*1
86
(538
55)
State,
SE2d
78)
(532
v.
State,
Bishop
(2000);
(2000); Morrow v.
691
SE2d
887)
State,
(486
(1997); Jones
I concur
fully
majority’s
I
concur in the
with
opinion
death sentences.
also
I
not believe
(b),
I cannot
because do
join
of Division 9
exception
in the
of the modified
giving
error whatsoever
any
there was
(17
States,
See Allen v. United
492,
164 U. S.
SC
Allen
charge.
528) (1896). Therefore,
overruling
I do not
join
41 LE
351) (1983)
State,
extent.
Legare
any
S09Q1613. REYNOLDS et al. v. INFINITY GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY.
HINES, Justice. a certified from the question
This case is before Court on in litigation United States Court of for the Eleventh Circuit of a commercial the effectiveness of a notice of cancellation involving Gen. Ins. Co. v. policy.1 Infinity Reynolds, automobile insurance (11th 2009). certified is: F3d 1228 Cir. The question properly given Is a notice of due, ineffective because it provides past insured to force keep for the statutory ten-day within the past-due premium paying period? Const., Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. IV; OCGA 15-2-9. question negative.
We answer the
BACKGROUND following. The facts as set forth the Eleventh Circuit are the purchased 5, 2006, On June Russell Graham a commercial automo- Infinity Company, *2 bile insurance from General Insurance formerly Coventry Company (“Infinity”). known as Insurance While operating August 2, 2006, the insured on vehicle Graham’s son was passengers, collision, involved in a which took the lives of his two Joey Reynolds Lloyd. Infinity Lee and Dustin Edward filed a declaratory judgment interpleader claiming action, that a and/or July 10, 2006 “CANCELLATION NOTICE” sent to the insured was effective, therefore, was not force at the time collision; defendants in this action included Graham and the estates and widows of the two decedents.2 body following language:
The of the notice contained the AS OF 07/10/2006, WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED YOUR PAYMENT.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED IN ACCORDANCEWITH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE ABOVE MEN- TIONED POLICY, AND IN THE ACCORDANCE WITH LAW,THAT YOUR POLICY INSURANCE WILL CEASE AT 11:59 EM. ON THE CANCELLATION DATE MEN- ABOVE, TIONED UNLESS WE RECEIVE PAY- YOUR MENT BEFORE THE CANCELLATION DATE.
IF THE PREMIUM AMOUNT LISTED ON THIS NOTICE IS NOT BY THE RECEIVED COMPANY BEFORE THE SPECIFIED, CANCELLATION DATE YOUR INSUR- ANCE WILL CEASE AT THAT 11:59 EM. ON DATE. IF CHECK, PAYMENTIS MADE BY DRAFT, OR OTHER ORDER OF PAYMENT AND PAYMENT IS NOT HON- ORED PAYMENT, UPON FIRST PRESENTATION FOR YOUR COVERAGE WILL BE NULL AND VOID AND YOUR INSURANCE WILL CEASE AS OF THE CANCEL- DATE LATION SHOWN ABOVE. Reynolds Lloyd plaintiffs underlying seeking defendants are in two suits
damages wrongful survivorship death and actions. NOTICE, stated, “CANCELLATION
The header on July date of PREMIUM” and the cancellation NONPAYMENT OF again top in a box at the of the notice and 25, 2006 was set out small immediately Also, of the notice. small box at the bottom another body, in the the notice stated “NONPAYMENT above the large stamped in letters NOTIFICATION,” and on the notice was payment options and a PAY NOTICE.” also contained “NON stub to be returned event detachable payment was remitted. FEDERAL
PROCEEDINGS IN COURT Infinity found as fact that never received The District Court alleged premium payment, Graham’s that the was overdue July July effectively 5, 2006, and that 2006 notice July Thus, the District Court cancelled the 2006. granted summary judgment Infinity. The several defen- favor appealed insured, Graham, dants other than the to the Eleventh appellants upon Circuit, Circuit. In the Eleventh relied State Farm 64) (1996), Drury, Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. *3 Pennsylvania Person, Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. 80) (1982), argue that the instant notice was a demand payment policy July and not cancel the effective to issue as Infinity urged 25, 2006. that the from the cited cases was § 33-24-44, dicta; that under OCGA the cancellation could not be days given; ten effective for at least after the notice of cancellation is purpose provide that the obvious statute is to the insured with opportunity premium payment keep to make the in arrangements; compliance force, or to make other insurance requires giving with the statute the insured the premium ten-day period keep policy within the time appellants’ position any force; correct, and that if complies ten-day statutory period notice that with the would be rendering impossible practical ineffective, as a matter. question, alia, The Eleventh Circuit certified the above inter perceived controlling precedent in clear, it “no the decisions of the Georgia Infinity Reynolds, supra. courts.” Gen. Ins. Co. v.
DISCUSSION may question company cancel There is little that an insurance premiums. nonpayment of See an automobile insurance (c) (l).3 And, delivering § OCGA 33-24-45 it do so after may timely to the insured as mailing provided or written notice of cancellation § 33-24-44,4 OCGA the statute the cancellation of insur- governing (c) (1) provides: § OCGA 33-24-45 (c) delivery in No notice of cancellation of a issued for this state shall be by agent duly mailed or delivered an insurer or its authorized to effect such cancellation, except following for one or more of the reasons: discharge any obligations The named insured failed to when due of his premiums any connection with the on such or installment of premiums, payable directly or the renewal of whether to the insurer or indirectly 4 agent; to the .. . provides: OCGA 33-24-44 (a) Except provided chapter, as otherwise in this cancellation of a by may by agent duly its terms and conditions be canceled the insurer or its accomplished authorized the insurer to effect such cancellation shall be as prescribed in this Code section. (b) stating effective, Written notice the time when the cancellation will be mailing delivery person which shall not be less than 30 from the date of or specific longer period may of such provided notice of cancellation or such other as statute, person by depositing in the contract or shall be delivered in or dispatched by in the United States mails to be at least first-class mail to the last any lienholder, applicable, address of record of the insured and of where receiving receipt provided by the United States Postal Service or such other mailing prescribed accepted by evidence of as or the United States Postal Service. subsection, purposes For the of this notice to the lienholder shall be considered if, consent, delivered or mailed with the lienholder’s is delivered electronic Any irregularity transmittal or facsimile. in the notice to the lienholder shall not invalidate an otherwise valid cancellation to the as insured. (c) (1) Any premium paid by unearned which has been the insured shall be pro provided refunded to the insured on a rata basis as in this Code If section. accompany cancellation, return does not notice of then such return shall be made on directly or before the cancellation date either to the named insured or to the agent insured’s of record. In the event the insurer elects to return such unearned premium record, agent to the agent insured via the insured’s such shall return the person by depositing unearned to the insured either in such return in working days the mail receipt premium, within ten of the unearned or within ten working days of notification from the insurer of the amount of return of unearned premium due, or on the effective date of whichever is later. If the open agent, insured has an may account with the return such of unearned applied any outstanding any remaining balance and unearned shall person by depositing be returned to the insured either in such return in the mail working days receipt premium, within ten working of the unearned or within ten days of notification from the insurer of the amount of return of unearned *4 due, or on the effective date of whichever is later. (2) (1) Paragraph apply of this subsection shall not if an audit or rate investigation required premiums by premium is or if the are financed finance company. investigation required, If an audit or rate is then the refund of unearned premium days shall be made within 30 after the conclusion of the audit or rate investigation. premiums by premium If the company, any are financed finance premiums premium unearned company shall be tendered to finance within ten working days after cancellation. (3) Any agent failing any premium prescribed insurer or to return unearned as (1) (2) paragraphs penalty equal of this subsection shall to the insured a percent to premium of the amount of the return of the unearned and interest equal percent per proper made, to 18 annum until such time that return has been the insurance by is used When the statute generally. anee policies coverage, of insurance in order to effect a cancellation company insurer, against construed strictly of the statute is be language are Assembly by the methods General adopted inasmuch as actual notice that the insured has and intended assure mandatory (1) Guess, 559, 560 cancellation. Travelers Indem. Co. 243 Ga. Ackley, Allstate Ins. Co. 227 Ga. (1979); SE2d 85) (1997). (2) (488 statutory The were requirements responsibility doing everything the insurer designed give certain that the insured is on notice placed its to make power within Favati v. National cancelled. the insurance Owners Ins. 723, 724-725 Property made; paid provided, penalty the time the return is which however, and interest must be penalty the maximum amount of such and interest shall not exceed 50 any premium percent of the amount of the refund due. Failure to return unearned (b) invalidate a in accordance with subsection shall not of this Code section. (d) discharge when When a is canceled for failure of the named insured to any obligations premiums in connection with the for a due or of his due, directly any payable to the insurer or installment of whether indirectly agent, days than 60 to the or when a that has been in effect for less any reason, may requirements canceled for of this Code section be any by delivering mailing written notice to the named insured and satisfied or lienholder, applicable, prior at least ten to the effective date of where days’ required by cancellation in lieu of the number of section. For the considered delivered or notice otherwise this Code subsection, purposes of this notice to lienholder shall be if, consent, by mailed it is delivered with lienholder’s Any irregularity transmittal or facsimile. in the notice to the lienholder electronic invalidate an valid cancellation as to the insured. shall not otherwise (d.l) requirements apply any not case The notice of this Code section shall or void ab initio for failure of consideration. where a binder contract insurance is (e) by required to the shall be this Code section when a Notice insured power premium company is canceled an insurance finance under a attorney agreement has been contained in an insurance finance which provisions Chapter 22 filed with the insurer in accordance with the However, with the of this title. (d) provisions comply the insurer shall of subsection of Code governmental agency,mortgagee, pertaining Section 33-22-13 to notice to a or other party. person by depositing third be the notice in the Such shall delivered dispatched by at mail to the last address United States mails to be of record of such the mailing least first-class receiving governmental agency,mortgagee, party third other receipt provided the United States Postal Service or such other evidence accepted by prescribed or the United States Postal Service. as (f) accomplished the insured shall be in accordance with Code Cancellation Section 33-24-44.1. may Any paid by (g) unearned which has been the insured pro to the insured on other than a rata basis if: refunded (1) due, any pay, failure of the when The cancellation results from due, any amount, finance to the insurer or when under a agreement; (2) specifies penalty may charged contains that a premium; and on unearned computing penalty is filed with the Commissioner The method of such Chapter accordance with 9 of this title.
91 (1980). statutory requirements met, the are notice And, until the Bridges, Fire Co. v. in Mut. Ins. effect. Nationwide remains (230 491) (1976). App. 242 SE2d 140 Ga. company § is 33-24-44 an insurance noted, under OCGA
As of the insurance because an automobile entitled to terminate delivering mailing nonpayment notice or written statutory the insured in accordance with the to the of requirements. cancellation App. Alexander, 293 Ga. Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners (2008). itself does However, OCGA 33-24-44 SE2d any particular provide Chambers v. form. not that notice (1941). Washington Nat. Ins. (Fla. App. Corp. Woodcock, 394 So2d policy provision Motors Ins. v. Accord 1981). outlining regulatory In the absence of a legally sufficient, to be notice,5 order method unequivocally required positively state is what is that taking place. Mut. North Carolina Ins. that the cancellation is Life (2) (363 586) (1988). Bailey, App. 191, Co. v. unambiguous the insured that must coverage a clear and statement being Consequently, terminated. Id. an assessment of the the is depend upon sufficiency notice of cancellation should particular Chapman Leger, of that cancellation notice. (La. 1981). inquiry is how the 405 So2d 604 present The initial then up requirements for an effective document measures the clearly, unambiguously, cancellation, that it and un- is, whether equivocally puts coverage at on notice that the insurance insured ending. issue is present plainly times no less than three that notice states coverage And, certain time and date. under will cease on a — being explains why coverage is cancelled because nothing pay policy. for There is in the notice to
has failed to coverage occur; not there are no that the cessation of will indicate misleading confusing mere that the statements. The fact notice option imminent cancella- an the insured to avoid contains policyholder alter to the tion does not the clear statement timely is terminated because the principally paid. appellants Nonetheless, Circuit cite the Eleventh Pennsylvania Drury, supra, Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. compel supra, they Person, Nat. Cas. Ins. v. maintain Mut. they of what the notice of because conclusion resulting option ambiguity inclusion from the describe as merely premium, is instead a demand overdue provision in this certified regarding the notice at issue No question. premium, therefore, such ineffective serve as necessary coverage. But, to terminate Drury, neither Farm State Mut. Auto. Pennsylvania Person, Ins. Co. v. nor Nat. nor Mut. Cas. Georgia precedent requires that other the notice of cancellation be payment; quite contrary. in fact, construed as a demand for In Pennsylvania Person, Mut. Cas. Ins. v. the Court Nat. purported reality found indeed of cancellation was in payment.6 But, a demand for it did so not fact the mere regarding that payment notice contained a statement of order to avoid cancellation of installment *6 policy; Appeals of the notice the Court found the document as a ineffective given upon
of
cancellation because it was not
to the insured
premium
pay
purported
the
due,
the failure to
rather
when
but
the
given
premium
notice of
489
was
Id.
cancellation
the
was due.
at
to
before
(1).
explained,
Appeals
“[t]here
As the
of
Court
was
no reason
premium
payable.”
cancel the
Id.
until
the
due
became
(Emphasis supplied.)
premium payment option
Thus, the
premature
regarding
context of the
statement
termination of cover-
age
ambiguous,
best,
rendered
document,
the
at
and well
of
short
the
positive
required
unequivocal
present
statement of the
intent to
coverage.7
cancel insurance
North Carolina Mut.
Ins. Co. v.
Life
(2).
Bailey
Pennsylvania
at
Person,
192 As
Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. v.
Drury,
attempted
State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
the
notice of
upon
cancellation
was
to the insured
the insured’s failure
premium
pay the
“when
State
due.”
Farm Mut. Auto.
Co. v.
Ins.
(3).
Drury, at 199
Appellants
rely upon
finding
also
the
of ineffective cancellation
ambiguity
Bailey.
because of
in North Carolina
Ins.
Mut.
Co. v.
Life
very
However, the situation in that case was
different from the
present
attempted
one; it
the
involved
cancellation of a life insurance
policy found to be ineffective because the
of
cancellation was
6
argued
7,
The insurer
that the insurance
had been cancelled effective November
1980;
was mailed
October
and was
1980
entitled “Installment Statement of
Due”;
Premium
it stated on its face:
PAY THE
DUE
AMOUNT
BEFORE THE INSTALLMENT DUE DATE SHOWN
OR THIS STATEMENT
A NOTICE
BECOMES
OF CANCELLATION EFFEC-
TIVE
07 80
A.M.
12:01
STANDARD TIME. PROVIDING ALL PRIOR OUT-
STANDING BILLINGS
BY
HAVE BEEN PAID
THEIR DUE DATES. NO FUR-
GIVENf;]
THER NOTICE
BE
WILL
(1).
and the installment due
was
date
November
1980. Id. at 488
(Ariz.
Co.,
In
App. 200Í),
Norman
Farm
v. State
Mut. Auto. Ins.
In
nonpayment
i.e.,
the reason
because
premium,
*7
however,
case,
In the
had not occurred.
instant
accompli
a fait
the declared reason
cancellation was
prior
of
of
fact that the notice
to
notice
cancellation. The
open
possibility
reinstatement of
cancellation left
of
policy did
notice.
not invalidate that cancellation
jurisdictions
to find notices of
have likewise refused
Other
simply
premium past
is
due ineffective
cancellation, sent after
keep
provides
opportunity to
the insured the
by
paying
in
the overdue
before the stated
force
e.g., Metropolitan Group Property and Cas.
See,
date.
(R.I. 2003) (notice
Lopes,
A2d
v.
cancellation for
Ins. Co.
nonpayment
and un-
was clear
automobile insurance
equivocal
stating
date,
in
a certain
the insurer would no
longer
by policy despite
in
to amount due
order
be bound
reference
(La. App.
policy);
828 So2d
Williams,
to
2002)
Johnson v.
reinstate
(notice
unambiguous
language
unequivocal and
clear,
premium);
though
opportunity
pay
provided
then
insured
to
even
(Ariz. Co.,
Question Hunstein, answered. the Justices Carley, J, J., Benham, J., C. P. who dissent. concurring.
NAHMIAS, Justice, Underlying specific presented, This is a close case. issue objective mandatory however, is the clear of the State’s automobile liability system, insurance which is to that all ensure vehicles are protection public at all times for as as well their passengers. § 33-34-4; drivers Cas. See OCGA Flewellen Atlanta 673) (1983) (“The clear legislative Georgia [the Reparations intent of Motor VehicleAccident require Act] carry tois all motor vehicle owners no-fault insur- ...”). aspect system requirement ance. mobile insurers One of this is the that auto-
notify writing insureds in of the cancellation of their policies nonpayment premiums § days prior due to least ten “at (d). objec- effective date of cancellation.” OCGA 33-24-44 The clear provision give grace period tive of this is to insureds a of at least ten preventing gaps coverage. insurance, to obtain new § specify any particular wording OCGA 33-24-44 does not Compare format that must be used a notice of cancellation. (e) (5), (reciting specific OCGA 33-24-45 nonrenewal). appear requires simply must in certain notices of the notice state “the time when cancellation will be *8 (b). Everyone agrees effective.” OCGA 33-24-44 that notice the unambiguous, unequivocal, agree clear, must be and and I with the majority that at issue in case this meets that test. See Majority Op. at 87-88, 91-92. major point disagreement majority
The between the and dissenting opinions is a also whether cancellation notice must be dissenting opinion says The in order to be effective. “unconditional” argues it yes when is ineffective that a notice and payment policy is made overdue of the the offers continuation if like cases, the The date. Court the stated cancellation question. conflicting provide this answers on states, cases from other cases), Dissenting (discussing Compare Majority Op. with at 91-92 cases). Op. (discussing at 97 suggesting only a of cancellation that notice This Court’s case unambiguous, clear, unconditional, addition must be unequivocal, predates mandatory auto- automobile, much less the liability here. See statute at issue insurance and notice mobile Petersburg Fire & v. Manhattan Sav. Ins. Co. (1881). weight Petersburg the dissent- cannot bear Moreover,
465 ing opinion places jury case, at in that
on The instructions issue it. opinion, did state that cancella- and hence the Court’s “ unconditionally,” ‘a rather than made or tion “must be ” expression cancelled.’ of a . . . that the should be mere desire case, of the convoluted facts Id. examination of somewhat Close controlling question not whether the however, reveals that the was (of policy) conditional, but rather a fire re-insurance unambiguously clearly communicated whether it was authority Company Fire Insurance someone with Manhattan agent Savings Company’s Petersburg act as the Insurance matter. requiring truly
A to be “unconditional” rule cancellation notices light objective mandatory would make little sense liability system. truly unconditional, a To be automobile cancellation notice insurance unequivocally that have to state
would specified matter cancelled, what, insurance will be no leaving later, as ten the insured to date, which could as soon recognizes, quickly. majority quite As the see obtain a new statutory overarching Majority Op. there be no at that allowing gaps coverage clearly promoted by instead in insurance existing to continue insurer to offer clearly simply making payment due before the stated delivering Writing a check cancellation date. or other being approved certainly finding, applying for, easier and than surer particularly having place policy, for, and a new insurance easily guarantee find a there is no insured will able may insurer Indeed, because the new or one the same cost. may, keeping as in this business, interest in the insured’s have an ten-day statutory grace period longer provide case, than minimum. dissenting opinion, recognize appellants, seem to and the — precluding requiring truly is, unconditional a rule *9 offering in a cancellation notice the of contin- insurers from — coverage paid gaps if
ued in the overdue is will lead more Dissenting Op. coverage. 97-98; See at Motion for Reconsideration may coverage Thus, at 25-28. the dissent asserts that continuation of “leav[ing] open be offered in the notice of cancellation possibility payment policy of the if the is of reinstatement” overdue Dissenting meaningful legal Op. distinction, 98.1 received. see no laypeople practical any one, and I do believe see most would advising policy that between a notice a will be cancelled on a certain (i.e., type payment date overdue unless the is received of notice case) advising and a this a notice that will be cancelled on payment a certain date but will is be reinstated the overdue if (i.e., type approve). received of notice the dissent would Either way tainty practical appellants raise, concerns that the such as uncer-
about whether a mailed has been received and present. many credited, be However, issues, more, would these and present existing actually required would be if we that an must be policy if effective, cancelled a cancellation notice so is to that a new
had to obtained. upon specific These cases are decided based of legal content notice at issue. Prudent insurers wish to that avoid risk and might type language best serve their customers choose the of notice appellants in their endorse motion reconsideration. I see no legal controlling language distinction, however, between that and the good prevent notice in is this case. There no reason clearly unambiguously notifying an from insurer and an insured premiums, that, due to overdue his or her be will cancelled on specific offering a later, date at least ten while to continue or policy proper payment reinstate if is received before that date. ultimately agree As I said at the this outset, case, is a close but I majority with that a notice of cancellation of automobile unambiguous, unequivocal, clear, insurance must be but unconditional, need not be and that the notice in this case satisfies properly negative give that standard. We therefore answer to the question. certified Presiding dissenting. Justice, CARLEY,
By failing give longstanding precedent full effect to of this relying inapplicable foreign majority authority, state and erroneously on purported
holds that cancellation sent Infinity Every Georgia appellate was effective. time that a court has give issue, which, considered the it has declined to effect to a here, like the one states that an insurance cancelled will be on particular paid prior date are unless due that date. equivocal, Because the notice this case was conditional and of cancellation. a valid notice acknowledges, not constitute could citing majority Mut. Carolina North As the Life 586) (2) (363 (1987), Bailey, 191, 193 Co. v. “positively must an insurer sent of cancellation a notice [Cit.] taking place. unequivocally that the cancellation state unambiguous to the insured statement be a clear must opinion, p. (Majority [Cit.]” terminated. majority as whether articulates the issue Indeed, unequivocally puts unambiguously, “clearly, the insured (Majority ending.” coverage at issue is the insurance notice that majority disregards that, p. fact opinion, However, the required years, of cancellation that the notice has this Court over *10 purpose of determination of the “the notice also be unconditional: unconditionally . . . .” [insurer] made or cancel must be the Savings Petersburg Co., Fire Ins. 66 Ga. v. Manhattan and Ins. Co. (8) (1881). § Ins. 32:32. Russ, 2 Lee R. Couch on See also 446, 465 “ merely ‘ifit. . . states insufficient Furthermore, the notice is Washington [Cit.]” Nat. Chambers v. intention to cancel.’ desire or 899) (1941). (17 Petersburg App. See also 509 SE2d Co., Ins. 66 Ga. (“ ‘[A] supra Savings mere Co., Fire Ins. Co. v. Manhattan and Ins. [insurer] upon part expression that the the of the of a desire ”). destroy policy.’ The the cancella- would not should be cancelled “ unequivocally positively ‘the insured inform must tion notice that it is the intention [insurer] shall cease of the that the stipulated upon expiration binding of the number of as such made known to the time when its intention is from ” Washington supra. also Co., Nat. Ins. See insured.’ Chambers v. (2) (97 Peavy, App. SE2d Ins. Co. v. Ga. Reserve Life (1957). expression purpose or intention to cancel A “mere of a [the notice] is, must be one of actual sufficient; that future is Russ, .” 2 future conditional cancellation... cancellation, not of supra at 32:31. holding principles of are consistent with
These well-settled “[a] Georgia notice of cancellation which Court specified on a date unless will be cancelled states that paid prior premiums date, is not a notice due are Pennsylva- merely payment. [Cits.]” cancellation, but a demand (1) (297 App. Person, 488, 489 Ins. Co. v. 164 Ga. nia Nat. Mut. Cas. 80) (1982). Drury, Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. See also State SE2d (474 64) (1996). Compare App. Daniels v. SE2d (1982) (short App. Co., Ins. 162 Ga. Allstate addressing opinion quoting notice nor neither from the cancellation issue). obviously principle where, as in Person and controls This this premium by Drury, nonpayment date, due which is the triggers very occurred. has not even event which Conversely, principle apply does not when “the declared reason accompli prior for cancellation was a fait to the notice of cancella- open possibility tion” and “the notice of cancellation left policy.” (Emphasis supplied.) reinstatement of the Southern Ins. Co. 502) (1987). Walker, In the bar, case at the declared reason for cancellation was nonpayment accompli.” awas “fait However, the merely here, in Walker, unlike that did far more than leave open possibility contrary Thus, reinstatement. I that, note paragraph majority opinion, disapproval Infinity’s the last of the preclude cancellation notice would not the inclusion of a reinstate- majority opinion, ment in future notices. As set forth in the provided only the notice in this case that the insurance would cease “unless” is received before the date, “if” By amount listed is not received. this conditional language, the notice treated cancellation as a future occurrence explicitly nonpayment premium. which was conditioned on Thus, the notice states a mere intention to cancel and fails to meet requirement positively, unequivocally, unconditionally stating terminated. foreign upon majority
Two of the four
cases
which the
relies on
page
opinion
merely
open
93 of its
involve notices which
leave
possibility
clearly distinguishable
of reinstatement and, thus, are
Metropolitan Group Prop.
the same manner as Walker.
and Cas. Ins.
(R.I.
Lopes,
2003);
Co. v.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein Justice join Benham in this dissent. Decided March April 9,
Reconsideration denied 2010. appellant.
Ben III, C. Brodhead for Stephen Currie, Hiers, Cotter, & Swift, McGhee L. Yoon J. Ettinger, appellee.
S10A0339. McBRIDE v. MURRAY. Justice. Melton, Following complaint the dismissal of her second amended *12 damages resulting alleged improper from termination, Vera appeals, arguing following McBride her termination as a Georgia Department Juvenile Correctional Officer at the of Juvenile (DJJ), proper name-clearing hearing Justice she never received a