CHARLES RUSSELL RHINES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and MIKE LEIDHOLT, Secretary, South Dakota Department of Corrections, Defendant and Appellee.
#29083-a-PER CURIAM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
OCTOBER 25, 2019
2019 S.D. 59
THE HONORABLE JON C. SOGN, Judge
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA. CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS OCTOBER 15, 2019.
DANIEL R. FRITZ TIMOTHY R. RAHN Ballard Spahr LLP Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.
JASON R. RAVNSBORG Attorney General PAUL S. SWEDLUND Assistant Attorney General Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and appellee.
[¶1.] Charles Rhines is a prisoner awaiting execution for a death sentence imposed
Background
[¶2.] Rhines killed Donnivan Schaeffer in March of 1992 while burglarizing a Rapid City doughnut shop. A jury convicted Rhines of first-degree murder and recommended a sentence of death. The circuit court1 imposed the death sentence and issued a warrant of execution. Rhines appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Rhines, 1996 S.D. 55, 548 N.W.2d 415. The United States Supreme Court later denied Rhines’ request for a writ of certiorari. Rhines v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 1013, 117 S. Ct. 522, 136 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1996).
[¶3.] In the twenty-three years that have followed, Rhines has pursued collateral review of his conviction and sentence in state and federal courts. Among these cases was a direct challenge to the State’s lethal injection protocols under the current law and under the law as it existed at the time of Rhines’ conviction and sentence.2 In an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Rhines argued that the State’s protocols violated due process and the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. The issues were fully litigated during a court trial, which included expert medical testimony.
[¶4.] In its subsequent written decision, the circuit court3 reviewed the parties’ evidence against settled constitutional principles, made detailed findings of fact, and concluded the State’s lethal injection protocols did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The circuit court denied Rhines’ request for a certificate of probable cause, which would have allowed an appeal to this Court. See
[¶5.] In August of 2018, Rhines commenced this civil action in circuit court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Rhines alleges he is not challenging the constitutionality of his death sentence or the death penalty itself. Instead, he claims that a written policy issued by the South Dakota Department of Corrections (DOC) relating to the execution of a condemned inmate is invalid because it was not promulgated within the rule-making requirements of South Dakota’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See
[¶6.] The State moved to dismiss Rhines’ complaint, arguing the DOC policy, known as SDDOC Policy 1.3.D.3 (“the Policy” or
[¶7.] The circuit court4 agreed. After considering the parties’ arguments, it issued a written decision, dismissing Rhines’ complaint, and determining that the Policy was not a rule and therefore not subject to the APA. The court also concluded that the authority of the DOC to carry out a death sentence was derived from
[¶8.] As this case was proceeding in circuit court, Rhines’ habeas corpus litigation came to a conclusion on April 15, 2019, with the United States Supreme Court’s decision denying certiorari to consider Rhines’ federal habeas claims. Rhines v. Young, 899 F.3d 482 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1567, 203 L. Ed. 2d 730 (2019). The successor to the original sentencing court issued a new warrant of execution ordering the warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary to carry out Rhines’ execution during the week of Sunday, November 3, 2019.
[¶9.] Rhines now appeals the circuit court’s order dismissing his APA challenge to the Policy. The case was fully briefed as of October 2, 2019. Citing his imminent execution, Rhines has asked this Court for an order staying the current execution date. The State has resisted the stay request, arguing this appeal is simply what it believes to be the latest of Rhines’ long-standing efforts to delay his execution.
[¶10.] We have reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions and have determined that we can decide the case on its merits without a stay. We therefore address Rhines’ principal issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the circuit court erred when it determined the DOC Policy was not subject to the APA’s rule-making requirements and granted the State’s motion to dismiss.
Analysis
[¶11.] Determining whether the Policy is subject to the APA requires an interpretation of several relevant statutes. This is a legal question for which we accord the circuit court no deference and review de novo. See Mergen v. N. States Power Co., 2001 S.D. 14, ¶ 4, 621 N.W.2d 620, 621 (quoting State v. Springer-Ertl, 1997 S.D. 128, ¶ 4, 570 N.W.2d 39, 40) (“The construction of a statute and its application to the facts present questions of law, which we review de novo.”). Motions to dismiss under
[¶12.] When confronting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. ¶ 7, 754 N.W.2d at 808 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). Although courts determining the motion are obligated to accept the truth of the complaint’s factual allegations, they “are not bound to accept
[¶13.] Our rules for construing statutory text are well-settled and may be concisely summarized as follows:
The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used. Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.
Discover Bank v. Stanley, 2008 S.D. 111, ¶ 15, 757 N.W.2d 756, 761 (quoting Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 2000 S.D. 85, ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d 600, 611).
Applicability of the APA
[¶14.] The APA provides a means by which interested parties can, in some instances, seek declaratory relief concerning an agency’s rules:
The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment in the circuit court for the county of the plaintiff’s residence, if it is alleged that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff.
[¶15.] We have held that
[¶16.] Here, Rhines’ effort to invoke
[¶17.] South Dakota’s APA imposes rule-making requirements upon agencies seeking to adopt, amend, or repeal administrative rules. See generally
[¶18.] A rule subject to the APA is an “agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law, policy, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency.”
[¶19.] The text of
[¶20.] Our interpretation of
[¶21.] This construction of
[¶22.] Applying these statutory rules here, we determine that the Policy is not a rule subject to the requirements of the APA. The Policy is entitled “Execution of an Inmate” and states that the DOC will “carry out the execution of an inmate in accordance with chapter 23A-27A[,]” adding that the execution “will be conducted in a professional, humane and dignified manner.” Among other things, the Policy regulates the number and type of witnesses an inmate can request, arrangements and procedures for the inmate’s movements immediately preceding the execution, the inmate’s final visit, and the inmate’s opportunity to make a final statement.
[¶23.] In addition, the Policy also contemplates the need for order, control, and safety as part of carrying out the penalty of death. For example, the Policy addresses the methods and procedure for the execution itself. In large part, these provisions reflect the DOC’s effort to adhere to the Unites States Supreme Court’s decision in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1529, 170 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2008). In Baze, the United States Supreme Court held that the use of lethal injection as a method of execution did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 47, 128 S. Ct. at 1529. A plurality of the Court further expressed the view that lethal injection would transgress the Eighth Amendment only if it presents a “‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively intolerable risk harm.’” Id. at 50, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846, and n.9, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1981, 1983, and n.9, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994)). The Policy is, therefore, an effort to ensure order, control, and safety in the actual execution process.
[¶24.] Beyond this, other provisions of the Policy are further directed at ensuring order, control, and safety for the benefit of those conducting and witnessing the execution. The Policy prescribes requisite qualifications and training for those carrying out the individual steps associated with the execution. It also references statutory provisions contained in
[¶25.] Rhines’ argument that the Policy does not address inmate disciplinary matters overlooks the breadth of its statutory definition. See
[¶26.] In addition, Rhines misreads the other provisions of
[¶27.] Because the Policy does not fit within the APA’s definition of a “rule,” it is not subject to the APA.8 The circuit court
[¶28.] More fundamentally, though, Rhines’ action contains an additional limitation—it incorrectly presupposes the Policy is the only basis of the State’s authority to carry out a sentence of death. We, therefore, write further to clarify the nature of the State’s authority in this regard and provide an additional basis for denying Rhines’ request to enjoin his execution.
The State’s Authority to Carry out a Death Sentence
[¶29.] “The Constitution allows capital punishment.” Bucklew v. Precythe, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1122, 203 L. Ed. 2d 521 (2019) (citing Glossip v. Gross, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731-33, 192 L. Ed. 2d 761 (2015); Baze, 553 U.S. at 47, 128 S. Ct. at 1520). Of course, the fact that the death penalty does not violate the Constitution does not mean that states are obligated to permit it. See id. South Dakota, however, does. Acting through its popularly-elected Legislature, South Dakota is among a majority of states that allow capital punishment.9 This case is not about the efficacy of capital punishment, which we recognize implicates deeply held convictions among many.10
[¶30.] The Legislature has enacted detailed statutory standards and requirements for the prosecution of capital cases and the imposition of the death penalty. See
The punishment of death shall be inflicted by the intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity. The warden, subject to the approval of the secretary of corrections, shall determine the substances and the quantity of substances used for the punishment of death. An execution carried out by intravenous injection shall be performed by persons trained to administer the injection who are selected by the warden and approved by the secretary of corrections.
[¶31.] In addition to identifying the method of execution,12 the Legislature has also provided explicit authority for the warden to carry out a death sentence. See
[¶32.] Though the context differed, we reached a similar conclusion in Clay v. Weber, 2007 S.D. 45, 733 N.W.2d 278. There we held that any failure to treat policies for charging inmates’ prison accounts for the costs of their confinement as APA rules was not consequential. Id. ¶ 12, 733 N.W.2d at 283-84. Even in the absence of the policies, penitentiary officials were authorized by statute to charge inmates’ accounts for the costs. Id.
[¶33.] Here, the same analysis applies. The provisions of
[¶34.] We affirm.13
[¶35.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, JENSEN and SALTER, Justices, and COMER and SHELTON, Circuit Court Judges, concur.
[¶36.] COMER, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for KERN, Justice, disqualified.
[¶37.] SHELTON, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for DEVANEY, Justice, disqualified.