783 N.E.2d 357 | Ind. Ct. App. | 2003
OPINION
Rebecea Reynolds appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of her petition for relief. She presents for our review the issue of whether she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
We affirm.,
Reynolds was charged by indictment with Neglect of a Dependent Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury, as a Class B felony.
The State sought indictments of both Reynolds and Troyer. Only Reynolds was indicted by the Grand Jury. Reynolds' trial
Mr. Doty advised his client to plead guilty in exchange for a guarantee that she would not receive a sentence of longer than ten years, the presumptive sentence for a Class B felony.
At the post-conviction hearing, Reynolds focused upon Mr. Doty's conclusion that the State would not likely be able to prove the means by which the cocaine entered into Reynolds' son's body. She asserts that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because Mr. Doty should have examined in more detail the State's theory of passive smoke inhalation and whether it was a viable cause of the child's death. She further asserts that had counsel investigated these matters further and properly advised her that she would probably not have pleaded guilty.
Because Reynolds asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel following a guilty plea, we review her contention under the standard established in Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496 (Ind.2001). A post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the petitioner to show that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 500-01; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Segura categorized two types of ineffective assistance of counsel claims following a guilty plea, one of which involves errors that impair or overlook a defense. Segura, 749 N.E.2d at 502-03; Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 290, 295 (Ind.2002). It is this category which applies because Reynolds' claim goes directly to whether she had a valid defense to challenge the State's case against her. To prevail upon her claim, Reynolds must show that a defense was overlooked or impaired and that there is a reasonable probability of success at trial. Segura, 749 N.E.2d at 503.
At a post-conviction hearing, the petitioner has the burden of establishing the grounds for relief Ind. Post-Conviction
We begin by addressing two points of error in Reynolds' claim. First, she contends that she must show that, but for counsel's errors, she "would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Appellant's Brief at 9. As discussed above, this contention is incorrect because Reynolds must show a reasonable probability of success at trial. Reynolds' argument also seems to be based upon the mistaken view that the State had to prove that she did an act which directly caused the death of her son, rather than just placing him in the situation which caused his death. Such is demonstrated in the questioning of her at the post-conviction hearing. Her post-conviction counsel asked her whether she had any way of knowing or whether she was provided with information that her actions of using cocaine while caring for her baby caused his death. She answered that she had no evidence that her consumption of cocaine caused his death. She also testified that she does not believe that she did anything to cause the death of her son. Reynolds also points to the post-conviction testimony of her trial counsel in which he stated, "If it could have been established that in fact someone had given the child cocaine, it very well would have had a direct bearing on her defense." Post-Conviction Transeript at 12.
Here, the State was not required to show that Reynolds "caused" her son's death, but rather, that her actions knowingly or intentionally placed him in a situation which endangered his life, and indeed, that this act resulted in serious bodily injury. See I.C. § 85-46-1-4.
Reynolds admits the fact that she caused her son to be at her residence where she was using cocaine. However, she also stated that she did not knowingly or intentionally place her child in danger. Nevertheless, this testimony cannot be squared with her testimony at her guilty plea hearing. Upon establishing the facts
Additionally, while Reynolds now claims that someone may have given the cocaine to the child, and while Mr. Doty stated that such fact would have had a direct bearing on her defense, Mr. Doty also stated that he had statements from the individuals who were present at Reynolds' home and did not have any reason to believe that anyone was going to come forward and admit that they voluntarily gave the child cocaine. Mr. Doty also stated that, at the time that Reynolds pleaded guilty, he believed that she felt in her heart that she was responsible for the death of her son regardless of the fact that there were questions about how the baby had ingested the cocaine. Further, Reynolds is misconstruing Mr. Doty's statement that evidence which showed someone else had given the child cocaine would have affected her defense. When viewed in context of Mr. Doty's entire testimony, it is clear that he recognized that the State did not have to show that Reynolds gave her baby cocaine but that she only placed him in the position where he may have come into contact with the cocaine and that the contact endangered his life or health. It is also apparent from his testimony that he did not believe that the evidence would establish that anyone had given the child drugs, and in any event, Reynolds' lifestyle is what placed the child in danger because she was using cocaine and allowed other people to use it in the baby's presence.
Here, Reynolds has not shown that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the trial court. In fact, Reynolds has been unable to show that a defense was overlooked or impaired, and in the event that one was, that there was a reasonable probability that she would have succeeded at trial.
The decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
. Ind.Code § 35-46-1-4 (Burns Code Ed. Supp.2002).
. From the testimony of trial counsel at the post-conviction hearing, it appears that there may have been several individuals partying at Reynolds' home either immediately before or during the time that her son died.
. The presumptive sentence for a Class B felony is established by Ind.Code § 35-50-2-5 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1998).
. The relevant portion of the statute reads:
"(a) A person having the care of a dependent, whether assumed voluntarily or because of a legal obligation, who knowingly or intentionally:
(1) places the dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent's life or health; ... commits neglect of a dependent, a Class D felony.
(b) However, the offense is:
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(2) a Class B felony if it is committed under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) and results in serious bodily injury...."