65 So. 194 | Ala. Ct. App. | 1914
The action was by the appellee against the appellant upon several promissory notes made by the appellant to R. J. Reynolds, who died before the suit was brought, leaving a will and a codicil thereto under which the appellee, his widow, and his
By a Avritten instrument, to which these three beneficiaries were parties, the two children of the deceased bargained, sold, and quitclaimed to the appellee “all the rights, title, and interests they and each of them have in and to any property owned by the said R. J. Reynolds at the time of his death, except that Avhich is devised to them by the terms of the will and codicil thereto and that which is granted to them by the terms of this agreement.” The will and the codicil thereto were properly admitted in evidence for the purpose of shoAving that the notes sued on were not Avithin the exception made in the above-quoted transfer to the appellee. The notes having been made payable to R. J. Reynolds, in the absence of any assignment or transfer of them, they remained his property until his death, and, not having been disposed of by the will or the codicil, they passed to the distributees of his estate, subject to administration, and, Avith this qualification, the sole ownership of them vested in the appellee as a result of the transfer to her by the only other persons Avho had an interest in them as distributees of the estate of the deceased payee.
The court sustained the objection of the plaintiff to the offer of the defendant to prove by himself as a witness that it was a part and parcel of the consideration of his entering into the written contract of settlement above quoted from that he Avas to be released of all indebtedness owing by him to the estate of the deceased, and that each of the other parties to the agreement relinquished all right or claim to any indebtedness OAving by the defendant to said estate. The objection was properly sustained. It is manifest that the proposed testimony would have varied or contradicted the terms of
The defendant was not entitled as a witness in his own behalf to testify as to a transaction between himself and R. J. Reynolds, deceased, whose estate was interested in the result of the suit. — Code, § 4007; Hodges v. Denny, 86 Ala. 226, 5 South. 492.
The defendant offered in evidence a check given by Kirkland & Reynolds, a firm of which he was a member, payable to the order of R. J. Reynolds, and having his indorsement on it, and an entry on the books of that firm showing a charge of $50 against R. J. Reynolds on an account between him and the firm. This evidence, standing by itself, had no tendency to prove any payment on the individual indebtedness of the defendant to the deceased payee of the notes sued on, and the objections to it were properly sustained.
It is suggested in the argument of the counsel for the appellant that the general affirmative charge given at the request of the plaintiff Avas improper, because the de
Affirmed.