Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA EDUARDO REYNOSO, Case No. 25-cv-07122-TSH Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO v. REMAND
Re: Dkt. No. 10 RECOLOGY INC., Defendant. I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Eduardo Reynoso filed a complaint in San Francisco Superior Court against
Defendant Recology Inc. (“Recology”) for claims arising out of Reynoso’s employment with Recology. ECF No. 1-2. Recology removed the action on federal question grounds. ECF No. 1 (“Not. of Removal”). Pending before the Court is Reynoso’s Motion to Remand. ECF No. 10 (“Mot.”). The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and VACATES the October 16, 2025, hearing. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the motion. [1]
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Recology is a California corporation with a principal place of business in San Francisco, California. ECF No. 1-2 (“Complaint”) ¶ 3; ECF No. 3 at 2 (Recology Inc.’s Corporate Disclosure Statement). Reynoso was employed by Recology at all relevant times to this action through his employment with Recology San Francisco (“Recology SF”), a subsidiary of Recology. Compl. ¶ 2; Not. of Removal at 4:4–5, n.2 (citing Declaration of Maurice Quillen (“Quillen Decl.”) ¶ 3 (ECF No. 1-1)). Recology SF “is a waste management company. It provides waste management services mainly in San Francisco, California. The company’s services include collection and disposal of solid waste, recycling, and organics/compost.” Quillen Decl. ¶ 6.
On October 5, 2006, Recology offered Reynoso employment “in various capacities, including as a material handler/freon technician and relief driver.” Compl. ¶ 11; see Quillen Decl. ¶ 4 (noting Reynoso was employed by Recology SF “beginning on or about October 6, 2006”). On October 27, 2023, Recology terminated Reynoso’s employment. Compl. ¶ 34; Not. of Removal at 4:21–22 (citing Quillen Decl. ¶ 4). Recology reinstated Reynoso’s employment on March 18, 2025. Compl. ¶ 39.
Reynoso brings claims against Recology for violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Labor Code, and California Business and Professions Code. See generally id. Reynoso alleges that despite his “exceptional work ethic and dedication to his job, [Recology] has repeatedly harassed and discriminated against [Reynoso] because of his medical conditions/disabilities,” and retaliated against Reynoso “for reporting his injury and asserting his workplace rights.” E.g., id. ¶¶ 13, 83. 1. Collective Bargaining Agreement And Dispute Resolution Recology asserts that through his employment by Recology SF, Reynoso is “in a classification that is part of the bargaining unit represented by the Sanitary Truck Drivers and Helpers Union Local 350, IBT [the “Union”].” Not. of Removal at 4:4–6 (citing Quillen Decl. ¶ 3); see also Compl. ¶ 37 (“[Reynoso’s] union filed a grievance challenging the termination, which was arbitrated.”). Recology SF and the Union are parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) effective January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2026. Not. of Removal at 4:6–8 (citing Quillen Decl. ¶ 3); Mot. at 3:11–14; see Quillen Decl., Ex. A (CBA). According to Recology, “[t]hroughout [Reynoso’s] employment by Recology SF, [Reynoso] has been a member of the Union and subject to the provisions of the CBA.” Not. of Removal at 4:8–9 (citing Quillen Decl. ¶ 3).
The CBA describes procedures for settling disputes between parties that are subject to the CBA. Id. at 4:14–20 (citing Quillen Decl. ¶ 3); see CBA at Section 17. Pursuant to the CBA, the Union filed a grievance challenging Reynoso’s termination by Recology. Compl. ¶ 37; see Mot. at 3:14–15 (“Reynoso exhausted the grievance process under the parties’ CBA to be reinstated at Recology[.]”); Not. of Removal at 4:21–23 (citing Quillen Decl. ¶ 4) (stating that on October 27, 2023, Reynoso “filed a grievance challenging his termination”). Pursuant to the CBA, “[o]n October 23, 2024, the Union, on behalf of [Reynoso], and [Recology] participated in a labor arbitration of [Reynoso’s] grievance.” Not. of Removal at 4:23–24 (citing Quillen Decl. at ¶ 4); see Compl. ¶ 37. On December 30, 2024, the arbitrator issued a decision and award. Not. of Removal at 4:24–25 (citing Quillen Decl. ¶ 4); Compl. ¶ 38; see Quillen Decl., Ex. B (“Arbitration Award”).
2. Factual Allegations Overall, Reynoso brings claims against Recology arising out of his employment with Recology. See generally Compl. Reynoso makes the following allegations in his Complaint. While employed by Recology, Reynoso engaged in protected activity under the California Labor Code “by reporting a work-related injury that occurred during a lithium battery fire on or about October 27, 2022. [Reynoso] reported the incident to his supervisor, Pink.” Id. ¶¶ 81, 92. “Rather than reporting the incident and filing a workers’ compensation claim, Pink suppressed the report, and [Reynoso] was forced to file a state disability claim instead.” Id. ¶¶ 82, 93. Recology took adverse actions against Reynoso,
including sending him to company doctors to prematurely release him to work, and later sending a series of misleading letters designed to build a case for termination during [Reynoso’s] disability leave. These actions were taken to retaliate against [Reynoso] for reporting his injury and asserting his workplace rights. Id. ¶¶ 83, 94.
Reynoso “also engaged in additional protected activity by filing an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and by testifying and participating in arbitration proceedings involving his injury and retaliation claims.” ¶¶ 85, 96. Recology again violated the Labor Code
when it failed to reinstate [Reynoso] in a timely manner following an
arbitration award ordering his reinstatement. Despite the arbitrator’s ruling requiring immediate reinstatement, [Recology] delayed
[Reynoso’s] return to work by eleven weeks, which resulted in additional lost wages, lost benefits, and emotional distress.
Id. ¶¶ 84, 95. “The temporal proximity between [Reynoso’s] participation in protected proceedings and [Recology’s] refusal to timely reinstate him, along with the pattern of adverse conduct following his injury report, support a causal connection between [Reynoso’s] protected activity and [Recology’s] retaliatory actions.” Id. ¶¶ 86, 97.
On December 18, 2023, Reynoso filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and a complaint with the California Civil Rights Department (“CRD”). Id. ¶¶ 9, 36. On November 13, 2024, the CRD issued a Right-To-Sue Notice. Id. ¶ 10. On December 30, 2024, following the Union’s filed grievance and arbitration between the Union and Recology, the arbitrator “sustained the union’s grievance, ordered [Reynoso’s] reinstatement, directed that he be made whole for any lost benefits, and required the parties to engage in the interactive process.” Id. ¶¶ 37–38. “Despite the arbitrator’s order, [Recology] did not reinstate [Reynoso] until March 18, 2025.” Id. ¶ 39. B. Procedural Background On July 23, 2025, Reynoso filed this case in San Francisco County Superior Court against Recology and Does 1–20. ECF No. 1-2 at 5 ( Eduardo Reynoso v. Recology, Inc. , Case No. CGC-25-627506). Reynoso alleges eleven causes of action under California law: (1) Disability Discrimination under FEHA (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940 et seq. ); (2) Failure to Accommodate under
FEHA (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(m)); (3) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process under FEHA (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(n)); (4) Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5; (5) Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 6310; (6) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (7) Failure to Prevent Discrimination (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940 et seq. ); (8) Negligent Failure to Train and Supervise; (9) Unfair Business Practices (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. ); (10) Failure to Produce Records (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226, 432, 1198.5); and (11) Statutory Prejudgment Interest (Cal. Civ. Code § 3287(a)). Compl. ¶¶ 41–142. Reynoso seeks, inter alia , damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. at 18–19. On August 19, 2025, Recology filed an Answer to Reynoso’s Complaint in San Francisco County Superior Court. Declaration of Jessica E. Quarless ¶ 4 (ECF No. 1-2); see ECF No. 1-2 at 27 (Answer).
On August 22, 2025, Recology filed a Notice of Removal asserting that the “Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331[.]” [2] ECF No. 1 (“Not. of Removal”) at 2:9–15. On September 8, 2025, Reynoso filed the instant Motion to Remand. ECF No. 10 (“Mot.”). On September 22, 2025, Recology filed an Opposition. ECF No. 14 (“Opp.”). Recology also filed a Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Its Opposition. ECF No. 14-2. On September 29, 2025, Reynoso filed a Reply. ECF No. 15 (“Reply”).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant” to the district court where the action
is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. There are two bases for subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332.
Federal question jurisdiction exists over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence of federal
question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal
jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly
pleaded complaint.”
California ex rel. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United
States
,
To establish diversity jurisdiction, the removing defendant must show (1) the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000, and (2) the suit is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. §
1332. As with federal question jurisdiction, the existence of diversity jurisdiction must be
determined from the face of the complaint.
Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.
,
“Upon removal, a defendant assumes voluntarily the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction.”
Love v. Villacana
,
IV. DISCUSSION
Recology asserts that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action on federal question grounds because Reynoso’s claims (1) are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”); and (2) are subject to federal preemption arising under the Garmon doctrine because Reynoso’s claims arise out of his protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Not. of Removal at 5:2–6:15, 8:18–9:13. Recology further asserts that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over any non-preempted claims because they are based on the same nucleus of operative facts. at 2:12–15, 9:14–22.
Reynoso argues that the Court should remand this action to the San Francisco County
Superior Court because “Recology cannot demonstrate federal subject matter jurisdiction” exists
because his “claims are not subject to federal preemption under the LMRA or NLRA.” Mot. at
6:27–7:3.
As a threshold matter, Recology does not assert that diversity jurisdiction exists in this
case. Nor could it. As a California citizen, Recology cannot remove this case based on diversity
jurisdiction because the forum defendant rule applies.
See
ECF No. 3 at 2 (“Recology Inc. is a
corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California.”); 28 U.S.C. §
1441(b)(2) (directing that an action may not be removed on the basis of diversity “if any of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought”);
Spencer v. U.S. Dist. Ct.
,
The question is whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case on federal question grounds. In sum, the Court concludes that Reynoso’s state law claims are not preempted by the LMRA, his claims are not subject to removal under the Garmon doctrine, and that the Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
A. Request For Judicial Notice
Recology asks the Court to take judicial notice of two documents: 1. Recology San Francisco Transfer Station Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect January 1, 2022 – December 31, 2026 (‘CBA’). 2. Decision and Award of Robert M. Hirsch, Arbitrator in the matter of Teamsters Local 350 (IBT) and Recology, Inc. SF. ECF No. 14-2. Reynoso does not object to the request in his Reply. See generally Reply.
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow the Court to “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
Here, the Court finds that it is unnecessary to take judicial notice of the CBA and the
Arbitration Award because these documents are already before the Court as exhibits to
the Notice of Removal.
See
Quillen Decl., Exs. A, B;
cf. Fenton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.
,
No. 17-cv-0113-DMS(WVG),
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Recology’s Request for Judicial Notice.
B. Section 301 Of The Labor Management Relations Act
Reynoso argues that his claims are not preempted by the LMRA because they “arise from state law, independent of the parties’ CBA.” Mot. at 6:27–7:3. Recology contends that Reynoso’s state law retaliation claims are preempted by the LMRA because (1) Reynoso “invokes a right to reinstatement that derives solely from the labor arbitrator’s authority to award remedies under Section 17 of the [CBA]”; and (2) Reynoso’s claims “cannot be resolved without interpreting the terms of the Arbitration Award and the CBA itself.” Opp. at 1:1–27 (emphasis in original).
“The most common way that federal questions are disguised as matters of state law
involves what is known as the ‘complete preemption’ doctrine. Complete preemption refers to the
situation in which federal law not only preempts a state-law cause of action, but also substitutes an
exclusive federal cause of action in its place.”
Hansen
,
Section 301 of the LMRA states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“Section 301”). Section 301 thus “preempts any state cause of action for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.”
Renteria-Hinojosa v.
Sunsweet Growers, Inc.
,
The Ninth Circuit “has distilled the Supreme Court’s doctrine on § 301 preemption into a
two-part inquiry into the nature of a plaintiff’s claim: § 301 preempts a plaintiff’s state law claim
only where the claim (1) arises entirely from a collective bargaining agreement or (2) requires
interpretation of the agreement.”
Renteria-Hinojosa
,
At step one of the test, courts “evaluate the legal character of the claim by asking whether
it seeks purely to vindicate a right or duty created by the CBA itself.” (citing
Livadas v.
Bradshaw
,
A court only proceeds to step two if preemption does not occur at step one—there, it asks
“whether litigating the state law claim nonetheless requires interpretation of a CBA, such that
resolving the entire claim in court threatens the proper role of grievance and arbitration.”
Id.
(quoting
Alaska
,
Reynoso argues that his “claims all arise from independent California state law, not the CBA,” and that his “complaint clearly does not seek relief for any violation of the CBA.” Mot. at 8:1–20. Recology contends that Reynoso’s state law retaliation claims are preempted at step one because Reynoso “asserts a reinstatement right based on the Arbitration Award,” and that Reynoso “alleges retaliation based on the arbitrator’s reinstatement order.” Opp. at 3:14–4:14.
Here, the Court concludes that because Reynoso’s state law retaliation claims do not arise
entirely from the CBA, they are not preempted at step one.
Burnside
,
In other words, because it is California law—and not the CBA—that defines Reynoso’s
retaliation claims and the adverse action condition precedent to those claims, the claims do not
arise from the CBA.
See St. Myers
,
Moreover, Recology’s argument that Reynoso’s claims are preempted at step one because Reynoso alleges that Recology’s “ violation of the Arbitration Award constituted unlawful retaliation,” is unavailing. Opp. at 4:9–10 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 84, 95) (emphasis in original). Reynoso alleges that Recology violated the Labor Code
when it failed to reinstate [Reynoso] in a timely manner following an
arbitration award ordering his reinstatement. Despite the arbitrator’s
ruling requiring immediate reinstatement, [Recology] delayed
[Reynoso’s] return to work by eleven weeks, which resulted in
additional lost wages, lost benefits, and emotional distress.
Compl. ¶¶ 84, 95. Even if Reynoso’s retaliation claims are predicated in part on Recology’s
breach of the Arbitration Award,
Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr.
does not support
Recology’s proposition that “state law claims predicated on breach of an arbitrator’s order . . . can
give rise to LMRA preemption” at step one. Opp. at 3:14–4:14 (citing
Accordingly, Reynoso’s state law retaliation claims are not preempted at step one of the Section 301 preemption analysis.
2. Section 301 Preemption: Step Two
Reynoso argues that [t]he merits of [his] claims can be resolved entirely without interpreting or enforcing any provision of the award of the CBA. Additionally, interpretation of the arbitration award and/or the CBA is wholly unnecessary to determine the motivation for Recology’s delayed reinstatement of Reynoso after the arbitration award. Mot. at 9:11–14. Recology contends that Reynoso’s state law retaliation claims are preempted at step two “because the resolution of [Reynoso’s] retaliation claims based on the reinstatement provision of the Arbitration Award raises myriad questions of interpretation about the Award and the CBA[.]” Opp. at 5:22–24.
Here, the Court concludes that because Reynoso’s state law retaliation claims do “not raise
questions about the scope, meaning, or application of the CBA,” they are not preempted at step
two.
Curtis
,
Recology’s cited cases do not stand for the proposition that
an entire arbitration award
is
part of a collective bargaining agreement—instead, they demonstrate that
an arbitrator’s
interpretation
of a collective bargaining agreement becomes part of that agreement. at 5:21–
6:3;
see, e.g., Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers Union, Loc. 996 v. United Parcel Serv.
, 241
F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2001) (equating an “arbitrator’s contract interpretation” with the
“contract itself”);
Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, Int’l Ass’n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
,
Moreover, Recology’s argument that Reynoso’s allegations regarding Recology’s failure
to reinstate him “necessarily means that his retaliation claims are based on alleged violations of
the CBA” falls flat. Not. of Removal at 8:5–7. The argument rests on a faulty premise that
determining if Recology violated the Labor Code “‘when it failed to reinstate [Reynoso]
in a
timely manner
,’ as alleged, necessarily requires interpretation” of the Arbitration Award and CBA.
Opp. at 4:16–25 (emphasis in original). Not so. As discussed, “[w]hether Recology’s delay of 11
weeks to reinstate Reynoso was retaliatory” and “whether Recology’s failure to timely reinstate
[Reynoso] is an adverse employment action requires an examination of California law, not the
CBA or arbitration award.” Reply at 5:3–16. If anything, Recology may turn to the Arbitration
Award—or the CBA for that matter—to defend its actions surrounding Reynoso’s reinstatement.
See Lawson
,
Finally, Recology’s remaining cited cases are inapposite.
See
Opp. at 5:22–6:18. In
De’Sart v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Inc.
and
Audette v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s
Union
, the plaintiff “(i) pleaded state law retaliatory discharge claims and (ii) expressly challenged
the employer’s actions under a collective bargaining agreement.”
De’Sart
, No. 18-cv-03515-JFW-
MRW,
In short, Recology “has not identified any specific CBA clause requiring interpretation.”
Mot. at 9:15. Thus, because Recology does not identify any provision in the CBA requiring
interpretation by virtue of Reynoso’s
retaliation claims
, Recology fails to show that Section 301
preemption applies.
McCray
,
Garmon
preemption—stemming from the
Garmon
doctrine—holds that “States cannot
regulate conduct that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.”
Glacier
Nw., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. Union No. 174
,
Here, the Court concludes that Reynoso’s state law claims are not subject to removal under
the
Garmon
doctrine. “[S]tate law actions claimed to be preempted by sections 7 and 8 of the
NLRA are not removable to federal court.”
Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest.
,
Notes
[1] The parties consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ECF Nos. 8, 9.
[2] On September 12, 2025, following Reynoso’s Motion to Remand, Recology filed a Motion for 26 Administrative Relief, “specifically requesting that the Court stay [Recology’s] obligation to engage in initial discovery pursuant to General Order No. 71 (‘GO 71’) pending an Order on 27 [Recology’s] upcoming Motion to Compel Arbitration.” ECF No. 11 at 2. On September 16, 2025, Reynoso filed an Opposition to the Administrative Motion. ECF No. 12. On September 17, 28 2025, the Court denied the Administrative Motion. ECF No. 13.
[3] However, Recology cited the Garmon doctrine as a basis for removal in its Notice of Removal. 27 Not. of Removal at 8:18–9:13. Because the Court has a sua sponte duty to assess federal subject matter jurisdiction., the Court addresses whether Garmon preemption applies to Reynoso’s claims. 28 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).