—In an action to recover damages pursuant to a homeowner’s insurance policy, the defendant appeals from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Henry, J.), dated July 20, 1994, which, inter alia, granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ cross motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of coverage under the homeowner’s insurance policy and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the branch of the plaintiffs’ cross motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of coverage under the homeowner’s insurance policy is denied, the defendant’s motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
The homeowner’s insurance policy in the instant case contained an exclusion for "loss resulting directly or indirectly from: * * * water damage” (emphasis added), except in situations of, inter alia, "[d]irect loss by * * * explosion * * * resulting from water damage”. The Supreme Court found that the water damage exclusion did not preclude coverage because the plaintiffs’ losses were caused primarily by oil damage and secondarily by water damage. We disagree.
It is well settled that where the provisions of an insurance contract are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their plain meaning (see, Goldman & Sons v Hanover Ins. Co.,