247 Pa. 26 | Pa. | 1915
Opinion by
The appellant is a public service corporation, incorporated and organized in 1888 under the provisions of the Act of April 29, 1874, P. L. 73, for the purpose of supplying the Borough of Reynoldsville and its inhabitants with water. The company having exercised the privilege conferred by its charter for more than twenty years, the Borough of Reynoldsville by resolution of the proper authorities passed May 6, 1913, signified a desire to become the owner of the water works erected and operated by the water company, in accordance with the provisions of the 7th section of the said Act of 1874. Notice of the adoption of this resolution was duly served on the water company, accompanied with the request for permission to examine the books and records of the company in order to ascertain the cost of erecting and maintaining the company’s plant. Permission having been refused, an application to the Court of Common Pleas by the borough for a writ of mandamus was so proceeded with, that judgment was entered for the petitioner, and a writ accordingly issued, commanding the water company “to give the borough, its officers and agents, access to its books and papers showing as fully and completely as the defendant has in its possession and under its
“It shall be lawful, at any time after twenty years from the introduction of water or gas, as the easemay be, into any place as aforesaid, for the town, borough, city or district into which the said company shall be located, to become the owner Of said works, and the property of the said company, by paying therefor the net cost of erecting and maintaining same, with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent, per annum, deducting from said interest all dividends theretofore declared.”
It was thus made a condition of the charter of such companies — evidently in view of the fact that the exclusive privilege given them, under the terms of the act, might become oppressive to the municipality — that after
If we have rightly distinguished between the legislative purpose in the one act and in the other, it may be somewhat difficult to explain the wisdom of or necessity for the later act; but that is not for us. It is sufficient to
Another objection urged by the appellant is, that the proceeding to take over the property of the water company was without the approval of the Public Service Commission first had and obtained, as required by Article 3 of the Act of July 26, 1913, P. L. 1374. In answer to this it is only necessary to say that by the express terms of this act it did not take effect until the 1st of January, 1914. At that date the present proceeding was pending, it having been instituted on the law side of the court 8th September, 1913. It is a mistake to suppose that the act merely effected a change in procedure and was therefore retroactive. It operated directly upon the rights of a municipality by qualifying its right to acquire at its own pleasure the property of a water company within its limits, and therefore it can only be allowed retroactive effect as such a result is expressly declared in the act itself: Kille v. Iron Works, 134 Pa. 225.
For the reasons stated the judgment is affirmed.