138 Tenn. 287 | Tenn. | 1917
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Knoxville Lithographing Company having sued the Reynolds Corporation in two actions before a justice of the peace of Sullivan county, the latter company, before trial had at law, filed the present bill in the chancery court of Sullivan county, for the'purpose of enjoining the further progress of the suits mentioned. The chancellor granted the injunction, but, in his fiat, omitted to require the complainant to confess judgment. After the injunction was served, the defendant appeared in the chancery court and made a motion in the following language:
“Comes the defendant and moves the court to dissolve the injunction heretofore granted and issued in this cause until, and unless, the complainant shall confess judgment in the suits at law sought to be enjoined herein.”
The chancellor granted this motion and ordered that, unless the- complainant should, on or before the 4th day of September, 1916, confess judgment in the two suits for the several demands sued on, together with costs, the injunction should stand dissolved; but that, in case the complainant should confess judgment on the two demands, then the injunction should operate to stay execution on such confessed judgments until the further order of the court. .The order then recited that the Reynolds Corporation appeared by its solicitor and confessed judgment on each, of the demands,
After having secured this order, counsel for defendant then filed its demurrer to the bill.
The bill charged that one of the suits was based on an account for $262-08, for certain lithographing work which the defendant undertook to furnish to complainant, and the other was an account for $119.21 arising out of an order for “35,000 sheets, No. 16 speedway, and labor and profits on a canceled order for 500,000 coupons.” The bill denied any indebtedness for the two .sums, charging, with respect to the first, that the work did not come up to the sample furnished when the contract was awarded, and, likewise, that the defendant had acted in such an arbitrary and unbusiness-like manner that the complainant could not afford to do business with it as to this matter. As to the second item the bill did not state the objection to it further than a general allegation that the complainant did not owe this account, adding that reasons would be made to appear at the trial.
It is further alleged that the two amounts represented two items on the same account, and that the complainant was therefore being annoyed with a multiplicity of suits about the same matter. It was also alleged, with respect to the first matter, that its proper solution depended upon expert testimony as to the
There were several grounds of demurrer stated, but they all went to the point that the court of law had first acquired jurisdiction, and no sufficient reason was shown in the bill to justify a defeat of that jurisdiction by a suit in equity.
The learned chancellor, and the learned court of civil appeals, when the case reached the latter court, overruled the demurrer, on the ground that the defendant, by its motion to dissolve the injunction, which we have just copied, had elected to submit to the jurisdiction of the chancery court, and was estopped to rely upon the demurrer. Accordingly the demurrer was overruled, an a special appeal was granted by the chancellor under the statute applicable to that'subject, and the case was determined by the court of civil appeals in the manner just indicated. It is now before us on writ of certiorari.
We think that both courts were in error.
It is the duty of a judge or chancellor, granting an injunction to restrain the prosecution of an action at law, to exact of the complainant a confession of judgment in the law case as a condition of granting an interlocutory order for an injunction, retaining, however, control of the judgment so confessed, in order that no injustice may be done to either party on the final decision of the injunction suit. The purpose of this rule is to prevent the complainant’s dismissing
It is urged in support of the ruling- of the chancellor, and of the court of civil appeals, that the defendant, on making such a motion, must he considered as having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and that having done so it could not thereafter demur for want of jurisdiction; that otherwise the defendant would he permitted to occupy antagonistic positions. This argument arises- out of a failure, as we think, to rightly discriminate between jurisdiction of the person and jurisdiction of the subject-matter. It is indeed true that by coming into court and making such a motion the defendant submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the court over it, but this was not tantamount to submitting to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter of the controversy. The defendant, by process served on it, was called to come into the chancery court and defend its rights. As a preliminary thereto,' it sought to have' the chancellor safeguard those rights in the manner in which the law required of him. Then, as the next- step in its defense, a demurrer was interposed, raising the point that the law court first obtained jurisdiction, and was entitled to retain the cases. This was a matter of defense. The defendant had acquired, by the institution of the suits at law, a valuable right, the right to. have the legal forum, which it had chosen, to proceed and determine
The case just referred to has no bearing upon the present controversy. The demurrer does not question the merits on which the complainant bases its defense, but only the right of the complainant to come into a court of chancery. The right to come into chancery is denied on two grounds, firstly, that the court of law had acquired the prior jurisdiction, and that no reason was stated in the bill which would justify a displacement of that jurisdiction; secondly, because it would be necessary, on the trial of the first-mentioned case, to introduce expert evidence as to the kind of paper that should have been used in the execution of the work. Defendant denies that the ground of multiplicity of actions claimed in the bill would operate as a distinguishing feature, since it insists the two actions
It is manifest that, as complainant alleges it does not owe these demands, and it has had no hearing upon its issue tendered to that effect, it would be most unjust to hold it bound by the confession of judgment exacted by the chancellor; nor can this be done. The chancellor rightly reserved control over these judgments. Now, since the bill must be dismissed, not on the merits, but on a technical question that does not go to the merits, these judgments confessed under the circumstances shown must be set aside, and the injunction against their enforcement must be made perpetual, and both parties must be remitted to their original rights at law.
It should be noted that the court’s power to make disposition of these confessed judgments does not depend on the issues made in a bill, though the filing of the bill is the occasion of the exercise of that power. The power exists independent of any particular bill, and arises out of the duty of the court to protect the rights of litigants against dangers that may come' from its own action. This protection, when the court grants its order, for an injunction, is extended to the defend
It results that the decree of the court of civil appeals and of the chancellor must be reversed, and a decree entered here in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
The defendant will pay all of the costs of the cause, both of this court and of the chancery court.