¶ 24 “Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party attempting to establish a particular line as the boundary between properties must establish that the parties mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the properties.”
Ault v. Holden,
¶ 26 The Partnership contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the Ericksens acknowledged that the fence in the east triangle was the boundary. The Partnership argues that this conclusion is not supported by the evidence because there was no direct evidence that either Durell Erick-sen or his father, both of whom are deceased, believed that the fence was the boundary. However, because acquiescence may be inferred from the landowner’s actions, the absence of direct evidence of a prior owner’s subjective belief concerning the boundary is not fatal to an assertion of mutual acquiescence.
See, e.g., Stoker,
¶ 27 The Ericksens’ recognition of the fence as a boundary can be reasonably inferred from the evidence presented at trial. Durell Ericksen’s brother, Bryce, who worked on the farm during the 1960s, testified that he always believed that the fence was the true boundary. The Ericksens’ actions over the years also indicate that they have recognized the fence as a boundary. They have farmed up to the fence line since 1938, and they never occupied the land south of the fence. Furthermore, the Ericksens never objected to the fence.line as the boundary. In light of these facts, the trial court’s inference of the Ericksens’ acquiescence is not clearly erroneous.
¶ 28 The Partnership further argues that Alton Veibell did not acquiesce in the fence because the 1958 deed transferring the property from Veibell’s father to Veibell placed him on constructive notice of the record boundary. The Partnership relies on
Low v. Bonacci,
¶ 29 In fact, the Partnership’s constructive notice argument is reminiscent of the objective uncertainty requirement that we eliminated from the boundary by acquiescence cause of action.
Staker v. Ainsworth,
B. For a Long Period of Time
¶ 30 The requirement that mutual acquiescence be for a long period of time has been interpreted in Utah to mean at least twenty years.
Jacobs v. Hafen,
¶ 31 Pointing to the fact that Alton Veibell knew about the true boundary line possibly as early as 1979, the Partnership contends that Veibell “acquiesced in the record boundary for more than 20 years, thus defeating any boundary by acquiescence that may have been established prior.” We disagree. Once adjacent landowners have acquiesced in a boundary for a long period of time, the operation of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is not vitiated by a subsequent discovery of the true record boundary by one of the parties.
Staker v. Ainsworth
involved a boundary by acquiescence claim in which there was evidence that one of the adjoining landowners, Max-field, had discovered the location of the true boundary thirteen years before the parties commenced an action to resolve the discrepancy.
II. DEED REFORMATION
¶ 32 The next issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that the parties to the 1967 transaction intended to transfer a particular acreage rather than a specific parcel of land, and in reforming the deed to conform with that intent. The trial court held that the 1967 deed contained a mutual mistake in that it purported to convey 75.8 acres of land but in reality conveyed ten acres less. The court also found that “[t]he parties intended to transfer about seventy-five acres” as evidenced “by the plain language of the warranty deed, the Real Estate Contract, and the Surveyor’s Certificate.” The trial court further found that “[t]his intent to transfer seventy-five acres [was] also shown by the purchase price.”
¶ 33 Regarding the placement of the eastern boundary, the trial court explained:
The Moser description can be made to close in two different ways: (i) by extending 4he 807.5 foot call from the point of beginning along the then existing (in 1967) fence line, which forms the northern boundary of the parcel, to a distance needed to close the description, or (ii) by shortening the 927.7 [foot] call along the southern boundary of the parcel so that the description closes.
The first method, according to the record, would create a parcel containing approximately 73.028 acres, and the second method would leave the partnership with fewer than sixty-five acres.
¶ 34 Based on its finding that the parties intended to convey seventy-five acres, the trial court reformed the deed according to option (i), which shifted the eastern boundary about 100 feet to the east, extended the south boundary to 927.7 feet, and lengthened the north boundary (the reformed boundary). The trial court explained that “[reforming the warranty deed in this way will reflect the intent of the parties” and noted that “[t]his description will come closer to the existing fence ... and is closer to seventy-five acres than the description urged by Veibell.”
¶ 35 “Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in equity.”
Hottinger v. Jensen,
¶ 36 Reformation of a deed
is appropriate where the terms of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent of the agreement between the parties. There are two grounds for reformation of such an agreement: mutual mistake of the parties and ignorance or mistake by one party, coupled with fraud by the other party.
Hottinger,
¶ 37 This case involves a mutual mistake by the parties. “Mutual mistake of fact may be defined as error in reducing the concurring intentions of the parties to writing.”
Naisbitt v. Hodges,
¶ 38 Once a mutual mistake has been shown, “the intention of the parties is the controlling consideration” in reforming a deed.
Losee v. Jones,
¶ 39 Before reviewing the trial court’s determination of the parties’ intent, we must determine whether the principles of deed construction are applicable in a reformation proceeding.
A. Deed Construction Versus Reformation
¶40 The .Partnership contends that in the context of a reformation claim, it is inappropriate to apply the rules of deed construction. We find this argument unpersuasive. Whereas a reformation action is an action in equity, deed construction is a proceeding in law.
Hartman v. Potter,
¶ 41 Some property disputes may be resolved through either a construction or a reformation analysis.
See, e.g., Knutson v. Reichel,
¶ 42 Appealing to this distinction between reformation and construction, the Partnership argues that the rules of construction are inapplicable to a reformation claim. However, while a court may not reform a deed under the guise of deed construction, there is no analogous limitation on applying the rules of construction in a reformation claim. The controlling consideration in a reformation claim is the intent of the parties.
Losee,
B. Intent to Transfer a Certain Acreage
¶ 43 The first issue that the discrepancies in the 1967 deed raise is whether the parties’ primary intent was to convey 75.8 acres or to convey property with specifically defined boundaries. The parties to the 1967 deed either intended to convey 75.8 acres and chose the boundaries accordingly, or they chose the boundaries of the property they intended to convey and calculated the acreage accordingly. The trial court erred in concluding from the evidence that the parties intended to transfer about seventy-five acres, rather than property along specific boundaries.
¶44 To determine the parties’ intent, we look first to the terms of the 1967 deed. In deed construction, • metes and bounds descriptions prevail over acreage. “A statement of quantity ordinarily adds nothing to a particular description except where the grantor has unequivocally expressed an intention to pass only a certain quantity of land.” David A. Thomas &
¶ 45 Our analysis on this point, however, is not limited exclusively to principles of deed construction. Extrinsic evidence further confirms that the parties’ primary intent was to convey property defined by specific boundaries, not to convey a specific acreage.
¶ 46 In finding that the parties intended to convey seventy-five acres, the trial court weighed the fact that the purchase price was calculated on a per acre basis multiplied by 75.8 acres. However, the universal convention in transfers of real property is to base payment on quantity. Thus, it is doubtful that the parties negotiated a purchase of 75.8 acres as opposed to merely calculating the purchase price in reliance on the mistaken property description contained in the deed. The trial court further found that the Erick-sens’ payment of property taxes on seventy-five acres over the years evidenced intent to convey 75.8 acres. However, the property taxes were also assessed in reliance on the deed’s mistaken acreage statement. The purchase price and the payment of taxes, if anything, support the conclusion that the parties believed that property transferred contained 75.8 acres, not that the primary intent of the parties was to transfer 75.8 acres.
¶ 47 Perhaps the best extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent is Alton Veibell’s testimony that he and Durell Ericksen negotiated specific boundaries and never discussed a conveyance of a specific number of acres in negotiating the 1967 transaction. In light of this testimony, and the language of the 1967 deed, the trial court’s finding that the parties intended a transfer of about 75.8 acres is clearly erroneous. We conclude instead that the parties intended a transfer of property along specific boundaries.
C. Where the Parties Intended to Place the Eastern Boundary
¶48 Having found that the parties negotiated a conveyance along specific boundaries, the second question we must resolve is where the parties intended to place the eastern boundary of the conveyed property. As the trial court noted, the property description in the 1967 deed can be made to close by either (i) extending the northern boundary, which shifts the eastern boundary further east, or (ii) shortening the 927.7 foot call of the southern boundary, which leaves the eastern boundary in the position described by the deed. Undoubtedly, the parties intended the property description to close; however, the language of the deed provides little insight into which option the parties intended.
¶ 49 The trial court chose the first option, noting that it “reflect[ed] the intent of the parties” to transfer about seventy-five acres. The trial court never found, however, that the parties intended the eastern boundary to be located in the position described in the first option. In fact, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the parties intended the second option.
¶ 50 The Partnership argues that the record boundary effectively renders the southeast corner of the Partnership’s property inaccessible from its own property due to a large gully that cuts across that corner. Moving the eastern boundary further to the east would allow the Partnership to access
¶ 51 In contrast, there is substantial evidence that the parties to the 1967 transaction intended a transfer of property along the record eastern boundary. Alton Veibell, the only remaining living party to the 1967 transaction, testified that he and Durell Ericksen negotiated and mutually agreed upon the placement of the eastern boundary as it is actually described in the 1967 deed. Veibell described in detail the facts surrounding their negotiations, and the Partnership presented no evidence to refute his testimony. Additionally, the location of the survey pin belonging to Edwin Moser, the surveyor hired to survey the property in 1967, indicates that Moser did not err in calculating the length of the northern boundary and thus that the eastern record boundary is consistent with.the parties’ intent.
¶ 52 The trial court mistakenly reformed the eastern boundary to lie “closer to the existing [Willow Creek] fence line.” Both Veibell and Paul Palmer testified that the southern portion of the fence was a fence of convenience that was intentionally not placed on the true boundary to allow the Ericksens’ livestock to access Willow Creek. Thus, the testimony regarding the placement of the fence instead supports the conclusion that the parties intended to locate the eastern boundary over fifty feet west of the southern portion of the fence, in a position closer to that described by the 1967 deed.
¶ 53 After weighing the evidence presented at trial in light of our. conclusion that the parties erroneously believed they were transferring seventy-five acres, we hold that the trial court’s determination that the parties intended to transfer property along the reformed boundary is clearly erroneous. Rather, the evidence indicates that the parties intended to transfer property along the specific eastern boundary described in the 1967 deed.
D. Closing the Property Description
¶ 54 Having determined the proper placement of the eastern boundary, we are still left with the question of how to reform the deed to close the property description. Where the parties intended to convey property along specific boundaries but the. deed description fails to close, a court in equity may reform the deed to cause the description to close.
Naisbitt v. Hodges,
¶ 55 The 1967 deed describes the southern boundary as follows: “[T]hence West 927.7 feet along said South line of Section 23, to the N-S centerline of said Section 23.” As is, the southern boundary description extends over 100 feet beyond the N-S center-line, onto property that Veibell did not own at the time of the transfer and could not have intended to include in the transfer. Because Veibell did not own and thus could not convey property beyond the N-S centerline and because monuments take precedence over distance, the call to the N-S centerline is more reliable than the 927.7 foot call of the southern boundary.
See Park v. Wilkinson,
CONCLUSION
¶ 56 We affirm the trial court’s finding of mutual acquiescence as to the east triangle. We reverse the trial court’s reformation of the metes and bounds description contained in the 1967 deed. We hold that the property description in the deed should instead be reformed to shorten the length of the southern boundary of the conveyed property so that the description closes.
Map of the Property
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